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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowA man challenging the propriety of his traffic stop for speeding under both the United States and Indiana Constitutions failed to convince Indiana Supreme Court justices Wednesday that the officer who conducted the stop should have documented the speed. Justices ruled that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him.
In Oct. 2016, Zachariah Marshall was pulled over by a Porter County reserve officer based upon his belief that Marshall was speeding, but the stop quickly became an investigation into operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Marshall filed a motion to suppress evidence at trial, alleging the traffic stop was unlawful because the officer’s belief that he was speeding was, alone, insufficient to prove how fast Marshall was driving prior to the stop.
A trial court denied Marshall’s motion to suppress, finding the traffic stop did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or the Indiana Constitution. However, the Indiana Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding in an issue of first impression that an officer’s testimony of witnessing speeding without further evidence was insufficient to support a traffic stop.
Indiana Supreme Court justices reversed the COA’s ruling in a Wednesday decision, finding there was a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, regardless of whether the officer physically documented the excessive speed. The high court found that the reasonable-suspicion standard did not change for speeding traffic stops, ultimately rejecting Marshall’s black-and-white suggestion that a Fourth Amendment reasonable-suspicion analysis could not be performed without a specific number identifying his speed.
The high court similarly rejected Marshall’s request for a bright-line rule, noting that what amounts to reasonable suspicion in one case may not be enough in a different case.
“What’s more, reasonable suspicion is not an exacting standard, and it has not and cannot be reduced to a generic checklist,” Goff wrote for the high court’s opinion in Zachariah J. Marshall v. State of Indiana, 18S-CR-464.
Further, the high court found the traffic stop was reasonable in view of the totality of the circumstances under Article 1, Section 11. It first noted that the reserve officer acted with a great degree of suspicion and ultimate knowledge that Marshall was speeding when he conducted the traffic stop. It then added that Dolan was performing routine procedures in asking Marshall to stop per the circumstances, and that law enforcement at least have a legitimate, if not compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety laws, including speeding limits.
The high court thus concluded that the traffic stop could stand under both the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions, and affirmed the trial court’s decision denying Marshall’s motion to suppress evidence.
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