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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowA former East Chicago councilman failed to prove his 2016 firing was in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Friday.
Between 1995 and 2005, Randall Artis served as a city councilman for the City of East Chicago.
His tenure ended in a felony conviction: In 2005, Artis pled guilty to stealing up to $1.5 million from the city in what East Chicagoans call the “sidewalk scandal.”
Artis, along with several other city politicians, used millions in public funds to finance unapproved repairs on his constituents’ private property.
He received a 27-month prison sentence for that offense.
Artis returned to public service in August 2015, when Mary Leonard, then East Chicago’s city clerk, hired him as a junior clerk.
Leonard, however, was on her way out of the clerk’s office.
A new city clerk, Adrian Santos, replaced her as city clerk after winning an election that fall.
Before taking office, Santos explored the possibility of implementing new professionalism standards within the clerk’s office. These new standards primarily involved running background checks on all employees to ensure that each qualified under the city’s existing crime insurance policy.
That policy excluded coverage for acts of employees who had previously committed “theft” or “any other dishonest act.” Santos believed that the city’s insurance policy would not cover an employee previously convicted of a felony.
Santos assumed office in January 2016. Shortly thereafter, he asked Artis to support the campaigns of two political candidates—Mike Repay, who was seeking reelection as Lake County Commissioner, and Marissa McDermott, who was running for Lake County Circuit Court Judge.
Santos wanted Artis to take Repay and McDermott through the West Calumet Housing Complex to secure voter support there.
But Artis rebuffed Santos’s overtures and declined to lend his help to the campaigns.
Santos fired Artis on Feb. 1, 2016. He explained the decision in two termination letters dated Feb. 1, 2016, and Feb. 4, 2016.
The Feb. 1 letter stated that Artis was losing his job because of his prior felony conviction.
The Feb. 4 letter further explained that Santos had adopted new professionalism standards for the clerk’s office, which required all employees to meet the criteria for bonding. The letter informed Artis that his prior conviction precluded him from satisfying the bonding requirements, meaning that the clerk’s office could no longer employ him.
Artis sued Santos and the City of East Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights, claiming that Santos fired him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech—namely, for refusing to support Repay and McDermott.
His five-count complaint also raised a due process claim against Santos and a disparate impact claim against the City of East Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
Only the First Amendment claim against Santos survived summary judgment, and Artis proceeded to trial on it.
During voir dire, a prospective juror allegedly made a racially controversial statement on her juror questionnaire. That questionnaire is not in the record.
The juror expressed some disagreement with the view that Black men undeservedly suffer disproportionately at the hands of law enforcement.
Artis, who is Black, moved to strike the prospective juror for cause, but the court denied his request after determining that the juror could act impartially. The court ultimately impaneled that juror.
At trial, and over Artis’s objection, the district court permitted Santos to call Roosevelt Haywood to testify as an expert witness. Haywood headed a business that provided risk management consultation and insurance brokerage services to municipalities and private entities.
He primarily testified about the risks of Artis’s continued employment to the city, opining that it would be both costly and risky for the city to employ a convicted felon like Artis in a junior clerk position.
After the close of evidence, Artis objected to the court’s jury instruction setting forth the elements of his First Amendment retaliation claim.
He also objected to one of the court’s verdict forms, which asked the jury to make findings of fact on the elements of the claim. Artis argued that both the instruction and verdict form were misleading and confusing.
The court denied his objections, reasoning that Artis had not explained why the language was confusing, and that the instruction and verdict form accurately stated the law.
The jury returned a verdict in Santos’s favor.
Artis later moved for a new trial under Rule 59 and for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). The targets of Artis’s Rule 59 motion included Haywood’s testimony, the allegedly biased juror, and the court’s jury instructions and verdict form.
The Indiana Northern District Court denied both motions, rejecting each claim of error.
Artis appealed and questioned that whether the district court improperly admitted expert testimony from Roosevelt Haywood and whether the court erred in denying his for cause challenge to the allegedly biased prospective juror.
Also, Artis questioned whether the court issued confusing and misleading jury instructions and verdict forms, and whether the jury’s completed verdict forms were inconsistent.
The 7th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.
Judge Amy St. Eve wrote the opinion for the appellate court.
St. Eve wrote that Haywood reached his conclusions after reviewing the record, consulting his significant insurance and risk assessment experience, and applying basic underwriting principles. All this provided ample foundation for his opinions.
Artis challenged Haywood’s reliance on an article from “chron.com” titled “What disqualifies a person from getting bonded for an insurance job?,” and a screenshot from “JustAnswer.com” addressing the question “can u obtain a surety bond if you have a felony.”
According to St. Eve, Artis confuses the weight of Haywood’s testimony with its admissibility.
“The legitimacy of these websites and criticisms of Haywood’s reliance on them are fodder for cross-examination, not grounds for exclusion. The district court appreciated this distinction. It did not err by admitting the testimony while permitting Artis’s counsel to attack these sources on cross-examination,” St. Eve wrote.
As to Artis’ claim regarding the allegedly biased juror, St. Eve wrote that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Artis’s for-cause challenge to the prospective juror.
“Even assuming the juror’s freighted statement on her questionnaire satisfied the first step—i.e., was both ‘material’ and ‘contestable’—the court was well within its discretion in concluding that she could suspend her beliefs at trial,” St. Eve wrote.
St. Eve also dismissed Artis’s arguments regarding jury instructions and the consistency of the verdict forms.
The case is Randall Artis v. Adrian Santos, 22-2619.
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