COA dismisses appeal of denied PCR petition

A convicted murderer will not be able to appeal the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief after the Court of Appeals of Indiana determined a trial court erred in granting him permission to file a belated appeal.

In May 2014, Leandrew Beasley was sentenced to 75 years in prison for murder, attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.

Beasley filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 2016, raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. His petition was denied in August 2020, and Beasley filed a pro se request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal shortly after the denial.

Then in September 2021, Beasley sought permission to file a belated notice of appeal, alleging he had filed a timely motion to proceed in forma pauperis and was entitled to file his belated notice of appeal pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2.

After being found eligible to do so, Beasley filed his notice with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court then denied the state’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

The state responded with a cross-appeal seeking the dismissal of Beasley’s PCR appeal. This time, the COA agreed with the state and dismissed Beasley’s appellate action.

In dismissing Leandrew Beasley v. State of Indiana, 21A-PC-2115, the Court of Appeals began by noting that the parties agreed the appeal was not timely filed.

“The post-conviction court relied exclusively on Post-Conviction Rule 2 in granting Beasley permission to file his belated appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief,” Judge Patricia Riley wrote. “In light of longstanding Indiana supreme court precedent, we conclude that the post-conviction court’s ruling was erroneous.

“Beasley appears to concede as much, as he did not address Post-Conviction Rule 2 in his response to the State’s dismissal motion or in his other appellate filings,” Riley wrote.

The COA also declined to credit Beasley’s arguments that “extraordinarily compelling reasons prohibit the forfeiture of his appeal, even though he did not seek to file his belated appeal until more than one year after the post-conviction court entered its Order denying him relief.”

First, it found no evidence that Beasley ever attempted to file a notice of appeal or to perfect his appeal before he filed his “Verified Petition for Permission to File a Belated Notice of Appeal Pursuant to Post-Conviction Relief 2.”

It also found no legal authority for Beasley’s proposition that an Indiana Appellate Rule 40(D) petition to proceed in forma pauperis was the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal, adding that it is “aware of none.”

Additionally, the COA found no evidence Beasley ever requested post-conviction appellate counsel or that he believed that his in forma pauperis motion would result in the appointment of counsel or lead to the initiation of his appeal.

“Without any evidence to the contrary, we decline to interpret his motion in this manner, as we observe that Beasley’s in forma pauperis motion was consistent with an intention to proceed pro se on appeal, which he had a right to do,” Riley wrote.

Lastly, the appellate court concluded Beasley’s invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not sufficiently compelling to justify addressing his appeal on the merits despite his forfeiture. It pointed out that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for purposes of pursuing an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief.

“In addition, this is a rationale that would always apply to belated appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief no matter what other circumstances were present in a particular case, and thus, it cannot be said, in and of itself, to be an extraordinarily compelling reason sufficient to restore a right to appeal,” Riley wrote in dismissal.

“… Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Beasley forfeited his right to appeal from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and that no extraordinarily compelling reasons exist sufficient to restore that right.”