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A trial court’s order in a property dispute between a North Judson man and a railroad company did not meet the criteria of a final judgment, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled in dismissing the man’s appeal.
According to court records, through a subsidiary, Norfolk Southern Corporation owned property in LaPorte County.
In 2019, Norfolk Southern fell delinquent on its property taxes.
Thomas DeCola bought the property at a tax sale two years later. Afterward, the county auditor issued DeCola a property tax deed.
DeCola brought a lawsuit against Norfolk Southern to quiet title. He sought judgment on the pleadings, which Norfolk Southern opposed, arguing it never received proper notice of the county’s decision to tax the property, the tax sale, the petition for tax deed or its right of redemption.
DeCola argued the LaPorte Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the tax deed was void for lack of notice.
Norfolk Southern asked the court to enter judgment for the company on all DeCola’s claims.
Because the trial court considered evidence outside the pleadings, it converted DeCola’s Indiana Trial Rule 12(C) motion to one for summary judgment.
The trial court then rejected DeCola’s jurisdictional objection and found the tax deed was void because Norfolk did not receive sufficient notice of the tax sale, the right of redemption or the petition for tax deed. It also denied DeCola’s motion for judgment.
DeCola filed a motion to reconsider, and Norfolk Southern filed its own motion for final judgment, asking the court to award it summary judgment on all claims.
The trial court did not rule on either motion, and the motion to reconsider was deemed denied.
DeCola appealed the denial of summary judgment. His notice of appeal said he was appealing “from a final order as defined by Ind. App. R. 2(H).”
The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed, finding genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the company received the statutorily required notices.
DeCola then sought transfer, which the Indiana Supreme Court granted in its Friday order.
But the high court ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Justice Geoffrey Slaughter wrote the opinion, with all justices concurring.
According to Slaughter, the trial court’s order satisfied none of the five definitions of a final judgment set out in Rule 2(H) of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure.
He wrote that the order did not “dispose[] of all claims as to all parties.”
“To the contrary, the order disposed of nothing,” Slaughter wrote. “DeCola’s quiet-title claim remains, as does Norfolk’s lack-of-notice argument.”
The order also made no express determination or direction in writing under Indiana Trial Rules 54(B) or 56(C) that judgment should be entered as to fewer than all issues, claims or parties; was not deemed final under Indiana Trial Rule 60(C); and was not a ruling on a motion to correct error under Indiana Trial Rule 59.
Finally, the order was not otherwise deemed final by law, Slaughter wrote.
The justice then noted that whether an order is immediately appealable is a jurisdictional question that cannot be waived and can be raised at any time, including by a reviewing court on its own motion.
“We raise the jurisdictional issue here to remind ourselves and our judicial colleagues of the importance of ensuring that courts exercise judicial power only where our jurisdiction is secure,” he wrote. “Imposing and enforcing limits on judicial power are important not only in their own right, but in sending the vital message that we police ourselves just as vigilantly as we do other government actors.”
The case is Thomas DeCola v. Norfolk Southern Corporation, 23S-PL-358.
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