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A conviction of a Class D felony that is later reduced to a Class A misdemeanor doesn’t prevent a trial court from
modifying a sentence below the statutory minimum, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled today in a matter of first impression. The
prohibition of a sentence modification below the minimum is premised on a defendant who “has” a prior unrelated
felony conviction.
In Julie Gardiner v. State of Indiana, No. 08S02-0906-CR-277, Julie Gardiner appealed
the trial court’s denial to modify her sentence for dealing in methamphetamine as a Class A felony in Carroll County.
The trial court refused to sentence her below the statutory minimum of 20 years because of a prior unrelated felony. She had
pleaded guilty in Hamilton County to possession with intent to manufacture, a Class D felony. That was later reduced to a
Class A misdemeanor based on her successful completion of her probation terms. This was after she was sentenced in Carroll
County.
Once her prior felony was reduced, the Carroll Circuit Court declined to reduce her sentence because at the time of her sentencing,
the judgment in Hamilton County was still entered as a felony. The Carroll Circuit judge believed he was bound by the restrictions
and limitations applicable at the time of the original sentence.
The Indiana Court of Appeals was divided in affirming the trial court.
The statute in question says “the court may suspend only that part of the sentence that is in excess of the minimum
sentence” where “the crime committed was a Class A or Class B felony and the person has a prior unrelated felony
conviction.”
The statute speaks in the present tense, but at the time she asked to have her sentence modified in Carroll County, Gardiner
no longer had a prior unrelated felony conviction.
“The trial court declined to suspend Gardiner’s sentence below the statutory minimum of twenty years. On this
narrow point we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion,” wrote Justice Robert Rucker. “To the extent
however the trial court’s decision was influenced by its assumption that it had no discretion to sentence otherwise,
the trial court erred. We therefore remand this cause to the trial court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.”
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