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There was clear and convincing evidence that a daughter repudiated her father, thus relieving him of his obligation to pay for her college under a marital dissolution decree, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed Tuesday.
In this case, the daughter, Brooke Wells, is the child of Joseph and Kimberly Wells, whose marriage was dissolved in 2010.
Under the dissolution decree, which incorporated the terms of a marital settlement agreement, the father was obligated to pay for the daughter to attend college.
In July 2021, Joseph Wells initiated the instant litigation by filing a petition for the emancipation of Brooke Wells, who turned 18 earlier that year.
The daughter intervened, filing a motion to enforce the provisions of the dissolution decree that required the father to pay for her college education.
Joseph Wells then filed a petition alleging that the daughter had repudiated him, asking the trial court to either relieve him of the obligation to pay for the daughter’s college education or modify the dissolution decree.
A fact-finding hearing was held in December 2022. Evidence was presented that the daughter—who was born on March 5, 2003—was completing her senior year of high school in the spring of 2021.
As of her junior year, the daughter’s plan was to join the Air Force. Before spring break of her senior year, Brooke Wells had taken a physical and received a special assignment.
When the daughter returned from spring break, she informed her father by text message that she no longer wished to go into the Air Force.
The issue of the daughter’s post-secondary plans resulted in family conflict and the deterioration of daughter’s relationships with her father, stepmother, and the daughter’s older brother.
In November 2021, the father became seriously ill and was hospitalized. The daughter did not visit her father, and she engaged in only minimal communications about his health.
As the daughter attended community college and later enrolled at Indiana University, she did not provide her father with specific information regarding the costs of attendance, the classes she was taking, or her grades.
The Marion Superior Court entered sua sponte findings and conclusions, writing that the daughter “repudiated her relationship with Father and Father is therefore relieved of his obligation to contribute to [Daughter’s] college expenses.”
The daughter moved to correct error, claiming the judgment was “contrary to relevant case law on repudiation and post-secondary educational support orders.”
She challenged several of the court’s findings, and she sought relief due to the alleged “misinterpretation of relevant case law, or a mistake having been made[.]”
The trial court denied the motion.
The daughter appealed, challenging the trial court’s determination that she repudiated her father and, therefore, the father was relieved of his obligation to pay for her college expenses.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Judge Peter Foley wrote the opinion for the appellate court.
Foley noted that there is ample evidence that the daughter withdrew from her father after she moved out, declining to attend family events where he was present. There was evidence that the father’s door was open to her, but she saw him in person on just three occasions in the 18 months between the date she moved in with her boyfriend’s family and the evidentiary hearing.
The daughter seemed to acknowledge that the parent-child relationship was severely strained, Foley wrote.
“However, she maintains that there is insufficient evidence that she completely refused to participate in the relationship so as to support a finding of repudiation. She asserts that, ‘from a practical standpoint, it is understandable why Daughter would not want to move back in with Father while there was pending litigation between [them], as it surely would have created a tense situation,'” Foley wrote.
Foley pointed out that the doctrine of repudiation contemplates intervening acts of the child to sever the parent’s duty to contribute to educational expenses, and this case involved conflicting evidence regarding the status and prognosis of the parent-child relationship.
‘Under the circumstances, we must adhere to our standard of review and defer to the trial court, which was in the best position to assess witness credibility and make a factual determination regarding Daughter’s intended relationship with Father,” Foley wrote, citing Cf. D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind. 2012).
Judge Rudolph Pyle concurred.
Judge Elizabeth Tavitas dissented with a separate opinion.
In her dissent, Tavitas wrote that the repudiation doctrine should not even apply to the father because he agreed to pay for all of his daughter’s college expenses in the settlement agreement between the father and mother during the dissolution of their marriage.
“And, even if the repudiation doctrine could apply in such situations, the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that Daughter completely repudiated her relationship with Father,” Tavitas wrote.
The case is Brook Wells v. Joseph Todd Wells and Kimberly Renay Wells, 23A-DR-990.
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