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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowOverturning the district court and disagreeing with a state appellate court’s analysis, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals has vacated the denial of habeas relief to a man convicted on drug charges, ordering an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition.
Following a jury trial in Grant Circuit Court, petitioner-appellant Ryan McMullen was convicted of possession of cocaine and marijuana and received a 50-year prison sentence.
McMullen’s sentence was upheld on direct appeal, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.
He then sought post-conviction relief, arguing his attorney, Joe Keith Lewis, was ineffective for failing to “conduct a reasonable investigation of McMullen’s character, background, and mental status, arrange for him to be evaluated by a mental health professional, and present evidence of mitigating circumstances at the sentencing hearing.”
But the state trial court concluded Lewis had not been ineffective, and the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed, with the Supreme Court again denying transfer.
McMullen then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The court found Lewis had performed deficiently, but his performance was not prejudicial.
Meanwhile in state court, on McMullen’s renewed motion to modify his sentence, the trial court “suspended” the remainder of his sentence and placed him on probation until Sept. 28, 2049.
Addressing McMullen’s appeal of the denial of his habeas petition, the 7th Circuit first rejected the argument that the appeal was moot based on the modified sentence.
“Because no separate judgment of conviction was entered after modification, no new penalty was imposed against McMullen. Instead, his sentence was suspended. He is therefore serving the remainder of the initially imposed sentence, but on probation,” Judge Michael Brennan wrote.
Turning to the merits, the appellate court next determined McMullen had satisfied § 2254(d) on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, thus vacating the denial of his habeas petition.
First finding that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act deference applies on the performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the appellate court then found Lewis was deficient for failing to investigate McMullen’s mental health or have him evaluated, failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into his background, and failing to present sufficient mitigating evidence at sentencing.
As for the mental health issue, “… (T)he Indiana Court of Appeals failed to analyze whether reasonable professional judgment supported Lewis’s limited investigation into McMullen’s mental health,” Brennan wrote.
As for the background investigation, “Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond just review and use of the (presentence report), and discussion of McMullen with a knowledgeable relative.”
Finally, as to the presentation of mitigating circumstances, “which mitigating circumstances Lewis could present was a function of the scope of his investigation before sentencing.”
“To be fair to Lewis, at times his advocacy greatly helped McMullen,” Brennan wrote. “… But under the reasoning above, we agree with the district court that McMullen has established Lewis’s deficient performance.”
As for prejudice, “The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling,” Brennan continued.
“McMullen received a maximum sentence, based in large part on his poor criminal history. The undiscovered mitigating evidence could have influenced the state trial court’s sentencing decision. The likelihood of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the sentencing hearing,” he wrote.
“… We remand for the district court to consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances. The district court can then decide whether or not Lewis was constitutionally ineffective such that McMullen’s petition for habeas corpus should be granted under § 2254(a),” the court concluded.
The case is Ryan T. McMullen v. Gary Dalton and Melissa Stephenson, 20-3273.
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