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Property owners of two parcels comprising 237 acres near Lake Monroe can use an easement to access the parcels as long as they do not intensify it, the Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled Monday.
The appellate court also clarified that the scope of a trial court’s partial summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
According to court records, Kenton Robinson owned a tract of land near Lake Monroe, which he planned to develop into a subdivision called The Shores.
Adjacent to the tract was the THR Property, at that point owned by Terre Haute Realty Corporation.
In 1990, Robinson executed a grant of easement, which specifically described the THR Property as the dominant estate. In the grant, Robinson established three easements across common areas in The Shores.
A representative from THR signed the grant, assenting to the “terms, conditions[,] and covenants” of the grant.
In 2017, trusts for William and Nicole Huff obtained the THR Property.
The Huffs later acquired the Chumley parcel from Chumley LLC. The Chumley parcel forms a peninsula on Lake Monroe.
In 2018, Michael Cain and Linda Raymond — owners of one of the affected lots in The Shores — sued the Huffs, alleging the Huffs were exceeding their easement rights.
At first, the lawsuit concerned only the THR Property, focusing on whether the Huffs could truck logs from the THR Property across The Shores.
The litigation led to two appeals involving the propriety of injunctive relief.
Eventually, the litigation involved the Chumley parcel.
The Huffs filed a counterclaim against Cain and a third-party complaint against Tammy Jo Sexton-Troy and 11 other affected estate-holders in The Shores.
The Huffs later moved for summary judgment on one count of the counterclaim/third-party complaint.
In doing so, the Huffs sought a specific declaratory judgment: “the Huffs are entitled to use the [e]asement[s] to access the Huffs’ [p]roperty, including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as long as [the] Huffs do not intensify the [e]asement[s].”
In seeking this declaration, the Huffs asked the trial court to “apply the law of the case” and rely on language in portions of prior appellate opinions.
The Monroe Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment to the Huffs. In doing so, the court determined it was bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine.
The written order contained the following statement: “[T]he Huffs may use the Grant … to access the entirety of their real estate, without regard for the delineation between the THR [Property] and [the] Chumley Parcel[.]”
The order also contained language rendering the order final and appealable.
Cain and Sexton-Troy appealed the denial of their motions to correct error, which challenged the order granting summary judgment to the Huffs.
The Court of Appeals affirmed partial summary judgment for the Huffs for the declaratory judgment they sought, while clarifying the scope of the judgment.
Judge Dana Kenworthy wrote the opinion for the appellate court.
According to Kenworthy, to the extent that either prior appeal in the case implicated the law-of-the-case doctrine, the appellate court declined to apply the doctrine.
In seeking summary judgment, the Huffs did not claim any implied easement rights, Kenworthy noted.
“Rather, this case involves only express easements appurtenant, i.e., ‘a permitted use of land granted by the servient estate-holder for the benefit of the dominant estate-holder [that] runs with the dominant estate,’” Kenworthy wrote, citing Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d 987 (Ind. 2018).
Further, as to the state’s common law, appurtenant easement rights benefit only the dominant estate, the COA held.
Kenworthy wrote that the designated evidence indicates the grant of easement was a private agreement between Robinson and THR, recorded in Monroe County in early 1990 — long before Huff acquired the THR Property in 2017.
The appellate judge wrote that grant of easement identifies only the THR Property as the dominant estate and does not provide for unilateral expansion of that estate.
“Applying the unambiguous language of the Grant within the broader context of Indiana common law, we conclude there is a legal distinction between rights associated with the THR Property and rights associated with the Chumley Parcel. Put differently, neither the Grant nor our common law extinguishes delineation between the THR Property, which is identified as the dominant estate, and the Chumley Parcel, which is not identified in the Grant,” Kenworthy wrote.
Because the grant of easement does not refer to the Chumley parcel or otherwise permit unilaterally adding land to the dominant estate — and because the affected estate-holders have not modified their agreement concerning the easements — Indiana law does not allow Huff to use the easement to facilitate logging or other development of the Chumley parcel, Kenworthy wrote.
“We hereby clarify the Huffs are entitled only to the specific declaration sought in Paragraph 38 of their counterclaim/third-party complaint, which reads as follows: ‘The Huffs request the Court to enter a Declaratory Judgment that the Huffs are entitled to use the Easement to access the Huffs’ Property, including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as long as Huffs do not intensify the Easement,’” Kenworthy concluded.
Judge Terry Crone and Senior Judge Margret Robb concurred.
The case is Michael O. Cain and Linda A. Raymond et al. v. William J. Huff II Revocable Trust Declaration Dated June 28, 2011, and Nicole E. Huff Revocable Trust Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011, 22A-PL-1258.
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