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An elected LaPorte County official did not convince the Court of Appeals of Indiana that a defamation suit brought against him by the county’s attorney should be dismissed under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP law.
The dispute began in January 2021, when LaPorte County Auditor Timothy Stabosz attempted to convince the LaPorte County commissioners not to retain Shaw Friedman as county attorney. He did so by sending the commissioners an email detailing the reasons Stabosz believed Friedman was a “walking talking conflict of interest.”
But the commissioners voted to keep Friedman in the position, prompting Stabosz to make a number of public comments about Friedman suggesting that the attorney had engaged in illegal and unethical behavior.
Specifically, Stabosz sent a statement to a group of radio and newspaper outlets — including the La Porte Herald-Dispatch, South Bend Tribune and Northwest Indiana Times — regarding his comments about Friedman. He also posted verbatim the email he had sent to the commissioners on his personal Facebook page.
In February 2021, Friedman filed suit, alleging Stabosz’s statements constituted defamation per se. Friedman’s lawsuit sought to have Stabosz retract his statements and apologize.
Claiming that Friedman’s lawsuit was a strategic lawsuit against public participation, Stabosz subsequently moved to dismiss the lawsuit under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP laws, Indiana Code § 34-7-7-5.
The LaPorte Circuit Court denied his motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in doing so.
Appellate judges noted at the outset that the crux of Stabosz’s argument on appeal was that Indiana’s summary judgment standard is “too onerous” to further anti-SLAPP policies.
But in affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals rejected Stabosz’s reliance on Heeb v. Smith, 613 N.E.2d 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied, and concluded that no other cases apply Heeb’s unique burden of proof where summary judgment has been sought in defamation cases.
“We have, however, found a number of cases applying the general summary judgment standard to anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss,” Chief Judge Cale Bradford wrote. “… Given the lack of any other cases applying Heeb’s unique standard, we find it to be an outlier and are unpersuaded by its conclusion. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in applying the general summary judgment standard to Stabosz’s motion.”
It also agreed with the trial court that Friedman designated sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stabosz’s statements were made in good faith and with a reasonable basis in law and fact.
“The designated evidence indicates that Stabosz had previously been told that, given his position as an elected official, if he had a reasonable belief that Friedman had committed illegal or unethical acts or if he had any evidence of illegal or unethical behavior by Friedman, then he should report the alleged wrongdoing to the appropriate authorities,” Bradford wrote. “The record does not reflect that Stabosz has ever done so.
“Further, in objecting to Friedman’s motion for summary judgment, Stabosz did not designate any evidence, beyond his alleged personal belief, that any illegal or unethical behavior actually occurred. … As such, given the record before us on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Stabosz’s motion to dismiss,” the chief judge concluded.
The case is Timothy Stabosz v. Shaw Friedman, 22A-PL-541.
According to online court records, more than a dozen state and national news media outlets, advocates and associations filed as amici curiae in the case.
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