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An Indiana trial court properly sanctioned the state by excluding a defendant’s statements related to a polygraph that was supposed to be admissible, the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled, laying out a test for determining whether such sanctions are permissible under Trial Rule 37.
Justice Derek Molter wrote the opinion for the unanimous court Tuesday in State of Indiana v. Bryan D. Lyons, 23S-CR-163.
The case involves Bryan Lyons, who was brought in for questioning after his daughter reported to her grandmother that Lyons had sexually abused her. Lyons denied his daughter’s allegations and agreed to sit for a polygraph.
Polygraphs are generally inadmissible at trial, but Lyons, who was unrepresented at the time, signed a written stipulation with the prosecutor agreeing that the results of his exam would be admissible if the state charged him.
Indiana State Police officer Dan Gress administered the exam a few days later, writing the word “stipulated” at the top of the polygraph form based on the written stipulation.
During questioning, Lyons admitted to mental illnesses including bipolar disorders, and he said he saw “spiritual shadows” that spoke to him a few days before the exam.
Based on those answers, Gress determined Lyons was not a suitable candidate for an “evidentiary polygraph.” Instead, Gress unilaterally converted the exam to an “investigatory” polygraph, which would not be admissible in court. However, the sergeant did not change the “stipulated” notation on the form.
The results of the polygraph were “very close to deception,” and when confronted with those results, Lyons began making incriminating statements to Gress.
Lyons was subsequently charged with Level 1 felony child molesting. He was appointed a public defender, who filed a motion to suppress the polygraph results.
Reviewing his files based on that motion, Gress changed the notation on the polygraph form to “non-stipulated,” but he did not scan the updated form into the case management system. He also failed to mention the change in subsequent testimony.
The Lawrence Superior Court denied the motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals of Indiana declined to exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal.
The case was then set for trial in July 2021. A few days before the scheduled start date, Gress revealed to a deputy prosecutor for the first time that he had unilaterally changed the polygraph to a non-stipulated investigatory exam.
The prosecutor shared the new information with defense counsel, who moved for a continuance and asked the trial court to suppress Lyons’ statements related to the exam based on the state’s untimely disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
The trial court agreed, granting a continuance and scheduling a suppression hearing.
At that hearing, Gress testified that he “assumed” the prosecutor was aware of the unilateral change because he claimed to have told a detective to inform the prosecutor. But the detective testified that he did not recall that instruction, nor did he even recall learning about the change.
The trial court ultimately entered an order sanctioning the state by “excluding any and all evidence generated or acquired by S[ergeant] Dan Gress,” including Lyons’ agreement to take the polygraph, the exam itself and the post-exam interview.
The Court of Appeals this time accepted jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and affirmed the sanction.
Granting transfer in its Tuesday opinion, the Supreme Court likewise upheld the trial court’s order.
In doing so, the justices listed two factors that trial courts must consider before excluding evidence as a Trial Rule 37 sanction: a finding that exclusion is the sole remedy available to avoid substantial prejudice, or a finding that the sanctioned party’s culpability reflects an egregious discovery violation.
The trial court’s sanction in Lyons’ case fell within the latter finding, the justices held.
“… (E)ven when there is no remaining prejudice, a trial court may reasonably conclude that excluding evidence is necessary to deter egregious discovery misconduct,” Molter wrote. “That is what the trial court concluded here.
“… The State downplays this as a case of misfeasance rather than malfeasance. But that is not what the trial court concluded,” Molter continued. “Instead, the trial court concluded that Sergeant Gress’ misleading omissions were so egregious that the State should undertake a perjury investigation. … While the State has not concluded Sergeant Gress’ omissions rose to the level of perjury, it has acknowledged its own frustration and concerns with Sergeant Gress’ failure to timely share information with the prosecutors.
“… In sum, our prior cases have explained that trial courts may exclude the State’s evidence when a discovery violation is ‘grossly misleading or demonstrates bad faith,’” Molter concluded, quoting Thompson v. State, 492 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1986). “Because the trial court found that level of culpability here, and the record supports (even if it does not compel) that conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.”
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