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A split appellate panel has reversed a teen’s delinquency adjudication for auto theft, finding insufficient evidence to support the adjudication. A dissenting judge disagreed, however, finding that intent to deprive the vehicle’s owner of its use and value could be inferred from the record.
In June 2020, then-16-year-old V.R. was driving a silver car with a plate that matched the description of a vehicle that had been reported stolen. A Tell City police officer stopped the car, and V.R. was arrested and later alleged to be a delinquent for committing an act that would constitute Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult.
The officer testified during a factfinding hearing that he had “made a traffic stop based on the … stolen status of the car.” The officer added that V.R. had made no admission about how came to possess the car.
In his defense, V.R. testified that he had borrowed the car from a friend named Alex. He said Alex, who lived in Dale, had given him a ride in the vehicle before, so he assumed it belong to Alex.
V.R. further testified that his grandmother had told him to come home to Tell City when he was in Dale, hence his use of Alex’s vehicle. But he said he did not know Tyler Oliver, the registered owner of the silver car, or Alex’s last name.
The Perry Circuit Court ultimately determined C.R. had committed auto theft and entered a true finding against him. The court then placed V.R. in the Department of Correction for an indeterminate term, prompting an appeal in V.R. v. State of Indiana, 22A-JV-759.
“V.R. contends that the evidence was insufficient because the State ‘merely proved that [V.R.] was in possession of a vehicle that had been stolen’ and ‘did not present any evidence to support an inference that V.R. was the [person] who stole the car,’” Judge Rudolph Pyle wrote for the majority, which included Judge Leanna Weissmann. “We agree.”
The majority noted the state presented no evidence that V.R. “knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the car with the intent to deprive the owner of its value.” Rather, the state’s evidence only proved beyond a reasonable doubt that V.R. had possession of a vehicle that had been reported stolen, Pyle wrote.
“V.R.’s explanation as to how he came to possess the vehicle might have sounded suspicious, but it does not lead to the logical conclusion that he intended to deprive someone of its value or use,” the majority held. “Even when combined with the testimony of Officer (Matt) Leisener, that conclusion is based upon speculation, conjecture, or another inference. No evidence was introduced (direct or circumstantial) to prove V.R.’s intent to deprive anyone of the vehicle’s value or use.
“Accordingly, we hold that there was insufficient evidence to support V.R.’s adjudication for auto theft,” the court concluded. “Thus, we reverse V.R.’s adjudication and remand to the trial court for resentencing on his remaining unchallenged adjudication.”
But Chief Judge Cale Bradford dissented in a separate opinion, disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile adjudication.
“It is well-established that the trial court was not obligated to believe V.R.’s claim that he had borrowed the vehicle from an individual known only to the court as ‘Alex,’” Bradford wrote. “… As in this case, intent to deprive the vehicle’s owner of its use and value can be inferred from the record.
“… Because I believe that the evidence is sufficient to sustain V.R.’s juvenile adjudication and V.R.’s contention to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, I respectfully dissent and would vote to affirm the judgment of the juvenile court,” he concluded.
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