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The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s dismissal of Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violations after the plaintiff failed to state an FCRA claim and lacked standing to bring an FDCPA claim, Seventh Circuit Judge Thomas Kirsch wrote.
The lawsuit was brought against Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC and the Bank of New York Mellon.
Demona Freeman, the plaintiff in the case, alleged Ocwen violated the FCRA after the company reported to various consumer reporting agencies that Freeman’s house loan was delinquent.
Freeman also argued Ocwen failed to conduct a reasonable investigation after she notified CRAs that she disputed Ocwen’s reporting of her loan.
However, the circuit court upheld the district court’s dismissal of Freeman’s FCRA claim because Freeman did not specify which CRAs she notified of her dispute.
By not identifying the specific CRAs she notified, Freeman did not give Ocwen “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Kirsch wrote, citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
Ocwen can’t respond to a claim if it doesn’t know which CRAs it needed to respond to, Kirsch wrote.
In turning to Freeman’s FDCPA claim, the circuit court upheld the district court’s decision that Freeman lacked standing in bringing the claim.
To bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must have Article III standing, which requires showing they suffered a concrete injury caused by the defendant, and that it can be redressed by judicial relief.
Freeman claimed she suffered concrete intangible injuries in the form of defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion and abuse of process.
However, the district court stated, and the circuit court upheld, that these harms don’t count as concrete injuries.
Freeman also claimed monetary harm, saying she incurred legal fees to defend against a second foreclosure on her home. However, the court stated that seeking legal advice in response to communication over a disputed debt is not considered an injury.
Finally, Freeman argued that she suffered psychological pressures from fighting against the foreclosure but failed to point out any physical manifestations or medical diagnoses showing an Article III injury. Psychological harm alone does not count as an Article III injury.
Freeman also sued the Bank of New York Mellon but on appeal, did not “dispute the district court’s disposition of her claims against it,” Kirsch wrote.
The case is Demona Freeman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Bank of New York Mellon, No. 23-2512.
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