COA reverses summary judgment denial in patient negligence, wrongful death suit

The Indiana Court of Appeals has reversed the denial of partial summary judgment in a wrongful death case brought by the estate of a woman killed while in the care of a professional health care group.

While Virginia Newman was a participant in the Franciscan Senior Health & Wellness Day Care program, she was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a Franciscan ACO employee who failed to ensure she and her wheelchair were properly secured for transport. Thus, when the vehicle made a turn, Virginia and her wheelchair fell over and Virginia sustained injuries that later killed her.

Virginia’s son, Vaughn Newman, became the personal representative of her estate. Vaughn had lived with his mother for several years and helped take care of her, but he did not contribute to the living costs of their arrangement until later on when her health began to deteriorate. Virginia never claimed Vaughn as a dependent on her taxes and Vaughn never claimed her.

After Virginia’s death, Vaughn filed a complaint against Charlotte Sweezer, who was the driver, Franciscan ACO Inc. and Franciscan Alliance Inc., alleging on behalf of his mother’s estate counts of negligence and wrongful death pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-23-1-1 or, in the alternative, the Indiana Survival Act. The defendants asked the Lake Superior Court to enter partial summary judgment in favor of Vaughn on Count II, leaving the issue of damages to be decided, and to dismiss Count III.

However, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and concluded there were “factual issues to be determined by the trier of facts which prevent [it] from considering Defendants’ motion.”

But the appellate court reversed in an interlocutory appeal after finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that a reasonable jury could not find dependence based on the facts.

“The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Vaughn’s rent-free living arrangement arose out of convenience and his desire to care for his ailing mother, not out of necessity. The arrangement allowed him to live with and care for his mother and avoid moving to a cheaper apartment within his budget but located in an unacceptable or unsafe area. Rather than Vaughn being a dependent of Virginia, it seems that Virginia was dependent on Vaughn but not in the required legal sense. Although the two may have relied on each other, the arrangement is not the dependency contemplated in the (General Wrongful Death Statute),” Judge Margret Robb wrote Monday for the appellate court.

Thus, finding the designated evidence failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact relating to Vaughn’s dependency upon Virginia, the appellate court found error in the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion on that issue.

Additionally, the appellate court noted that because it had been established as fact that Virginia’s death was caused by the defendants’ negligence, Vaughn could not show “Virginia died from causes other than Defendants’ negligence and has no cause of action under” the Indiana Survival Act. It therefore concluded that the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on that issue, as well.

The case of Franciscan ACO, Inc., Franciscan Alliance, Inc., and Charlotte Sweezer v. Vaughn Newman, as personal represenatative of the Estate of Virginia Newman,19A-CT-2465, was remanded.