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A man’s appointed counsel agreed to the rescheduling of his trial beyond a 70-day deadline and did not raise an objection, so his right to a speedy trial was not violated, the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed Friday.
In December 2022, Shawn Miller had a domestic dispute with his girlfriend, after which the state charged him with two counts of Level 6 felony criminal confinement of his girlfriend and her daughter; Level 6 felony strangulation; Level 6 felony intimidation; and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.
According to court records, on Jan. 25, Miller’s appointed counsel requested a speedy trial, which made the latest permissible trial date April 5. The Vanderburgh Circuit Court scheduled a trial for April 3.
Three days before Miller’s scheduled trial, the trial court entered a congestion order due to a trial in another case, State v. Woodard.
At a hearing on April 3, the trial court rescheduled Miller’s jury trial for June 2 —a date to which Miller’s counsel agreed. Miller, however, personally objected to “any and all continuances” that would place his trial outside the “70-day calendar day deadline.”
The trial court noted and overruled Miller’s objection. In April and May, Miller filed pro se motions for discharge and dismissal and asked to terminate counsel and proceed pro se.
At a hearing on June 1, the trial court granted Miller permission to proceed pro se, and he filed another petition for discharge. However, after hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion, finding the new trial date had been set within a reasonable time.
At that same hearing, the parties disputed newly-discovered evidence, and Miller requested a one-week continuance to review it. The trial court granted Miller’s request and set the trial date for June 9.
On June 9, Miller moved for discharge.
In that motion, Miller claimed his case had been pushed due to Woodard, despite there being no early-trial request under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B) or imminent Criminal Rule 4(A) or (C) deadlines in that case.
The trial court denied Miller’s motion, explaining that the Vanderburgh Superior Court’s rule prioritizing Criminal Rule 4(B) cases does not apply to the circuit court.
The case proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which a jury found Miller guilty of strangulation, intimidation, domestic battery and one of the confinement charges, and not guilty of the other confinement charge.
The trial court sentenced Miller to an aggregate 609-day sentence.
Miller appealed and argued the trial court violated his Criminal Rule 4(B) right to a speedy trial by continuing his trial beyond the 70-day deadline.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Judge Cale Bradford wrote the opinion for the appellate court.
Bradford noted the state’s argument that Miller had waived his request for a speedy trial by failing to object and affirmatively acquiescing to a trial date outside the 70-day window.
Miller argued that, because it was impossible to reschedule the trial within the Criminal Rule 4 deadline, no objection was necessary. He also claimed that even if he had had a duty to object, he did so pro se despite his counsel failing to object.
The appellate court agreed with the state that the issue was waived, with Bradford writing that Miller’s reliance on N.E.S. v. State, 708 N.E.2d 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), was misplaced.
“In that case, we acknowledged that ‘a defendant has no duty to object to the setting of a belated trial when the setting of the date occurs after the time expires such that the court cannot reset the trial date within the time allotted by Crim. R. 4(C). All the defendant needs to do then is move for discharge,’” Bradford wrote.
For Miller, the trial court entered its congestion order on March 31, 2022, which was a few days before Miller’s speedy-trial deadline, and the parties scheduled a new trial date before the expiration of that deadline. Therefore, N.E.S. does not control, Bradford wrote.
Bradford added that Miller’s objection should have come through his counsel.
Although he had been represented by counsel at the time, Miller lodged a pro se objection “to any and all continuances.”
“However, once counsel is appointed, a defendant speaks through his counsel and the trial court is not required to respond to the defendant’s pro-se requests or objections,” Bradford wrote, citing Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000).
According to Bradford, while the trial court acknowledged and denied Miller’s objection, that did nothing to undermine Miller’s counsel of record’s agreement to continue the trial date.
“Therefore, we conclude that, in the absence of an objection from Miller’s counsel, the issue is waived,” Bradford wrote.
Judges Nancy Vaidik and Elaine Brown concurred.
The case is Shawn Tyler Miller v. State of Indiana, 23A-CR-1793.
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