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A birth father’s untimely registration with the state’s Putative Father registry barred him from receiving notice of his biological child’s adoption, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled in reversing a lower court’s order.
K.Q.A. gave birth to L.A. on Aug. 15, 2022.
Two days later, K.Q.A. executed a consent to the adoption of L.A.
Pursuant to the terms of this consent, K.Q.A. surrendered care and control of L.A. to KidsFirst Adoption Services LLC and granted KidsFirst the authority to place L.A. for adoption.
Also, K.Q.A. executed an affidavit of birth father identity, wherein she stated that she was unwilling to name L.A.’s biological father.
That same day, the adoptive parents took custody of L.A. and one week later filed a petition to adopt the child.
On Sept. 29, 2022, the adoptive parents filed a motion for determination, wherein they stated that the putative father had registered with the Putative Father Registry.
The Marion Superior Court found that the putative father had timely registered with the registry and denied the adoptive parents’ motion for determination.
The trial court’s order stated that a putative father who registers within 30 days after the child’s birth or the date the adoption petition is filed, whichever occurs later, is entitled to notice of the adoption.
In this case, the adoption petition was filed on Aug. 26 and the putative father was registered on Sept. 23.
The trial court denied the adoptive parents’ motion to correct error.
In July 2023, the trial court issued an order establishing the putative father’s paternity of L.A. In addition, the trial court made “an express determination that there [was] no just reason for delay and expressly direct[ed] entry of a final appealable judgment of the judgment of paternity.”
The adoptive parents appealed, arguing that the putative father was barred from establishing paternity because his consent to L.A.’s adoption had been irrevocably implied when he failed to timely register with the registry.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the adoptive parents and reversed the trial court’s order.
Judge Rudolph Pyle wrote the opinion for the appellate court.
Pyle pointed out that K.Q.A. did not disclose the name or address of the putative father. In order to be entitled to notice of the adoption, the father was required to comply with Indiana Code § 31-19-5-12.
The outcome in this case turns on the interpretation of I. C. § 31-195-12(a) because if the trial court properly interpreted the statute, the putative father’s registration with the registry was timely, Pyle wrote.
However, if the adoptive parents are correct that the trial court misinterpreted the statute, the father’s registration with the registry was not timely.
Pyle wrote that the statute does provide that a putative father must register with the registry by the later of two dates.
“Indiana Code § 31-19-5-12(a)(1) ‘does say’ that one of those dates is not later than thirty days after the child’s birth. However, Indiana Code § 3119-5-12(a)(2) ‘does not say’ that the other of those dates is not later than thirty days after the date of the filing of the adoption petition. Instead, it simply reads the date of the filing of the petition for the child’s adoption,” Pyle wrote.
The appellate court concluded that to comply with state law and to be entitled to notice of an adoption, a putative father must register with the registry not later than 30 days after the child is born or not later than the date of the filing of the adoption petition, whichever date occurs later.
Pyle added that the putative father’s registration was untimely because it was nine days past the statutory deadline.
“Pursuant to Indiana Code § 31-19-5-18, Putative Father’s consent to the adoption was, therefore, irrevocably implied, and Putative Father was barred from challenging the adoption or establishing paternity,” Pyle wrote.
Judges Elizabeth Tavitas and Peter Foley concurred.
The case is In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Girl; C.M. and K.M., In the Matter of the Paternity of L.A. (Minor Child); Y.N. v. K.Q.A. and C.M. and K.M., 23A-AD-1590.
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