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The Worker’s Compensation Board of Indiana erred when it dismissed a Franciscan Health employee’s claim as untimely, the Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled Monday in reversing and remanding the board’s order.
On Dec. 5, 2019, Angela Santos suffered an injury to her lower back during the course of and arising out of her employment with Franciscan Health. Santos’ injury was accepted as compensable by Franciscan Health, and she was provided workers’ compensation benefits.
Santos sought an adjustment of her claim, with the deadline for her application falling on Sunday, Dec. 5, 2021. She filed her application on Monday, Dec. 6, and it was received on Dec. 10.
The following April 6, Franciscan Health filed a motion to dismiss Santos’ application, arguing it was not timely filed.
The board, by its single hearing member, granted the motion without a hearing, finding that Indiana Code § 22-3-3-3 is a “non-claim statute with requirements that cannot be set aside or excused,” and that, under the statute, a claim is “extinguished if not exercised within the proscribed time limit.”
Santos appealed to the full board, which affirmed the hearing member.
She then appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the board erred in granting Franciscan Health’s motion to dismiss her application on the grounds that it wasn’t timely filed.
The appellate court agreed, reversing the dismissal and remanding for further proceedings.
Judge Peter Foley wrote the opinion for the appellate court.
On appeal, Santos argued that the Worker’s Compensation Act is silent as to the manner in which an application must be filed.
She also argued that Trial Rules 5(F) and 6(A) apply to the two-year filing deadline under I.C. 22-3-3-3, and as a result, her application was filed timely.
Trial Rule 5(F) provides that, “The filing of pleadings, motions, and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by … Mailing to the clerk by registered, certified or express mail, return receipt requested … .” Trial Rule 6(A) provides that “the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, a legal holiday, or a day on which the office is closed.”
Under those rules, Santos argued that because the last day of the two-year period fell on a weekend, the last day of her two-year period should be extended to the next business day after the weekend, which was Dec. 6, 2021. Because she filed her application by certified mail, return receipt requested, she argued the application was deemed filed as of the date of the mailing, which was Dec. 6, 2021.
The appellate court disagreed with Franciscan Health’s argument that the board only adopted Trial Rule 5 for filings made after the original application.
“First, a plain reading of the rule provides no such limitation or distinction between an original application and subsequent filings, both of which constitute documents,” Foley wrote. “Next, the Board’s actions in the present case belie Franciscan Health’s argument.”
Specifically, Foley noted the board marked the application as filed Dec. 6, even though it wasn’t received until Dec. 10.
“Therefore,” he wrote, “the Board used Trial Rule 5 to find that the Application was filed on December 6, 2021.”
Santos relied on several cases to back her assertion that both Trial Rules 5(F) and 6(A) should be applied to her application filing under I.C. 22-3-3-3 (a), including Ball Stores, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 316 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. 1974); State Board of Tax Commissioners v. LeSea Broadcasting Corp., 511 N.E.2d 1009 (Ind. 1987); State ex rel. Goodman v. Review Board of Indiana Department of Employment Training Services, et. al., 536 N.E.2d 1023 (Ind. 1989); Inland Steel Co. v Brown, 496 N.E. 2d 1332 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); and Wilks v. First National Bank of Mishawaka, 326 N.E. 2d 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
“In looking at all these cases together, it is clear that the holdings lead us to the conclusion that, where the applicable statute is silent as to the methods of filing and the computation of time, both Trial Rule 5 and Trial Rule 6(A) apply,” Foley wrote. “Here, the Act is silent as to how filing is to be accomplished and as to how the time for filing is to be computed. Therefore, Trial Rules 5 and 6(A) should be applied to Santos’s Application.”
The COA concluded by noting, “We do not find our conclusion to be in conflict with the Act’s status as a non-claim statute.
“… Additionally, we acknowledge cases holding that, with the exception of the rules incorporated by the Board, the Indiana Trial Rules do not apply to the Board,” the court continued. “… Although this general proposition exists, Ball Stores, LeSea, and their progeny address a specific issue of what to do when a statute is silent as to how to define filing and how to compute time limitations as to the filing of documents filed with an administrative agency or board. We do not view these cases to be in conflict with the general proposition that the trial rules do not apply to the Board.”
Judges Nancy Vaidik and Elizabeth Tavitas concurred in Angela Santos v. Franciscan Health, 22A-EX-2611.
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