Ex-officers’ wiretap lawsuit against Pittsboro police advances

A lawsuit by former officers against Pittsboro police claiming the department secretly recorded their conversations in violation of federal wiretapping laws will proceed, a federal judge has ruled.

In late 2016, Pittsboro Police Chief Christi Patterson and Major Scott King installed surveillance cameras in the front of the Pittsboro Police building, in the main lobby and inside King’s office. Though the force was told the cameras could only capture video, Patterson and King began secretly recording and listening to audio conversations captured by the cameras.

That included conversations had by former officer Matthew Stumm with then-fellow officers Jason Stumm and Brian Helmer, in which Matthew Stumm made negative comments about Patterson and King. At the same time, Matthew Stumm began obtaining official documents to prove his suspicion that Patterson and King were being paid for hours they did not work. In response, Patterson filed a report accusing Stumm of defaming a fellow officer and asked Plainfield Police Captain Carri Weber to investigate the alleged misconduct.

After finding they had been audibly recorded, all three officers filed a complaint against Pittsboro, Patterson, King and Weber, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment Rights and of the Federal Wiretap Act.

Indiana Southern District Chief Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson previously denied Weber’s argument that Matthew Stumm failed to allege Weber knew or had reason to know the recordings were made in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act. Magnus-Stinson ultimately ruled Weber did not hold Stumm’s complaint to the appropriate standard of plausibility.

Then in a Friday ruling in Jason Stumm, et al. v. Town of Pittsboro, et al., 1:17-cv-04296, Magnus-Stinson concluded that Pittsboro, Patterson, King and Weber were not entitled to summary judgment on the expectation of privacy element of the officers’ claims.  

Defendants argued, among other things, that the conversations were held at the police department, which is open to the public, and therefore not protected against being overheard.

“It is true that ‘the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.’ And it is likewise true that some courts have found common areas of police departments to be areas in which officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy,” Magnus-Stinson wrote.

“However, these cases are inapposite to this case because Matt Stumm testified that he was not in the PPD lobby when he was recorded, but rather in his office just off of the lobby with the door open, or in the squad room.”

The chief judge also concluded that if Matthew or Jason Stumm were explicitly told that their conversations were not being recorded, they would have ‘an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception’ and would therefore qualify as an oral communication under the Federal Wiretap Act.

Magnus-Stinson further denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as to the issue of Patterson and King’s intent in in regard to the PPD lobby recording, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the recordings were the product of Patterson and King’s conscious objective and were, therefore, made with requisite intent. Further, Pittsboro also must face the officer plaintiffs’ Monell claim after the chief judge denied a defense motion for summary judgment on the complaint that the department had a policy of recording its officers.

However, the district granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis of Helmer’s claims, finding his presented evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his conversations were intercepted. It similarly granted judgment to the defendants as to the three officers’ claims against Weber, finding they presented “mere speculations” and no evidence other than their own conjecture that Weber knew or should have known that the recordings were illegally obtained.

The district court ultimately granted in part and denied in part summary judgment to the defendants, requesting the magistrate judge confer with the parties regarding a possible resolution of the remaining matters, short of trial.