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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowA jury could determinate that retaliatory animus influenced a woman’s decision-making and ultimately caused the termination of her co-worker, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in a Thursday reversal.
As an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration, Alice Robbins Huff was required to follow a strict alcohol and drug policy. But she violated that policy in April 2016 when she was arrested for driving while intoxicated.
Huff self-reported the infraction, which meant she avoided immediate disciplinary action, but only if she completed a rehabilitation plan designed and supervised by the FAA. Huff, a Jehovah’s Witness, initially agreed to the plan but objected on religious grounds to its requirement that she attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
Ava Wright, an employee responsible for overseeing Huff’s rehabilitation plan, later allegedly rebuffed Huff’s objection to the AA-related requirements, informing Huff that she would only honor her objection if she was an atheist.
Although the FAA’s equal employment opportunity counselor approved her participation in an alternate recovery program, Huff filed a formal complaint against the agency for religious discrimination, specifically naming Wright as the discriminatory actor.
Huff and Wright, who did not get along, often disagreed about whether the plan required Huff to request medication approvals over the phone or via email — a dispute that culminated in Huff receiving a formal notice of noncompliance. That notice ultimately triggered a process that resulted in Huff’s removal from her job.
Huff sued, alleging the FAA violated Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Rehabilitation Act by retaliating against her for filing a formal complaint.
The Southern Indiana District Court granted summary judgment to the FAA, ruling that Huff failed to establish a causal link between the formal complaint and her termination. It also found that Wright lacked actually authority to fire Huff and that independent assessments by other FAA staff members insulated the agency from any animus on Wright’s part.
But the 7th Circuit disagreed, reversing and remanding for further proceedings in Alice Robbins Huff v. Pete Buttigieg, Secretary of Transportation, 21-1257.
In initially defining the source of a federal-sector retaliation claim, the 7th Circuit concluded that, under Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1171 (2020), and Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 prohibits retaliation when it “plays a part in a federal employment decision.”
Finding that the district court did not apply the appropriate causation standard, the 7th Circuit noted that issue alone may require a remand. However, it also found genuine issues of fact that warranted reversal, too.
On appeal, which solely focused on the Title VII retaliation claim, the 7th Circuit pointed out that Huff’s case proceeds under a “cat’s paw theory of liability” because Huff alleged Wright retaliated against her, yet she conceded that Wright did not have the power to fire her.
The court identified four connections Huff could make that would permit a reasonable juror to conclude Wright proximately caused her termination by actions that were tainted by retaliatory motive.
First, the court said a reasonable juror could conclude that the issuance of the noncompliance memo was objectively unreasonable and thus pretextual. It also noted that contrary to the FAA’s assertion, the rehabilitation plan did not expressly prohibit email communication.
“Mobilizing a rarely enforced rule against an employee is evidence of pretext, even without comparators,” Circuit Judge Michael Brennan wrote. “Naturally, if a rule is rarely enforced, few employees, if any, would be similarly situated.”
“Even if the rehabilitation plan prohibited email and required phone calls, the punishment imposed by the FAA was disproportionately severe,” Brennan continued. “Firing an employee for using an email rather than a phone call on several occasions is heavy-handed.”
Second, Huff could show that Wright proximately caused the noncompliance memo to be issued, despite her lack of authority to do so.
As for the “suspicious” timing of the noncompliance memo, the 7th Circuit found that although the sequence was consistent with Huff’s theory, it was not strong supporting evidence. Nonetheless, it concluded that a jury may consider that evidence when determining pretext.
As for the other connections, the 7th Circuit found that a reasonable juror could conclude that Wright initiated the noncompliance memo with retaliatory animus.
Specifically, it found that because Wright’s familiarity with the FAA’s applicable alcohol policy would have made her aware that a noncompliance memo would prompt removal proceedings, a reasonable juror could conclude that she initiated the noncompliance memo out of retaliatory animus, exerted influence over the nominal decision-makers, resulting in the issuance of the noncompliance memo, and knew that the proposed removal would automatically follow.
Finally, it found that a reasonable juror could conclude Huff’s termination automatically followed the proposed removal, aided further by Wright’s consistent recommendation that Huff be terminated.
The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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