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Two months after vacating a man’s attempted murder and battery convictions, the Court of Appeals of Indiana has reaffirmed that decision on rehearing, doubling down on its holding that a speedy trial request was not met.
But while the court’s initial opinion in Stevie Bradley v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-2317, was unanimous, on rehearing, the same panel split.
Back in November, the COA vacated Stevie Bradley’s convictions after finding that Bradley’s motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(B) should have been granted.
Bradley had twice made an oral motion for an early trial, but his trial date was set for May 4, 2022, after the trial court sua sponte ordered a competency evaluation. That date was outside the 70-day period of Criminal Rule 4(B), so Bradley objected.
The trial date was continued additional times and was eventually set for Aug. 8, 2022. But it was the May 4, 2022, trial date that was at issue on appeal.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Bradley that there wasn’t evidence in the record showing that his trial could not be scheduled until May 4, 2022, due to a delay caused by Bradley, court congestion or an emergency.
Reaffirming that holding on rehearing, Judge Paul Felix wrote, “Here, Bradley did not abandon or otherwise act consistently with his early trial motion; in fact, Bradley frequently reminded the trial court of his request.”
Also, “The trial court initiated competency proceedings sua sponte,” Felix wrote. “… Once the competency evaluation is complete and the 70-day early trial period resumes, the State must fulfill its affirmative duty to bring the defendant to trial.”
According to the state, tolling the 70-day period during the competency proceedings left the state with just eight days to assemble jurors, subpoena witnesses and otherwise prepare for trial.
But under the version of Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) in effect at the time, “when Bradley’s early trial period clock resumed with eight days remaining, the State should have filed a motion to continue the trial if it was ‘functionally impossible’ for the State to bring Bradley to trial within those eight days,” Felix wrote. “The State chose not to do so.
“Similarly, the trial court could have ‘take[n] note of congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding,’ could have ordered a continuance that would not have been chargeable to the State,” Felix continued. “… The trial court did not do so.”
Judge Terry Crone concurred with the opinion on rehearing, but Judge Elaine Brown switched her vote.
“Upon further reflection, I believe this Court should affirm the trial court’s judgment,” Brown wrote. That’s because, in her view, the trial court’s decision to order a competency evaluation resulted from Bradley’s actions.
“On July 19, 2022, the court stated that it vacated Bradley’s previous trial over concerns about his competency and the decision had been made ‘based on in-court and remote conduct by Mr. Bradley,’ ‘based on a jail e-mail that was received that was filed in this case indicating Mr. Bradley had a psychiatric history and there were some issues with respect to medication,’ and Bradley ‘at that point in time, refused to be transported,’” Brown wrote. “I would conclude that Bradley’s actions leading to questions about his competency were inconsistent with his motion for an early trial and that the resulting delay was chargeable to him.”
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