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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowThe 65-year sentence of a man convicted of murder was affirmed Monday on appeal, but a judge wrote separately to “address a practical dilemma facing appellate courts, lawyers, and litigants” after recent appeals revised longstanding double jeopardy caselaw.
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed Damonta Jarrett’s murder and robbery convictions in the fatal 2016 convenience store shooting of Steven Marquand in Gary. Jarrett twice unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial, which the Lake Superior Court denied, and the COA affirmed.
Jarrett first argued he was prejudiced by an investigator’s testimony that he had not submitted Jarrett’s DNA for analysis because such testing is not feasible until a suspect is taken into custody. Jarrett argued jurors may have wondered whether Jarrett took flight after Marquand’s killing. The trial court gave jurors a limiting instruction to address Jarrett’s counsel’s concerns.
Likewise, Jarrett wishing the judge happy birthday also was no grounds for mistrial, the COA affirmed. The appeals panel also rejected Jarrett’s sentencing claims.
However, the panel most focused on double jeopardy and the new analytical framework devised by the Indiana Supreme Court in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 235 (Ind. 2020).
“Jarrett … argues that his convictions for murder and Level 5 felony attempted robbery violate Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy under the actual evidence test established by our supreme court in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999). However, while Jarrett’s case was pending on appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court ‘expressly overrule[d] the Richardson constitutional tests in resolving claims of substantive double jeopardy’ and adopted an analytical framework to be applied where, as here, ‘a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes (rather than a single statute),’” Judge Rudolph Pyle III wrote for the panel.
“… Because neither murder nor Level 5 felony attempted robbery is included in the other, Jarrett’s convictions do not constitute double jeopardy under Wadle.”
Concurring Judge Leanna Weissmann wrote separately to “address a practical dilemma facing appellate courts, lawyers, and litigants in the wake of Wadle … how do we proceed in cases where the appellant’s brief was filed before Wadle and, thus, the defendant did not have the benefit of Wadle’s acknowledgement of possible alternative relief in the absence of double jeopardy violations?”
“Although Jarrett reasonably could not have anticipated Wadle’s quantum leap in double jeopardy analysis, his case lacks the special circumstances which appear to be a prerequisite for rare sua sponte review under Appellate Rule 7(B)” concerning the appropriateness of sentences, Weissmann wrote.
“As (Wilson v. State, 19S-PC-548, (Ind. Nov. 17, 2020)) appears to bar us from sua sponte review of Jarrett’s sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment,” she concluded.
The case is Damonta Lamont Jarrett v. State of Indiana, 20A-CR-59.
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