Supreme Court upholds standalone voluntary manslaughter charge, conviction

In an unusual case involving a voluntary manslaughter charge being brought without a related murder charge, the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that voluntary manslaughter can be brought as a standalone charge, and a Marion County man’s conviction on that charge was proper.

In Billy Brantley v.  State of Indiana, 18S-CR-98, Billy Brantley lived with his sister and her husband, Bruce Gunn in Indianapolis. Gunn suffered from physical and mental health issues, leading to frequent and often violent arguments in the home.

On the morning of July 14, 2014, Brantley drove to a job interview in a high-crime area, taking a gun along for protection. When he returned home later that morning, the couple was once again fighting, with Gunn screaming and acting belligerent.  

Gunn then told Brantley he was “getting ready to get rid of all (his) problems right now” and lunged from his chair, clenching something shiny in his fist. Fearing the object was a knife — Gunn was known for keeping sharp objects — and fearing for his life, Brantley drew his gun and fired.

The shot killed Gunn, who was later discovered to have been clutching his glasses. The state charged Brantley with voluntary manslaughter, but both he and his sister testified that he was acting in self-defense. The jury was instructed on voluntary manslaughter and on the definition of sudden heat, with the instructions noting the state had conceded sudden heat in choosing to charge Brantley with voluntary manslaughter instead of murder.  

A jury convicted Brantley, but a majority of the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed nearly one year ago. Judge Edward Najam wrote for the majority the state was barred from retrial because it failed to present sufficient evidence that Brantley acted with sudden heat.

But in a Friday opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and unanimously affirmed Brantley’s conviction.

Justice Mark Massa initially noted that voluntary manslaughter is defined separately from murder in Indiana code, so it may be brought as a standalone charge. But in a footnote, Massa agreed with the Court of Appeals that the legality of bringing the standalone charge “does not mean the State selected a wise course.”

“Murder and voluntary manslaughter both require a knowing killing; whether culpability is mitigated by sudden heat is best left to a factfinder to determine, and avoids the thicket we must cut through today,” he wrote.

The court then determined sudden heat is a mitigating factor to a freestanding charge of voluntary manslaughter, but found that under Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. 2008), there must be actual evidence of its existence, not just a concession. Here, that evidence existed in the form of Brantley’s testimony regarding the chaos at the time of the shooting, Gunn’s history of mental illness and his penchant for keeping sharp objects in his chair.

Finally, the court found the instruction on sudden heat did not nullify Brantley’s claim of self-defense, as he argued on appeal.

“As with most cases, the jury here was faced with two stories: one where Brantley acted irrationally out of sudden heat, the other where Brantley acted rationally in self-defense,” Massa wrote. “These explanations for Brantley’s actions are not conflicting since the nature of each defense is different, and it was within the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility in arriving at its verdict.”