COA rules for tenant in landlord’s breach of contract case

An apartment tenant facing eviction who alleged his landlord failed to take keep the space safe, clean and habitable won favor from an appellate panel Tuesday.

In Syed Umar Husainy v. Granite Management, LLC, and Jaffa Varsity 1, LLC, 18A-PL-2752, tenant Syed Husainy was sued by his landlords, Granite Management LLC and Jaffa Varsity 1 LLC, who sought his eviction for alleged nonpayment of rent, maintenance and late fees totaling $1,280.50. Husainy’s leasing agreement states that his monthly rent was $725, not including a $25 month charge for parking, and that his security deposit was $605.

Husainy filed a jury trial demand, a counterclaim against Granite and a third-party complaint against Jaffa. Meanwhile, Husainy vacated his apartment at the end of his lease term in May 2017 but did not receive his security deposit because it had been applied against his outstanding unpaid balance of over $2,750.

While Granite and Jaffa alleged Husainy had clogged toilets and refused to pay for removal of the clogs, Husainy alleged that at times the building had no heating, that pipes leaked and covered the hallway and stairs with half an inch of water, and that he was forced to buy bottles of water and shower elsewhere because of interruptions of cold and hot water service.

A jury ultimately ruled in Husainy’s favor, and he requested nearly $60,000 in attorney’s fees. The Tippecanoe Superior Court, however, only awarded Husainy $2,000 and later granted in part the appellee’s motion to correct error on the jury’s verdict. It specifically vacated the breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment verdict but denied the motion in part as to the under Indiana Code § 32-31-8-5.

On Husainy’s appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded the trial court abused its discretion in granting Granite and Jaffa’s motion to correct error on Husainy’s breach of quiet enjoyment claim. It noted the cost Husainy carried of purchasing his own water, at $5 or $6 per case, which he had purchased more than 20 times.

“The jury awarded Husainy damages equivalent to six months’ rent, including his parking fee ($750 × 6 = $4500). Given the numerous interruptions of and difficulties with the building’s water and heating service, we cannot conclude that the jury’s damages award falls outside the bounds of the evidence presented at trial,” Judge Terry Crone wrote, reversing and remanding with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict on the breach of quiet enjoyment.

Next, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of Granite and Jaffa’s motion to correct error on Husainy’s I.C 32-31-8-5 claim. It noted a person could reasonably infer that the jury determined that awarding Husainy the amount of his security deposit for the appellees’ multiple failures to comply with the statute was a “remedy appropriate under the circumstances,” pursuant to I.C. 32-31-8-6(d)(3).

A jury could reasonably find that Granite did not remedy the lack of hot running water within a reasonable amount of time, the appellate court first noted. It continued to point out that Granite could be found to have had both actual knowledge and notice of the hallway’s pipe leak and did not make all reasonable efforts to keep the buildings common areas in a clean and proper condition as required under the statute.

Lastly, the appellate court found an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of $2,000 to Husainy when he requested nearly $60,000.

“The trial court’s order disregards Appellees’ significant role in driving up Husainy’s legal fees,” Crone wrote, agreeing with Husainy that the award was “far too small to recompense a successful plaintiff for filing and prosecuting a complaint and preparing for and conducting a multiple-day jury trial” and that it “would discourage attorneys from representing parties without financial means to pay attorney’s fees, even where the legislature created a remedy for the same.

“…We also agree with Husainy’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the fee award based on counsel’s requested verdict. It was counsel’s prerogative to request a minimal recovery as a matter of trial strategy, and the jury was the ultimate arbiter of the value of Husainy’s claim,” Crone wrote.

The panel therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to reconsider Husainy’s request for fees in light of nonexclusive factors listed in Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) regarding the reasonableness of a fee.

The appellate court ended with a note stating that because Husainy waived his argument that the trial judge was biased against him – based on remarks made before, during and after trial – and should have disqualified himself, it would not address that point.

“We do, however, take this opportunity to remind the trial judge of his obligation to be ‘patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity[.],’” the panel concluded, quoting from Rule 2.8(B) of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct.