Former Vigo superintendent must face bribery charges

A former school superintendent facing multiple bribery charges failed to persuade the Indiana Court of Appeals that the charges should be dismissed.

Former Vigo County Schools superintendent Danny Tanoos was charged with one count of Class C felony bribery and two counts of Level 5 felony bribery after he was accused of soliciting and accepting meals, tickets and other items from Energy Systems Group, an energy savings contractor that often worked with the school corporation.

Over a 16-year period, VCSC entered into nine contracts with ESG worth more than $42 million.  ESG donated or expensed more than $100,000 to VCSC and Tanoos in the form of, but not limited to, expensive dinners, Colts tickets, concert tickets and a limousine rental.

Tanoos unsuccessfully filed a motion to dismiss all three of his charges, arguing the facts stated in the charging information did not constitute the offense of bribery because Indiana does not recognize a “generalized bribe” theory. He also argued the state was required to show “that any of these solicitations, acceptances, or agreements to accept food/beverages/tickets were [] made on a quid pro quo basis, i.e., in exchange for Tanoos’[s] agreement or promise to recommend ESG for any particular project.”

However, the Indiana Court of Appeals founds no error with the Marion Superior Court’s denial of Tanoos’ motion to dismiss. Tanoos appealed, arguing that the facts alleged against him did not constitute the offense of bribery and that he was charged under “a generalized bribery theory which is prohibited under Indiana law.”

The appellate court concluded otherwise, rejecting Tanoos’ citations from Wurster v. State, 708 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), summarily aff’d in part by 715 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. 1999), and McDonnell v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).

“Relying on those cases, Tanoos argues that (1) the McDonnell framework explaining ‘official act’ supports his assertion that specificity in identification of what act he allegedly performed or agreed to perform is required and that influencing the VCSC school board ‘is exactly the type of nebulous, nonspecific act’ that McDonnell said does not constitute bribery, and (2) as in Wurster, none of the counts against Tanoos ‘identify a specific action Tanoos took; rather, each relies on a general notion that Tanoos would support continued business with ESG,’” Judge Robert Altice wrote for the appellate court.

“We are unpersuaded, however, that dismissal of the charges is warranted,” Altice continued. “While McDonnell may be relevant to the discussion, it does not govern our decision, as it concerned interpretation of the federal bribery statute’s definition of ‘official act’ in the context of jury instructions. Its context is wholly distinct from that before us.”

Additionally, the appellate panel found that Wurster is distinguishable and that the PCA and charging information identify a quid pro quo sufficient that Tanoos could “anticipate the evidence that may be presented against him and marshal evidence in his defense.

“…The State asserts, and we agree, that ‘Tanoos’s arguments are not about legal deficiencies in the information,’ but rather ‘amount to an assertion that he will be able to convince a jury that the alleged bribes were actually innocent acts of business development and there was no quid pro quo for these gifts,’” it wrote.

The appellate court therefore concluded that a motion to dismiss an information is not a proper vehicle for raising questions of fact to be decided at trial or facts constituting a defense, and that Tanoos’ motion was properly denied in Daniel Tanoos v. State of Indiana, 19A-CR-1086.