Indiana Court Decisions: Dec. 28, 2023-Jan. 10, 2024

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Jan. 2, 2024

United States of America v. Sergio Gamez

22-2278

7th Circuit vacates 15-year mandatory minimum sentence after determining arson is not a ‘crime of violence’

After the Indiana Supreme Court declined to answer a certified question on what constitutes arson under state law, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals answered that question for itself, vacating a man’s 15-year sentence after determining that the state’s 2002 definition of arson does not qualify as a crime of violence.

Judge Michael Scudder wrote the opinion for the federal appellate court.

In June 2021, Sergio Gamez pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At the time, Gamez had three prior felony convictions for robbery and aiding and abetting arson.

At Gamez’s sentencing, the question was whether his three prior felony convictions triggered the sentencing enhancement under § 924(e) of the Armed Career Criminal Act. His prior convictions were viewed as qualifying violent felonies, leading to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.

On appeal, the question of whether Gamez’s Indiana arson conviction qualified as a predicate violent felony was renewed.

In an August decision, the 7th Circuit asked the Indiana Supreme Court to weigh in, certifying the following question to the justices: “Under Indiana law, need the state prove that the defendant burned property in order to obtain a conviction for arson? Or is it sufficient to prove that the defendant more generally caused damage to property ‘by means of fire, explosive, or destructive device?’”

But the justices declined to accept the certified question in September, although the high court’s order shows that Chief Justice Loretta Rush and Justice Derek Molter voted to accept it.

Back at the 7th Circuit, the appellate court again considered Gamez’s argument that his arson offense was not a crime of violence because “arson” under the 2002 version of Indiana Code § 35-43-1-1(a) is categorically broader than “arson” as described in § 924(e).

“That view finds support in the statutory text enacted into law by the Indiana General Assembly,” Scudder wrote. “Unlike generic arson, Indiana’s 2002 arson statute does not require burning. The statute extends to property damage caused by ‘fire, explosive, or destructive device.’

“If ‘destructive device’ were limited to devices that cause fire, it would be duplicative of the terms ‘fire’ and ‘explosive’ that immediately precede it,” the judge continued. “… The statute’s plain language does not support such a construction.

“… By not confining itself to fire-related damage,” he wrote, “the text of the 2002 statute would seem to exceed to scope of the generic federal definition of arson, suggesting that arson under Indiana law may not qualify as a ‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”

The parties also disputed the corpus delicti of arson.

The government argued the doctrine requires evidence of burned property and that, under the corpus delicti rule, Indiana courts require prosecutors to provide evidence of fire-related property damage in all arson cases.

However, the 7th Circuit disagreed.

“Corpus delicti does not add to the elements a prosecutor must prove to secure a conviction under a criminal statute,” Scudder wrote. “It simply requires a minimum level of proof that an offense — however defined — actually occurred. Establishing the statutory elements of an offense necessarily satisfies the corpus delicti rule because the doctrine exists and operates in a more limited manner — to ensure that a charged crime happened.”

Caselaw supports that conclusion, Scudder continued, adding that the federal court found no decision in which an Indiana court struck down an arson conviction under the corpus delicti rule based on a lack of burning after the passage of the 1976 statute.

“To the contrary,” he wrote, “Indiana courts have upheld arson convictions under the modern statute even when no property was burned.”

Thus, the 7th Circuit vacated Gamez’s 15-year sentence and remanded for resentencing without the mandatory minimum required by § 924(e).

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Jan. 4

United States of America v. Byron Pierson

21-3248

Proffer letter signed before defendant chose to go to trial doesn’t undercut firearm conviction, 7th Circuit rules

A man challenging the proffer letter he signed during plea negotiations before ultimately choosing to go to trial failed to convince the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals that he did not knowingly waive his rights in the initial agreement.

In April 2018, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Matthew Minnis responded to a call from a woman claiming Byron Pierson had threatened to “come back and shoot the house up.” The woman told Minnis what car Pierson was driving and appeared very frightened.

During the investigation, Minnis learned that Pierson could be armed and that he had a criminal record. Minnis called for backup in case Pierson returned to carry out his threat.

Minnis saw the described car and, after briefly losing sight of it, other officers located it and initiated a traffic stop. A woman was driving the car with Pierson’s daughter in the front passenger seat and Pierson in the back.

Minnis recognized Pierson from photos and asked him to step out of the car. When Pierson stepped out, he pressed his right hip out and stated he had a knife on him.

Another officer removed the knife, and Minnis attempted to place Pierson in handcuffs, but Pierson struck him and fled on foot.

The officers pursued him into a nearby yard, and when he was blocked from further escape by dense brush and trees, Pierson looked back at the officers and reached toward his waistband. Minnis believed Pierson was about to pull a firearm from his waistband, so the officers deployed a taser and attempted to restrain Pierson, who had fallen to the ground.

During the struggle, one of the officers saw a firearm under Pierson, and Minnis was able to reach underneath him and remove the gun.

Pierson was then taken into custody, and he was ultimately charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. While he initially began plea negotiations, he ultimately chose to go to trial.

Before trial, Pierson moved in limine to exclude statements he made during plea negotiations and asserted that admission of the proffer statements would violate his rights to due process, effective counsel and a fair trial. He also argued that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, and that he had not understood that the proffer letter covered the second session in which he made an admission about possessing the gun.

The government responded with legal support for the enforceability of the proffer agreement and indicated that it did not intend to offer any of Pierson’s proffer statements as evidence in the absence of a triggering event, as outlined in the proffer letter.

The Indiana Southern District Court ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Pierson had been told that the terms of the proffer letter applied to the second proffer session.

But the government submitted a signed copy of the proffer letter, an affidavit from Pierson’s former lawyer, and email correspondence between government counsel and Pierson’s counsel indicating the parties’ understanding that the proffer letter covered the second proffer session. The court thus vacated the hearing and denied both of Pierson’s motions.

The government also filed a motion in limine to admit evidence regarding the course of the investigation, including testimony from the woman who made the initial 911 call.

Pierson opposed the motion, and the court ruled that the government couldn’t offer evidence that Pierson went to the woman’s home, damaged her vehicle or threatened her. But the court did allow the government to submit testimony from the officers who conducted the traffic stop and the officers who later arrived at the scene.

Following the government’s opening statement at trial, Pierson’s counsel objected and moved for a mistrial based on the government’s use of the word “likely” rather than “may” in reference to whether Pierson was expected to be armed.

The court admonished both government and defense counsel but denied the motion for a mistrial. Also, the court indicated that it intended to give a limiting instruction to address the proper use of the evidence, in addition to the instructions the jurors had already been given informing them that opening statements are not evidence.

Meanwhile, the government moved to reconsider its motion in limine on the course-of-investigation evidence, and the court determined that evidence was admissible as nonhearsay statements offered to explain why the officers took the steps they took when they pulled the car over and arrested Pierson.

The jury ultimately found Pierson guilty as charged.

On appeal, he argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to hold a hearing to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) when he signed the proffer letter.

“The district court did not abuse its discretion here,” Judge Ilana Rovner wrote. “An evidentiary hearing is necessary only if there is a disputed factual issue that will affect the outcome of the motion.

“… In this instance, Pierson provided the district court with nothing but conclusory statements that he did not sign the Proffer Letter knowingly and voluntarily,” Rovner continued. “He did not contend that he was coerced, and he offered no support for a conclusion that he did not understand the rights that Rules 410 and 11(f) confer.”

Pierson’s arguments against the proffer agreement challenged the way such agreements are designed to work, the 7th Circuit held. By authorizing the prosecutor to use his statements if he contradicted himself at trial, Pierson made his representations more credible and strengthened his hand in plea negotiations.

“Ultimately that means that a defendant who signs a proffer waiver and later withdraws from plea negotiations will not be able to mount a defense that factually contradicts his proffer statements,” Rovner wrote. “Pierson was still able to put the government to its burden of proof and robustly cross-examine the government’s witnesses. That is the bargain he struck with the Proffer Letter.”

Pierson also argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the government to submit the course-of-investigation evidence, including the woman’s statements to officers regarding threats he purportedly made to her.

“But we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in this instance,” Rovner concluded. “The court allowed this testimony only after concluding that the defendant opened the door to it in opening statements, and the court also immediately gave a carefully crafted limiting instruction for the jury on the proper use of this evidence.”

Indiana Supreme Court

Jan. 9, 2024

Jennifer Pennington and Joshua Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc., d/b/a Beacon Health and Fitness, Spear Corporation, and Panzica Building Corporation

23S-CT-182

IN Supreme Court rejects summary judgment for owner of fitness facility where swimmer suffered head injury

The owner of a health and fitness center where a woman suffered a head injury while swimming must face the woman’s negligence-related claims, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled in finding the gym’s owner is not entitled to summary judgment. But the justices affirmed summary judgment for the facility’s principal architect and subcontractor on similar claims.

Justice Christopher Goff wrote the unanimous decision.

The case involves a Beacon Health and Fitness facility that opened in November 2016. The Panzica Building Corporation was the principal architect and designer for the facility, and it subcontracted with the Spear Corporation to design the swimming pool.

During the first week the pool was open, Dr. Jennifer Pennington began using it to swim laps. While transitioning from a freestyle stroke to a backstroke, Pennington hit her head on a concrete “wing-wall,” causing her injury.

Pennington and her husband, Joshua, subsequently filed suit against Beacon, Panzica and Spear alleging negligence-related claims related to the design of the pool.

Following discovery, the defendants asked the St. Joseph Superior Court to bar the testimony of Dr. Thomas Sawyer, the Penningtons’ expert, and to strike various items of evidence, including post-accident photos of the pool and an email sent by Panzica’s president. They also moved for summary judgment.

The trial court partially restricted Sawyer’s testimony and struck the evidence.

It also granted summary judgment in full to Panzica and Spear, and to Beacon on counts of defective design and failure to warn.

Beacon was also awarded partial summary judgment on negligent maintenance and operation, but it was denied partial summary judgment as to its failure to provide adequate warnings and instruction. Also, the court denied summary judgment to Beacon on a count alleging it deprived Joshua of his wife’s services and companionship due to her injury, insofar as it derived from a maintenance-and-operation claim.

The trial court then entered final judgment on Spear’s motion under Indiana Trial Rule 54(B).

The Penningtons appealed the summary judgments in favor of Spear and Panzica while Beacon sought, and was granted, an interlocutory appeal under Appellate Rule 14(B). The Penningtons also raised cross-appeal issues as to Beacon.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed in full in a March decision.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer in July, then affirmed and reversed in part.

As an initial matter, Goff clarified that all summary judgment issues are available to the court on interlocutory appeal.

He noted that the trial court’s Rule 54(B) certification entered final judgment as to Spear, while the trial court granted Beacon’s request for interlocutory appeal only as to the part of its order partially denying summary judgment to Beacon.

“This manner of proceeding improperly purported to certify a specific issue rather than the interlocutory order as a whole,” Goff wrote.

But looking to Budden v. Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, 698 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. 1998), the justices concluded that “when a trial court purports to certify an ‘issue,’ it implicitly certifies the entire order and merely identifies a ‘substantial question of law’ that calls for ‘early determination.’”

Turning to the merits, the justices first addressed — and affirmed — the Penningtons’ appeal of summary judgment in favor of Spear and Panzica.

First, the high court determined the trial court did not err in excluding part of Sawyer’s — the Penningtons’ expert — evidence because he admitted to being unqualified to speak about an architect’s standard of care.

Also, the email from the president of Panzica to Spear executives saying a “condition” of the pool “expose[d]” the defendants to “liability for injury” was properly excluded because the Penningtons did not contest the trial court’s conclusion that the statement was an inadmissible legal conclusion.

Further, the exclusion of post-accident photos of the pool was proper because “evidence of subsequent remedial measures cannot be used to prove negligence.”

Finally, a binder containing miscellaneous design materials was properly excluded because there was no foundation for that exhibit.

“The Penningtons’ evidence fails to create an issue of fact over whether Spear or Panzica’s work fell below their professional standard of care,” Goff wrote. “For this reason, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Spear and Panzica.”

However, the justices reversed the grant of summary judgment for Beacon on the maintenance-and-operation claim.

In reaching that conclusion, Goff noted that Pennington’s injury implicated the condition of the pool, not activities on the premises, meaning the court used the foreseeability test under the Restatement (Second) of Tort § 343.

“The unreasonable danger in which Dr. Pennington allegedly found herself was not merely swimming backstroke, but swimming backstroke next to the unpadded wing-wall,” he wrote. “It was the placement and condition of this wing-wall that formed the basis for alleging a duty to protect.”

Applying that test, the justices concluded that issues of fact exist as to whether Beacon owed a duty to protect invitees from striking the wing-wall.

While Beacon met its initial burden to show that Pennington’s injury was unforeseeable, the Penningtons succeeded in designating evidence that Beacon either did or should have foreseen the risk by offering Sawyer’s opinion.

“Dr. Sawyer stated that Beacon could have made the pool safer by providing signage warning against swimming backstroke alongside the wing-walls, lifeguards to ‘enforce the rules and assist’ swimmers, and functioning surveillance cameras. This evidence creates an issue of fact over whether Beacon should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have foreseen what happened as a matter of its operational and managerial responsibility,” Goff wrote.

He continued, “We thus agree for the most part with the Penningtons that summary judgment was unwarranted on Count III. However, we affirm the trial court’s entry of partial summary judgment on one specific issue within Count III” — specifically, the issue of whether the water level contributed to the pool’s allegedly dangerous condition.

Further, looking to Roumbos v. Samuel G. Vazanellis & Thiros and Stracci, PC, 95 N.E.3d 63 (Ind. 2018), the justices concluded there is an issue of fact as to whether the risk was known or obvious.

Finally, the court determined Beacon is not entitled to summary judgment on the design claim.

“In Dr. Sawyer’s view, Beacon acted ‘carelessly and negligently’ in failing to appoint a ‘design committee/team’ composed of professionals such as ‘an aquatic consultant/specialist (with aquatic safety expertise)’ to liaise with Spear and Panzica during the design process,” Goff wrote. “… This opinion creates an issue of fact concerning Beacon’s alleged breach of its standard of care.

“Still, Beacon repeatedly states that it ‘relied’ on Spear and Panzica to design and build a safe pool,” he continued. “… However, there is evidence indicating that Beacon itself played a role in the design process.

“… Therefore,” the justice concluded, “the evidence does not utterly foreclose the possibility that Beacon, in the exercise of reasonable care, should itself have discovered and remedied the allegedly dangerous condition during the design phase.”

The case was remanded for trial on all the Penningtons’ claims against Beacon.

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Dec. 29, 2023

Shawn Tyler Miller v. State of Indiana

23A-CR-1793

Defendant’s right to speedy trial not violated by continuance, COA affirms

A man’s appointed counsel agreed to the rescheduling of his trial beyond a 70-day deadline and did not raise an objection, so his right to a speedy trial was not violated, the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed.

In December 2022, Shawn Miller had a domestic dispute with his girlfriend, after which the state charged him with two counts of Level 6 felony criminal confinement of his girlfriend and her daughter; Level 6 felony strangulation; Level 6 felony intimidation; and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.

According to court records, on Jan. 25, 2023, Miller’s appointed counsel requested a speedy trial, which made the latest permissible trial date April 5. The Vanderburgh Circuit Court scheduled a trial for April 3.

Three days before Miller’s scheduled trial, the trial court entered a congestion order due to a trial in another case, State v. Woodard.

At a hearing on April 3, the trial court rescheduled Miller’s jury trial for June 2 —a date to which Miller’s counsel agreed. Miller, however, personally objected to “any and all continuances” that would place his trial outside the “70-day calendar day deadline.”

The trial court noted and overruled Miller’s objection. In April and May, Miller filed pro se motions for discharge and dismissal and asked to terminate counsel and proceed pro se.

At a hearing on June 1, the trial court granted Miller permission to proceed pro se, and he filed another petition for discharge. However, after hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion, finding the new trial date had been set within a reasonable time.

At that same hearing, the parties disputed newly-discovered evidence, and Miller requested a one-week continuance to review it. The trial court granted Miller’s request and set the trial date for June 9.

On June 9, Miller moved for discharge.

In that motion, Miller claimed his case had been pushed due to Woodard, despite there being no early-trial request under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B) or imminent Criminal Rule 4(A) or (C) deadlines in that case.

The trial court denied Miller’s motion, explaining that the Vanderburgh Superior Court’s rule prioritizing Criminal Rule 4(B) cases does not apply to the circuit court.

The case proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which a jury found Miller guilty of strangulation, intimidation, domestic battery and one of the confinement charges, and not guilty of the other confinement charge.

The trial court sentenced Miller to an aggregate 609-day sentence.

Miller appealed and argued the trial court violated his Criminal Rule 4(B) right to a speedy trial by continuing his trial beyond the 70-day deadline.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Judge Cale Bradford wrote the opinion for the appellate court.

Bradford noted the state’s argument that Miller had waived his request for a speedy trial by failing to object and affirmatively acquiescing to a trial date outside the 70-day window.

Miller argued that, because it was impossible to reschedule the trial within the Criminal Rule 4 deadline, no objection was necessary. He also claimed that even if he had had a duty to object, he did so pro se despite his counsel failing to object.

The appellate court agreed with the state that the issue was waived, with Bradford writing that Miller’s reliance on N.E.S. v. State, 708 N.E.2d 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), was misplaced.

“In that case, we acknowledged that ‘a defendant has no duty to object to the setting of a belated trial when the setting of the date occurs after the time expires such that the court cannot reset the trial date within the time allotted by Crim. R. 4(C). All the defendant needs to do then is move for discharge,’” Bradford wrote.

For Miller, the trial court entered its congestion order on March 31, 2022, which was a few days before Miller’s speedy-trial deadline, and the parties scheduled a new trial date before the expiration of that deadline. Therefore, N.E.S. does not control, Bradford wrote.

Bradford added that Miller’s objection should have come through his counsel.

Although he had been represented by counsel at the time, Miller lodged a pro se objection “to any and all continuances.”

“However, once counsel is appointed, a defendant speaks through his counsel and the trial court is not required to respond to the defendant’s pro-se requests or objections,” Bradford wrote, citing Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000).

According to Bradford, while the trial court acknowledged and denied Miller’s objection, that did nothing to undermine Miller’s counsel of record’s agreement to continue the trial date.

“Therefore, we conclude that, in the absence of an objection from Miller’s counsel, the issue is waived,” Bradford wrote.

Judges Nancy Vaidik and Elaine Brown concurred.

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Jan. 9, 2024

Esther Martin v. State of Indiana

22A-PC-2574

Split COA affirms denial of PCR to woman with intellectual disabilities convicted of child molesting

A woman with intellectual disabilities whose sentence for child molesting was already cut in half failed in her bid to convince the Court of Appeals of Indiana that she was entitled to post-conviction relief.

A dissenting judge, however, wrote that the woman’s trial counsel should have requested another competency exam before her second trial began.

Esther Martin was raised by Andrew and Arlene Martin, who adopted her when she was about 4 years old. The Martins are Old Order Mennonite and have five children, all adopted.

Martin exhibited developmental delays as a child and did not continue education past eighth grade, which wasn’t uncommon in her community. She lived with her parents in rural Elkhart County helping with household chores and never worked outside the home.

The Martins eventually began providing child care in their home for a handful of children, including B.H. Martin was about 18 years old at the time and helped care for the children.

According to court records, in January 2011, B.H. told his father that Martin, who was 26, was touching him inappropriately. B.H. was 10 at the time, and he said the touching began when he was 6 or 7.

Before an interview with Elkhart County Sheriff’s Detective Ryan Hubbell, Martin’s father informed the detective that she communicated at the level of a 12-year-old.

During the interview, Martin said she had a “problem” with wanting to inappropriately touch the children in her mother’s day care 10 to 15 years ago, but she had since grown out of it.

In October 2011, the state charged Martin with two counts of Class A felony child molesting related to B.H. The case was set for trial in July 2014, but a mistrial was ultimately declared when a juror asked if Martin’s mental state had een assessed.

Subsequent evaluations found she was not competent to stand trial. Thus, in November 2014, the Elkhart Superior Court committed Martin to the Division of Mental Health, and she was admitted to Madison State Hospital.

While there, Martin participated in the Legal Education Group with the goal that she could have a basic understanding of the conditions for participating in her own defense and the charges against her, along with the potential consequences and the trial process. Two doctors reported that despite Martin’s low IQ, she had scored 90.2% on a recent legal terminology test.

The case was reset for trial in January 2016.

Prior to trial, Martin’s counsel filed a motion to suppress her January 2011 interview, arguing that due to her mental deficiencies, she did not fully understand the waiver of Miranda rights or its significance.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

The trial proceeded, and the jury ultimately found Martin, then 32, guilty as charged.

At sentencing, her counsel argued that mitigating circumstances existed, including her mental challenges and lack of criminal history.

The state argued that while Martin didn’t have an official criminal record, there were prior incidents of sexual misconduct that her parents were aware of. The state further noted that while Martin was at MSH, she inappropriately touched a peer despite being specifically told to stay away from that person.

The court found the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and viewed Martin as an “opportunist,” having contact with B.H. when no one was around. She was sentenced to consecutive 40-year terms.

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced Martin’s sentence to concurrent 40-year terms.

She then filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel on 16 bases, and that her appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that she should have received credit against her sentence for her time at MSH.

The post-conviction court denied relief, leading to the instant appeal.

In her second appeal, Martin argued that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to request another competency evaluation prior to the 2016 trial.

However, the appellate court agreed with the PCR court that Martin’s trial counsel didn’t provide deficient performance.

“We agree with the State that, given the two 2015 competency reports, ‘no reasonable attorney would have believed there was a need to re-challenge Martin’s competency,” Chief Judge Robert Altice wrote. “Accordingly, we find, as did the PCR court, that (trial counsel) did not provide deficient performance by failing to seek a competency hearing before the second trial. Her ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to request a competency hearing fails.”

Martin also argued that her trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to present available evidence of her intellectual disability.

Rejecting that claim, Altice wrote, “While counsel could have provided more evidence of Martin’s mental functioning, there is a presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance, and we are not persuaded that additional evidence about Martin’s recognized intellectual limitations would have had any appreciable effect on the sentence imposed.”

Finally, Martin argued — and the COA disagreed — that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the state’s argument at sentencing that her family and community were aware of her sexual deviant tendencies yet failed to protect children from her and instead protected their own.

“As the State observes, the argument was likely responsive to Martin’s mitigating argument at sentencing that her family and community had supported her throughout the whole process and were present at the sentencing hearing,” Altice wrote. “Moreover, while the trial court did mention the family/community’s complicity, it did not expressly identify such as an aggravator … .”

Judge Peter Foley concurred, but Judge Patricia Riley dissented with a separate opinion.

In her dissent, Riley concluded that trial counsel’s representation was inconsistent with prevailing professional norms, resulting in ineffective assistance when he failed to seek a competency hearing before Martin’s second trial.

“Unlike the majority and the post-conviction court, I find that an abundant amount of contemporaneous evidence exists which, viewed against the backdrop of Martin’s prior psychological and psychiatric testing, casts a bona fide doubt on Martin’s competency at the time of her second trial in January 2016,” Riley wrote.

The dissenting judge noted Martin had memorization capabilities that helped her pass the legal exam while committed, but that didn’t prove she fully understood the trial process.

“During MSH’s attempted ‘restoration’ of Martin’s intellectual abilities to gain an understanding of the legal process, it was obvious that, although Martin had memorization capabilities to a certain extent, these abilities declined rapidly once she was no longer ‘drilled.’ By the time of the second trial, it can be reasonably inferred that, in the absence of constant drilling and repetition, Martin had resorted back to her initial intellectual baseline,” Riley wrote.

While Riley said she would agree with the majority under normal circumstances, the moment a juror handed the trial court a note questioning Martin’s mental abilities, normal circumstances ceased to exist.

“Accordingly, I conclude that Martin met her burden of establishing that, had (trial counsel) requested a competency hearing, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of her case would have been different,” Riley concluded. “(Trial counsel) was ineffective for failing to challenge Martin’s competency to stand trial in 2016, and the post-conviction court’s conclusion is clearly erroneous.”

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Steven T. Lakes v. State of Indiana

23A-CR-1442

Marijuana, meth convictions reversed for insufficient evidence, double jeopardy

The legalization of hemp has led to the reversal of a man’s possession of marijuana conviction at the Court of Appeals of Indiana, which also vacated a meth-possession conviction on double jeopardy grounds.

The case began when Brookville Police Lt. Ryan Geiser initiated a traffic stop of Steven Lakes for failing to signal before turning, and because Lakes’ vehicle had an excessively loud muffler. During the stop, Geiser detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside Lakes’ vehicle.

A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a clear bag with a substance that tested positive for marijuana. The search also revealed 10 grams of methamphetamine, a digital scale, a smoking pipe and a small container holding pills of the controlled substance buprenorphine.

The state charged Lakes with Level 3 felony dealing in meth, Level 5 felony possession of meth, Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.

A jury found Lakes guilty of all charges, and the Franklin Circuit Court sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Lakes only challenged his convictions for Level 5 felony possession of meth and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana.

On the marijuana conviction, the appellate court noted that the state sent the suspected meth to the Indiana State Police Lab for further testing, but the suspected marijuana was not tested.

“This leads to the fatal flaw underpinning Lakes’s marijuana conviction: with the legalization of hemp, Lieutenant Geiser’s generic statement no longer satisfies the State’s burden of proof,” Judge Leanna Weissmann wrote.

Thus, the COA found insufficient evidence to support the possession of marijuana conviction and reversed on that count.

“Lakes next asks this Court to vacate his conviction for possession of methamphetamine because it is a lesser-included offense to his dealing conviction and is based on the same underlying facts,” Weissmann continued. “With the State conceding that this argument is correct, we agree and remand for the trial court to vacate Lakes’s possession of methamphetamine conviction.”•