Seizure of evidence during prolonged traffic stop was constitutional, split COA affirms

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An officer’s prolonged traffic stop and a search of a man’s vehicle that detected illegal drugs was justified by reasonable suspicion and did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a split Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed Monday.

According to court records, Theodore Canonge Jr. faces four drug-related charges stemming from the discovery of contraband in a vehicle he was driving.

Canonge moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of the vehicle.

At a hearing in Hendricks Superior Court on Canonge’s motion, the state presented evidence about a traffic stop conducted on April 22, 2021.

The evidence included testimony from the officer who conducted the traffic stop, Officer Kevin Roach of the Avon Police Department, and the officer who later brought his K-9 partner to the traffic stop, Officer Steven Kaspryzk of the Avon Police Department.

The evidence also included footage from a camera installed in Roach’s police vehicle.

Roach testified that he saw the driver of a Chevy Malibu commit multiple traffic violations, including changing lanes without proper signaling.

He decided to conduct a traffic stop.

When Roach activated the lights of his patrol vehicle, he noticed “three (3) occupants moving about in the car, reaching in various locations and then continuously looking back at [his] patrol vehicle.”

Before Roach reached the front window to speak with the occupants, he noticed that the driver — Canonge — was already “reaching over” to hand documents to Roach.

Roach returned to his vehicle and began “running identification, vehicle information, things of that nature.”

His investigatory steps included a criminal-history check through Indiana’s MyCase system, which revealed “a couple of drug charges” between Canonge and the other adult occupant.

While Roach was using the computer and “conducting [his] typical procedure with a traffic stop,” he contacted officers with K-9 partners to inquire about availability for a dog sniff.

Kaspryzk arrived about 13 minutes later, which was about 21 minutes into the traffic stop.

When Kaspryzk arrived, Roach exited his patrol vehicle and directed Canonge and the others to step out of the Chevy Malibu.

Kaspryzk then walked around the vehicle with a K-9 unit certified in detecting the odors of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, ecstasy and marijuana.

The dog gave a positive alert at the rear driver’s side door. At that point, Roach searched the vehicle, locating items that he suspected consisted of cocaine, meth and marijuana.

In lieu of oral arguments, Canonge and the state submitted briefs concerning the motion to suppress.

The trial court denied the motion. On Sept. 6, 2022 — more than 30 days later — Canonge moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to certify. The Court of Appeals later accepted jurisdiction.

Canonge argued the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress evidence because the traffic stop resulted in an unreasonable seizure, contrary to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Canonge’s motion to suppress the evidence.

Judge Peter Foley wrote the opinion for the appellate court.

Foley wrote that Roach testified that he saw movements in the vehicle that began when he activated his police lights and continued when the vehicle stopped.

Video evidence corroborated the observations of movement, showing Canonge turned backward, at one point bent down and no longer visible through the rear windshield.

Foley wrote that Roach observed specific behavior that, taken together, gave him a particularized and objective basis to suspect that criminal activity was afoot.

According to Foley, next, before Roach approached to engage the occupants about the reason for the traffic stop, he saw that Canonge already had his arm extended to hand over documents.

This conduct struck Roach as unusual because, after conducting 500 or so traffic stops, no one else had seemingly tried to expedite a traffic stop in this manner, Foley wrote.

“Viewing those collective observations in light of Officer Roach’s professional experience—as we must—it was reasonable for Officer Roach to seize the occupants of the vehicle for a short time longer to conduct the minimally intrusive investigatory dog sniff. Thus, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—provided reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff,” Foley wrote.

Foley wrote that because any prolongment of the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the otherwise-lawful seizure was “reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).

Chief Judge Robert Altice concurred.

Judge Melissa May dissented with a separate opinion.

In her dissent, May wrote that she held that Roach unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop so that a dog sniff could occur, and disagreed with the majority’s decision to simply assume the stop was prolonged without addressing the issue.

“In addition, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that sufficient reasonable suspicion arose during the traffic stop to justify holding Canonge until a dog sniff could be performed. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of Canonge’s motion to suppress,” May wrote.

May wrote that Roach held Canonge for approximately 20 minutes before a K-9 officer arrived, a longer period than the approximately 10 to 15 minutes Roach testified a traffic stop typically takes.

“In addition, while Officer Roach ultimately did not issue any ticket to Canonge, Officer Roach testified that he only began writing a warning ticket ‘to fill time until [Officer Kaspryzk] got there,’” May wrote.

May added that, where an officer explicitly admits the writing of a ticket was pretextual, the judge would explicitly hold that officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to address the reason for the stop.

The case is Theodore J. Canonge, Jr. v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-2451.