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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowAn Allen County sex offender’s constitutional rights were not violated when the period of time he was required to register as a sex offender was extended under a law amended after he was convicted of the sex crime, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled Wednesday.
In Dickie D. Bridges v. State of Indiana, 18A-CR-373, Dickie Bridges was convicted in 2002 of two counts of Class C felony child molesting and was required to register as a sex offender for 10 years beginning in May 2006. But in July 2008, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19 to toll the registration requirement for sex offenders who commit additional offenses that result in incarceration.
For Bridges, that meant his 10-year registration requirement was tolled when he was convicted of operating while intoxicated and two counts of failure to register as a sex offender in 2010, 2011 and 2013. Each of those convictions resulted in time served, include an aggregate of six years for the failure to register counts.
Bridges was eventually released in January 2017 and was instructed to register as a sex offender until January 2020, an extension caused by the amended tolling statute. However, Bridges failed to register from June 29 to July 17, 2017, so he was charged with Level 5 felony failure to register as a sex offender.
Bridges moved to dismiss the Level 5 felony charge and challenged the tolling of his registration requirement. The Allen Superior Court denied his motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on interlocutory appeal on Wednesday.
On appeal, Bridges claimed the application of the 2008 amendments violated ex post fact law prohibitions in the Indiana Constitution. But Judge John Baker, writing for a unanimous appellate panel, noted Bridges’ subsequent offenses occurred in 2010, 2011 and 2013, so the 2008 amendments were not retroactively applied to him.
“Indeed, this statute does not necessarily apply to all people who have already committed sex offenses – rather, the statute’s plain language makes clear that it applies only to people who, after having committed a sex offense, subsequently commit an additional offense that leads to a new sentence of incarceration,” Baker wrote. “Bridges’ registration was tolled not because of his 2002 child molestation conviction, but because, after his release in 2006 and after the 2008 amendments became effective, he committed and was convicted of and sentenced for new offenses.”
“And because Bridges committed his subsequent offenses years after the 2008 amendments became effective,” Baker continued, “he had fair notice and warning that he would be subjected to the tolling provision for his registration if he became incarcerated after 2008.”
Bridges also argued the extension of his registration to 2020 does not account for the almost four years he did register while incarcerated, an argument Baker said was well-taken.
“However, that is a policy argument to take to the General Assembly, not an argument for this Court, which ‘may not interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous on its face,’” he wrote.
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