Subscriber Benefit
As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe Now
After a decade of litigation triggered by the death of a conservation officer’s dog, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s finding in a false-arrest case despite it being clearly erroneous.
In December 2012, Kailee Leonard was driving to her boyfriend’s house when she hit and killed a dog, Gypsy, owned by Department of Natural Resources Conservation Officer Scott Johnson.
Leonard initially stopped but continued driving about a mile to her boyfriend’s house so he could return with her to the accident scene. He then drove to Johnson’s home, where Leonard spoke with the officer and apologized for hitting the dog.
Johnson later questioned whether her actions would be a misdemeanor violation. A few months later, Johnson spoke with Hancock County’s chief deputy prosecutor while on duty and in uniform, asking whether leaving the scene of an accident involving a pet and returning “over an hour later” in a different vehicle “would meet the elements of leaving the scene of an accident.”
Based on the prosecutor’s advice, Johnson relayed “the basics about the incident” to an investigator, who later found probable cause to charge Leonard. But the investigator also said he wasn’t going to file charges “at that time,” prompting Johnson to speak to the Hancock County prosecutor about potential charges.
In June 2013, Leonard received a criminal summons in the mail charging her with Class B misdemeanor failure to stop after an accident. She hired an attorney and answered the summons but was never arrested.
Almost a year later, Johnson asked for the charges to be dropped. The state dismissed the case.
Leonard then filed a federal lawsuit against Johnson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming his “actions in procuring [her] prosecution constituted false arrest” in violation of her constitutional rights. She alleged he told the investigator that she left the scene and did not return until the following day.
Johnson requested that the state represent him in the federal lawsuit, but it declined because it believed his alleged actions were not within the scope of his duties.
A jury found Leonard “was falsely arrested by” Johnson and awarded her $10,000 in damages. The federal court also approved Leonard’s request for $52,462 in attorney fees and costs.
Johnson assigned his indemnification rights against the state to Leonard and her attorney, Jeffrey McQuary, because he was unable to pay the full amount.
Leonard sued the state and sought a declaratory judgment that the state had a duty to indemnify Johnson and pay the judgment under Indiana’s public employee indemnification statute.
The case proceeded to a bench trial after the state’s unsuccessful motion for summary judgment. The Marion Superior Court found in Leonard’s favor and ordered the state to pay the $62,462 judgment.
The court, however, only identified one issue: whether Johnson acted within the scope of employment. As to whether Johnson’s actions were noncriminal, it found only that “Johnson falsely maintained that Leonard had left the scene and returned the next day — not shortly after the accident, as had actually happened.”
The state moved to correct error, arguing that Johnson was not entitled to indemnification because the court found his “actions were not noncriminal.” That motion was deemed denied after the trial court failed to rule on it within 45 days.
The state appealed, only challenging whether Johnson’s actions were “noncriminal.” The Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed and held that the trial court effectively found Johnson committed the crime of false informing, so his conduct was therefore not noncriminal as required by statute.
But in its Monday opinion, the Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court.
Justices first addressed the meaning of “noncriminal,” defining the term as an “act or omission … for which the State cannot establish a prima facie showing of criminal conduct.”
Here, Leonard produced evidence that Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal.
“Leonard alleged in her complaint that the State was ‘required to pay the judgment, costs, and attorney fees assessed against’ Officer Johnson under the indemnification statute,” Chief Justice Loretta Rush wrote. “And she presented evidence during the bench trial demonstrating that Officer Johnson did not knowingly give either ‘a false report of the commission of a crime’ or “false information to a law enforcement officer that relates to the commission of a crime.’
“… Thus, all the uncontradicted testimony established that Officer Johnson did not commit the crime of false informing,” Rush wrote. “Accordingly, Leonard met her burden under the indemnification statute by producing evidence that Officer Johnson did not commit a criminal act.”
Next, the court found the state failed to rebut the evidence establishing a noncriminal act.
“We acknowledge Leonard alleged in her federal complaint that Officer Johnson ‘falsely told [an investigator] that [Leonard] left the scene of the accident and did not return until the following day.’ But the complaint was admitted only to establish the allegations against Officer Johnson, not for the truth of those allegations. Because the complaint was admitted for this limited purpose, it cannot ‘constitute evidence of the facts alleged,’” Rush wrote.
“… To conclude otherwise would have broad implications, precluding indemnification anytime a civil rights violation is framed as a crime that does not impose liability based on recklessness. But because the trial court made a factual finding inconsistent with its conclusion, we now determine whether that finding is clearly erroneous.”
Lastly, the high court concluded that while the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous, the evidence supported the court’s judgment.
“Because the evidence establishes that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal and because the State does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that Officer Johnson acted within the scope of his employment, the judgment is supported by the evidence,” Rush concluded.
All justices concurred in State of Indiana by and through its Department of Natural Resources v. Kailee M. Leonard and Jeffrey S. McQuary, 24S-MI-46
Please enable JavaScript to view this content.