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A trial court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute before accepting a teenager’s admission to auto theft, the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled in a reversal.
According to court records, T.D. was detained in June 2020 in the Lake County Juvenile Detention Center after he stole a vehicle and money. He was 15 at the time.
The state filed a delinquency petition, alleging T.D. committed auto theft and theft.
T.D.’s appointed counsel filed a motion on the same day seeking T.D.’s release from detention, stating he viewed the video on his rights and had no questions about his rights.
The Lake Superior Court denied the motion.
At an initial hearing, T.D. denied all allegations.
T.D. and his mother were both at the next hearing, where T.D.’s counsel informed the trial court that the parties had reached an agreement by which T.D. would admit to the auto theft charge and the state would dismiss the theft charge.
The court, without informing T.D. of his constitutional rights or confirming that he waived those rights, asked T.D. and his mother whether they agreed with the resolution.
After his mother agreed, T.D. admitted to committing auto theft, prompting the court to grant the delinquency petition on that count. The court then dismissed the theft count, the parties proceeded to argue disposition and the court took T.D.’s placement under advisement.
In an order issued later that day, the trial court accepted T.D.’s admission and found that he and his mother understood the admission “waives those rights explained in the video.”
The court issued a dispositional order placing T.D. under the wardship of the Department of Correction.
More than a year later, T.D. filed a motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and 60(B)(8), asserting the adjudication should be set aside because his admission was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.
T.D. argued he and his mother were not “informed of a single right on the record.”
The state argued T.D. and his mother were previously advised of and understood T.D.’s rights and also asserted that the waiver was valid because it was the court’s practice “that each child, including those detained, views an advisement of rights video before they are brought into the courtroom for a hearing.”
The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment.
On appeal, a split Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed in October 2022, finding the court’s judgment void under Trial Rule 60(B)(6). The majority reasoned that “a trial court’s failure to follow the juvenile waiver statute is not a procedural error.”
Because the COA found T.D. is entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6), it did not address Trial Rule 60(B)(8).
T.D. petitioned for transfer, and the Supreme Court granted transfer in April.
The Supreme Court opinion notes that the rights conferred on children through state or federal law can be waived in only three ways: by counsel if the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joins the waiver; by the juvenile’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian or guardian ad litem if that individual knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights, along with other conditions; or by the juvenile if they are emancipated and knowingly and voluntarily consent to the waiver.
Trial Rule 60(B)(6) permits relief when a court’s judgment is void, the opinion says, while Trial Rule 60(B)(8) permits relief for “any reason” other than those set forth in other subsections that aren’t relevant to the case.
T.D. and the state didn’t dispute that the trial court erred by failing to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute, but they disagreed on the effect of that error.
The high court first ruled T.D. isn’t entitled to relief under Rule 60(B)(6) because a violation of the Juvenile Waiver Statute renders a judgment entering an agreed delinquency adjudication voidable rather than void.
The state argued that because the trial court had both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, T.D.’s agreed delinquency adjudication “cannot be considered void.”
T.D. conceded that the court had both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, but he argued the judgment is void because the court lacked authority to find him delinquent without first securing a valid waiver of his rights.
The Supreme Court partially agreed with both parties, finding a judgment is void when the issuing court lacks personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction or the authority to render the judgment.
“But a court’s failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute falls outside of that scope because, despite the statutory violation, the court still has the authority to adjudicate the juvenile as a delinquent,” the opinion states.
The opinion continued: “There is a distinct difference between a judgment that the law does not authorize under any circumstances (a void judgment), and a judgment authorized by law but derived in violation of law (a voidable judgment). In the latter scenario, the trial court still has the requisite authority to act, and thus, the error is a procedural irregularity that can be cured.”
The Supreme Court ruled a failure to comply with the statute renders an agreed delinquency adjudication voidable.
“Given the special caution afforded to juvenile admissions, a trial court’s failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute is particularly alarming,” the opinion says. “But that failure does not mean the court lacks the legal authority under any set of circumstances to adjudicate a juvenile as a delinquent.”
As a result, the Supreme Court ruled Trial Rule 60(B)(8) is the “proper vehicle for juveniles to collaterally attack an adjudication based on an invalid waiver of rights.”
The Supreme Court then ruled T.D. is entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8).
“In fact,” the opinion states, “the record is devoid of evidence that the court mentioned any of T.D.’s rights during any hearing, including the initial hearing at which Indiana law requires the court to ‘inform the child’ of certain rights.”
The state argued the waiver was nevertheless valid under the Juvenile Waiver Statute because T.D. and his mother watched a video advisement before each hearing that explained his rights.
But the high court disagreed, ruling video advisements alone are insufficient to comply with the statute.
The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to “hold a hearing during which T.D. either admits to the allegations raised in the delinquency petition after the court complies with the Juvenile Waiver Statute or proceeds to fact-finding.”
Indiana Chief Justice Loretta Rush wrote the opinion, with all justices concurring.
The case is T.D. v. State of Indiana, 23S-JV-110.
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