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Editor’s note: This article has been updated.
In agreeing on a public reprimand for Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita, the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission looked to the prior discipline of another elected official.
The conditional agreement between Rokita and the commission was released Thursday after the Indiana Supreme Court granted the commission’s motion to unseal the agreement.
Rokita received a public reprimand from the court in November for comments he made on national television about an Indianapolis OB-GYN who was at the center of a public debate over abortion access.
The parties agreed to a reprimand in the conditional agreement, which required Rokita to sign an affidavit “confirming his or her knowing and voluntary consent to the agreement and acknowledgement that ‘the material facts set forth in the Conditional Agreement are true’ and ‘if prosecuted, the respondent could not successfully defend himself or herself,’” according to the Supreme Court.
The same day the discipline was handed down, Rokita released a statement saying, in part, “Having evidence and explanation for everything I said, I could have fought … but ending their campaign now will save a lot of taxpayer money and distraction, which is also very important to me. In order to resolve this, I was required to sign an affidavit without any modifications.”
Subsequently, the Disciplinary Commission filed to unseal the agreement, which would typically be kept confidential. According to the Indiana Capital Chronicle, the commission alleged that Rokita’s statement was inconsistent with what he agreed to in the conditional agreement.
“As the Commission observes, the purpose of confidentiality is not to shield the material facts and circumstances of the case from public view, but to allow the parties to ‘candidly provide sensitive information to the Court that may be relevant to a sanction decision, such as treatment and recovery information for attorneys struggling with substance use disorder or mental health issues.’ Other privacy interests, such as those of clients or other persons aggrieved by an attorney’s misconduct, also may be implicated. Of course, not all conditional agreements will include such sensitive information, but enough do to warrant a general rule of confidentiality,” the court’s order states.
“The conditional agreement in this case does not include any information of this nature, and Respondent has verified in writing to this Court that he does not object to its public release,” the order continues. “For these reasons, a majority of the Court votes to GRANT the Commission’s Verified Petition.”
Rokita did not object to the unsealing of the agreement, but he did request a case management conference. That motion was denied in Thursday’s order.
In agreeing to a reprimand, the commission cited In Matter of Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. 2012), in which the high court imposed a public reprimand on former Marion County Proecutor Carl Brizzi, who violated Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) and 3.8(f) by making statements to the media prior to trial about a defendant’s character.
In his case, Rokita was found to have violated Rules 3.6(a) and 4.4(a).
“In cases in which a more severe sanction was imposed,” the agreement says, “other significant factors that are not present here were involved.” That includes Matter of Hall, 108 N.E.3d 889 (Ind. 2018), and Matter of Richardson, 792 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. 2003).
The commission also initially charged Rokita with violating Rule 8.4(d), but the agreement notes, “the parties agree that a trial on the merits on Count 3 would not likely result in a different sanction than the already agreed to proposed sanction on Counts 1 and 2.”
The agreement lists as mitigators Rokita’s experience, lack of prior discipline, cooperation and responsiveness and, notably, his acceptance of responsibility.
In an affidavit attached to the agreement, Rokita signed a statement saying, “I submit my agreement to discipline because I know that if this proceeding were prosecuted, I could not successfully defend myself.”
The case is In the Matter of Theodore E. Rokita, 23S-DI-258.
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