7th Circuit tweaks opinion but won’t rehear immigration crime victim case

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals on Thursday denied a government petition to rehear an immigrant crime victim’s case decided in his favor, but the panel amended its earlier opinion in a case that also rejected caselaw limiting immigration judges’ authority to administratively close cases when warranted.

In the case of Yeison Meza Morales v. William Barr, 19-1999, the 7th Circuit in June reversed a removal order issued against Yeison Meza Morales that also had been upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Meza Morales has lived in the United States since arriving as a child in 2002. In October 2013, he was walking through an Indianapolis neighborhood when he encountered a group of men arguing. As he ran from them, one of the men shot Meza Morales in the ankle. He recovered and cooperated with the police investigation, the 7th Circuit noted.

As such, Meza Morales qualified for a U Visa — an immigration category reserved for crime victims who assist police but that is limited to 10,000 nationwide per year. Because many more U Visas are applied for than are available, those not granted the visas are placed on a waiting list in chronological order.

Before his 2017 application could be acted on, immigration authorities found him removable due to his status as a noncitizen and for a 2014 conviction for possession of marijuana.

In reversing his removal order in June, the 7th Circuit also rejected prior caselaw that limited the authority of immigration judges to administratively close cases. The panel held these judges have broad authority to close cases where “appropriate and necessary for disposition.”

In an order Thursday, the 7th Circuit denied the government’s petition for rehearing, largely affirming its prior opinion. However, the panel also issued an amended opinion Thursday that added this sentence to a procedural footnote on page 13 regarding the issue of whether an immigrant remains admissible.

“Although we note the potential pitfalls of a nonfinal waiver of inadmissibility, we express no view on whether the government might be precluded from contesting the waiver on the basis of forfeiture, waiver, estoppel, or some other ground.”