Indiana Court Decisions: June 1-14, 2023

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

June 9

United States of America v. Derrick Granger, Clifford R. King Jr., and Eric Walker

21-2874, 21-3056 and 21-3382

7th Circuit declines 3 men’s appeals to discard judge’s assessment of juror, vacates 1 man’s sentence

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals declined to overrule a district court judge’s decision to not disqualify a juror in a heroin and methamphetamine case involving three men. But the appellate court did vacate the sentence handed down for one of the men.

During their trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Derrick Granger, Clifford King and Eric Walker requested that the judge disqualify a juror who said, as a retired police officer, he would be more inclined to believe an officer than he would a civilian witness.

The juror was subject to voir dire examination because all three defendants had exhausted their peremptory challenges. The judge denied the motion, and the three men were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and methamphetamine, as well as firearm offenses.

Granger and King were sentenced to 30 years, and Walker was sentenced to 27 1/2 years.

The defendants raised seven issues on appeal, though the 7th Circuit ruled only two warranted discussion.

Their main argument was the district court judge should have struck the juror for cause.

But the 7th Circuit disagreed in separate but identical opinions for each defendant.

The opinions include a transcript of a back-and-forth between Juror 70 and the judge. It started when the judge asked the group of potential jurors if they thought a law enforcement officer’s testimony should receive extra weight. Juror 70 raised his hand, and the judge asked what “extra weight” meant to him.

“Well, being a retired police officer with 30 years of service, the vast majority of police officers in my experience take their oath very, very seriously; and I can’t think of too many times or any times actually in my entire career where I have seen or heard of evidence being presented by a police officer that wasn’t the straight-up truth,” the juror said.

Asked if he could keep an “open mind” and “judge each witness by their testimony,” the juror said he could.

Defense counsel asked the juror if he would give greater weight to testimony by police officers.

“I would like to believe I’m fair and take everything at face value; but I mean, it’s what I’ve done for over 30 years, and I’m still involved in an ancillary role as a rider,” the juror said. “So I would say that police officers—I look at them as coming in vetted already.”

In disagreeing with the defendants’ arguments, the 7th Circuit ruled the district judge can do things like “hear the prospective juror’s tone of voice” to help make a reliable assessment of honesty.

“A transcript lacks that information,” the opinions say, also noting the district judge can read a prospective juror’s facial expressions and body language.

The defendants also argued a prospective juror’s assurances must be the last thing they say. For the juror in question, his last words had to do with giving more weight to a police officer’s testimony as opposed to a witness he knew “nothing about.”

According to the 7th Circuit, the case Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2001) “could be read to imply a last-in-time requirement for evaluating the statements of a prospective juror.” But Thompson didn’t announce or even consider such a rule, the opinion says.

The 7th Circuit also said other cases consider everything the prospective juror said, without suggesting that only the final statement matters.

“The norm in this circuit has been, and remains, that a district judge may take into account everything a potential juror says when deciding whether that person can be impartial,” the opinion says.

The 7th Circuit also noted it was “undoubtedly a closely balanced situation” and that other judges may have granted the request to remove the juror.

But the 7th Circuit did vacate Walker’s sentence, ruling the district court judge didn’t totally satisfy all three elements of the relevant-conduct sentencing guideline to establish Walker was accountable for all drugs that the conspiracy as a whole distributed during his time as a participant.

The judge established the first two findings, the 7th Circuit ruled, but not the third, which addresses what conduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to Walker.

The omission required a remand for resentencing, the opinion says.

The convictions, along with the sentences for Granger and King, were affirmed.

Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote the opinions.

The cases are United State of America v. Derrick Granger, Clifford R. King Jr., and Eric Walker, 21-2874, 21-3056 & 21-3382.

Indiana Supreme Court

June 8

Donald R. Owen, Jr. v. State of Indiana

21S-LW-333

IN Supreme Court affirms LWOP sentence for man involved in 2019 gang torture, killing

A man who received life without parole for his role in torturing and killing a woman failed to convince the Indiana Supreme Court that three statutory aggravators applied to his murder conviction were inappropriate.

Donald Owen, a leader of the local Latin Kings gang in Elkhart County, was called to a house in 2019 after other gang members suspected a woman, Kim Dyer, was a police snitch.

By the time Owen arrived at the house, other members had interrogated Dyer in the basement and had her zip-tied with her mouth taped shut. They had also turned on another man, Rob Porter, whom Dyer had brought with her to the house.

Owen robbed Porter and zip-tied him before questioning Dyer. He removed a bandana he was wearing over his face because “there was no point in having it on” since Dyer knew she was going to die.

Owen then made Porter crawl into a dog cage and ordered him to put a cigarette out on his own tongue.

Porter was sent back to the basement, where he heard Owen tell another member to make Porter and Dyer “go to sleep.” Another member told Porter he would have to help strangle Dyer if he wanted to leave the house alive, so he did.

Another member eventually slit Dyer’s throat, and Owen never intervened. He then led the effort to clean the crime scene, and he put her body in a trash can and helped drive it to Michigan.

Owen fled to Texas, where he was arrested and brought back to Elkhart County.

Owen was convicted by a jury in the Elkhart Circuit Court of murder, felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury and two counts of criminal confinement.

The jury found three statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt and recommended a sentence of life without parole for the murder conviction, which the trial court adopted.

Owen appealed, challenging his murder conviction and LWOP aggravator, as well as his sentence.

He argued there was insufficient evidence that he was a “major participant” in the murder and that there was insufficient evidence that he murdered Dyer while also satisfying one of the statutory aggravators that he did it to further the interests of the Latin Kings gang.

The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling he “actively participated in the antecedent crimes leading to Dyer’s murder.”

That included holding her against her will, interrogating her and giving the order to “make her go to sleep.”

The Supreme Court also ruled the criminal-organization aggravator was appropriate, finding it undisputed that the gang is a criminal organization and that Dyer’s confinement was related to the gang.

“Owen’s behavior at the house also connected the killing to the Latin Kings,” the opinion says. “He ‘tagged’ the basement after Dyer’s death, spraying his name, ‘King Duke’, and other Latin Kings symbols on the walls.”

The Supreme Court also ruled the under-custody aggravator was appropriate.

Owen also argued the trial court erred by declining to provide two proposed instructions to the jury.

The instructions included the state’s duty to prove Owen was a “major participant” and the different levels of intent the jury had to find in the penalty phase versus the guilt phase.

The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling the instructions could have confused the jury.

Lastly, Owen argued the trial court relied on several aggravating factors not supported by the record. Specifically, he argued there was insufficient evidence that he was involved in beating and torturing Dyer for being a snitch; that he allowed Dyer to have her head shaved, to be treated in a demeaning manner, to be waterboarded and to be duct-taped; and that he was present when Dyer was strangled and killed.

“As for Owen’s claim that he had nothing to do with Dyer’s torture, the record shows it happened on his watch and under his supervision,” the opinion says.

Even if he was right about one or more of the aggravators, the Supreme Court said the error wouldn’t warrant resentencing.

The Supreme Court ordered the trial court to produce an amended transcript of the sidebars and told Owen to either file a supplemental brief or notify that he wouldn’t file a further brief within 30 days. But the brief was filed late, and his untimely brief meant any supplemental arguments were waived.

“Were we even to consider the additional arguments Owen raised in his supplemental brief, we would find them to be without merit,” the opinion says.

Justice Geoffrey Slaughter wrote the opinion. Chief Justice Loretta Rush and Justices Mark Massa, Christopher Goff and Derek Molter concurred.

The case is Donald R. Owen, Jr. v. State of Indiana, 21S–LW–333.

Court of Appeals of Indiana

June 2

Indiana Department of Insurance and Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Jane Doe and John Doe I, individually and as next friends and legal guardians of John Doe II, an unmarried minor, and Johnathan Cavins and Board of Trustees of Anonymous Hospital

22A-CT-1276

Split COA rules Patient’s Compensation Fund entitled to summary judgment in malpractice case

A split Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled the Patient’s Compensation Fund is entitled to summary judgment in a medical malpractice case because, among other reasons, an underlying act of medical malpractice is a necessary predicate to a medical credentialing malpractice claim.

The ruling reversed a lower court’s decision.

The legal guardians of a teenager filed a medical malpractice action against Jonathan Cavins and the hospital where he was a pediatrician after Cavins was convicted of two counts of felony child molesting, one count of felony sexual misconduct with a minor and two counts of felony child seduction for his commission of sexual acts on several male teenage patients, including John Doe II, the minor.

Jane Doe and John Doe I reached a settlement with the hospital in an amount sufficient to permit them to petition for excess damages from the Patient’s Compensation Fund.

The settlement isn’t final but is contingent on whether the Does gain access to the fund.

The Does filed this action for additional compensation from the fund, and the hospital and Cavins intervened.

The Department of Insurance and the fund moved for summary judgment, asserting the Does’ claims fall outside the scope of the Medical Malpractice Act.

The Boone Circuit Court denied the motion, and the Department of Insurance and the fund appealed.

The ultimate question presented on appeal, the COA said, was whether the Does satisfied the statutory prerequisites for access to the Patient’s Compensation Fund.

The COA first addressed whether a freestanding claim of negligent credentialing can exist where the underlying act of negligence does not constitute medical malpractice under the act.

Neither the Does nor the hospital argued the negligent credentialing claim turned on whether a sexual assault constitutes medical malpractice, and the fund argued the Does’ negligent credentialing claim against the hospital was based on a claim that isn’t compensable under the act.

The Does argued the substance of their claim against the hospital constituted medical malpractice because the credentialing of a doctor is directly related to the provision of health care. The hospital agreed with the Does and further argued any underlying tort caused by negligent credentialing should suffice, regardless of whether it constitutes medical malpractice.

But the COA did not agree with the hospital’s view that any tort will do, that a negligent credentialing claim is a freestanding claim, and that it doesn’t make a difference whether the underlying claim sounds in medical negligence.

“This is an argument that finds no support in our case law; rather, the case law is clear that an underlying act of medical malpractice is the predicate and condition precedent for a negligent credentialing claim,” the COA ruled.

Citing as an example the case Fairbanks Hospital v. Harrold, 895 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), the opinion says the court has “consistently held that sexual misconduct is unrelated to the promotion of a patient’s health and does not constitute medical malpractice” and that Cavin’s misconduct constitutes ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice.

The COA next addressed if the liability of the health care provider under Indiana Code section 34- 18-15-3(5) precludes the fund from disputing the compensability of a claim for excess damages.

The Does argued the fund can’t challenge their negligent credentialing claim against the hospital because it is “established” as a matter of law as a result of their settlement agreement.

The opinion says the Does conflated two distinct concepts: factual compensability and legal compensability. There was an “excellent discussion” of the distinction in the case Cutchin v. Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 446 F. Supp. 3d 413, 420-21 (S.D. Ind. 2020), the COA said.

The COA ruled the settlement agreement between the Does, the hospital and Cavins established only the liability of Cavins and the hospital and does not preclude the fund from challenging the applicability of the act to the Does’ claims.

The COA next addressed if the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel can prevent the fund from contesting compensability of an excess damages claim where the fund did not intervene before the claimant and health care provider reached a settlement agreement to which the fund is not a party.

The hospital argued the doctrines should be applied to preclude the fund from challenging the applicability of the act to the Does’ claim and that the fund should have contested the Does’ claim to excess damages sooner than it did.

The COA disagreed, ruling parties to a medical malpractice claim cannot bind the fund as a non-party by an adjudication or stipulation establishing the health care provider’s factual liability in negligence.

“Rather, the Fund is permitted to make an independent determination of whether a claim for excess damages is based upon a claim covered by the Act,” the opinion says, “and the Fund’s responsibility in this regard is not ripe until a claim for excess damages is made.”

Finally, the COA addressed the applicability of the case Martinez v. Oaklawn Psychiatric Center, Inc., 128 N.E.3d 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Martinez announced a new “current test” for evaluating medical malpractice claims based on the employment law concept of scope of employment and the doctrine of respondeat superior. It stated the test for whether the act applies to specific misconduct is “whether that misconduct arises naturally or predictably from the relationship between the health care provider and patient or from an opportunity provided by that relationship.”

But the COA ruled Martinez did not apply to the case at hand because the court in Martinez did not apply the “current test” to any conduct not already within the recognized scope of the act.

“Instead, in Martinez we followed—and did not broaden or otherwise deviate from—well-established medical malpractice case law,” the COA said in concluding the actual holding in Martinez doesn’t affect the application of the act in this case.

The case was remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the fund.

Senior Judge Edward Najam wrote the majority opinion. Judge Peter Foley concurred.

The case is Indiana Department of Insurance and Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Jane Doe and John Doe I, individually and as next friends and legal guardians of John Doe II, an unmarried minor and Jonathan Cavins and Board of Trustees of Anonymous Hospital, 22A-CT-1276.

Judge Margret Robb concurred and dissented in part in a separate opinion.

Robb’s only disagreement was with the determination that an underlying act of medical malpractice is a necessary predicate and condition precedent to a medical credentialing malpractice claim.

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June 6

H.P. and S.P. v. G.F.

22A-AD-2674

COA reverses judgment giving visitation rights to grandfather in adoption case

Finding a grandfather lacked standing to seek grandparent visitation, the Court of Appeals of Indiana has reversed the grant of visitation rights to the grandfather in an adoption case.

The case centers on K.F., who was born in 2016. In 2018, the parental rights of mother B.R. and father T.F. were terminated due to substance abuse issues, resulting in K.F. becoming a ward of the state through child in need of services proceedings.

The Indiana Department of Child Services placed K.F. in relative care with H.P. and S.P during the week and with grandfather G.F. on weekends.

After the parents’ rights had been terminated, the Hendricks Superior Court ordered a plan of adoption, prompting H.P. and S.P. to begin taking steps to adopt the child with the consent of DCS. The adoption was granted in May 2019 without any notice to the grandfather.

A few months later, S.P. told G.F. that the adoption had been finalized. The adoptive parents continued to voluntarily give the grandfather weekend visitations with the child.

The child’s biological parents died a few years after the adoption — the father in July 2021 and the mother in January 2022. Around the same time, the adoptive parents ended visits with the grandfather, although for reasons unrelated to the biological parents’ deaths.

In April 2022, the grandfather filed a motion to reopen the adoption and intervene. He argued that he had a right to pursue grandparent visitation because he was not provided with proper notice of the adoption.

The trial court granted the grandfather’s motion to intervene. He then filed a motion for grandparent visitation, which the adoptive parents opposed on the merits as well as on the basis that reopening the adoption proceedings almost three years later was improper.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued its order awarding visitation to the grandfather on alternating weekends from Friday after school until Monday morning, or 6 p.m. to 9 a.m. when school isn’t in session.

The adoptive parents appealed and their request for a stay of the visitation order was granted by the appellate court. The stay remained in effect following the denial of the grandfather’s motion to reconsider.

While the adoptive parents presented the appellate court with several issues, the court only addressed one: whether the grandfather had standing to seek grandparent visitation rights at the time he filed his petition.

The appellate court found he did not have standing.

“In sum, we hold that Grandfather no longer has standing to seek grandparent visitation and that his attempt to regain standing by attacking the adoption decree is fruitless given the applicable statute of limitations,” Chief Judge Robert Altice wrote. “Accordingly, the trial court erred by addressing the merits of Grandfather’s claim for grandparent visitation under the Act. It may very well be that continued contact with Grandfather is in Child’s best interests, but at this point, such a determination must be left to her parents, not the court.”

This case is H.P. and S.P. v. G.F., 22A-AD-2674.

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June 13

Netflix Inc., Disney DTC LLC, Hulu LLC, DIRECTTV LLC, Dish Network Corp., and Dish Network L.L.C. v. City of Fishers, Indiana, City of Indianapolis, Indiana, City of Evansville, Indiana, and City of Valparaiso, Indiana on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

22A-PL-1630

Trial court has jurisdiction over complaint against streaming services, COA affirms

The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed and remanded a case in which four Indiana cities allege streaming services are subjected to requirements of the Indiana Video Service Franchises Act, ruling that Marion Superior Court has the authority to hear the case.

In August 2020, the cities of Indianapolis, Evansville, Valparaiso and Fishers filed a complaint alleging that streaming services Netflix, Inc., Disney DTC, LLC, Hulu, LLC, DIRECTV, LLC, Dish Network Corp., and Dish Network L.L.C. provide video service in Indiana.

The Indiana Video Service Franchises Act requires entities that provide video service in Indiana to obtain a franchise authorizing the construction of a video service system.

None of the streaming services in the complaint have obtained a franchise from the Indiana Utilities Regulatory Commission, meaning they haven’t paid fees to the four cities which are “units” under the VSF Act.

According to the complaint, the cities sought a declaration that the VSF Act applies to the streaming services and that they have violated the requirements, and accounting for the monies owed by the streaming services to the four cities, an order enjoining those streaming services from providing video services in Indiana until they obtain a franchise and pay the fees.

Also, the cities sought an order that the streaming services comply with the requirements of the VSF Act and pay any franchise fees, attorney fees and expenses associated with the action.

In December 2020, the streaming services filed a variety of motions to dismiss the four cities’ complaints. The motions to dismiss held two main arguments: whether the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and the complaint fails to allege a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Marion Superior Court denied all of the motions to dismiss in January 2022.

A month later, the streaming services filed a motion for certification for interlocutory appeal which was granted in June 2022. The appellate court accepted jurisdiction in August 2022.

However, on May 4, Gov. Eric Holcomb signed into law HEA 1454 which excluded streaming services from the definition of “video service.” Thus, the amendment to VSF is retroactive to July 1, 2006.

The first issue the COA addressed was whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction.

“No facts, as of yet, have been presented to the trial court, and, thus, there can be no dispute by the parties with respect to any facts. We therefore review the trial court’s decision to deny the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo,” Judge Peter Foley wrote.

The streaming services also questioned whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that “[t]here is no explicit procedural requirement in the VSF calling for the Plaintiffs to first seek a determination from the IURC on whether Defendants must apply for a franchise at all.”

“The four cities cannot be compelled to exhaust a remedy that does not exist,” Foley wrote. “We need not visit the streaming services’ arguments about whether the VSF Act creates a private right of action. The trial court correctly found that its jurisdiction derived from the (Indiana Declaratory Judgment Act).”

The appellate court found that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction.

On whether the VSF Act applies to the streaming services, the case is remanded back to the Marion Superior Court to vacate the denial of the streaming services’ motions to dismiss.

The case is Netflix Inc., Disney DTC LLC, Hulu LLC, DIRECTTV LLC, Dish Network Corp., and Dish Network L.L.C. v. City of Fishers, Indiana, City of Indianapolis, Indiana, City of Evansville, Indiana, and City of Valparaiso, Indiana on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 22A-PL-1630.

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June 14

The Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Richard Kelly v. The Board of Commissioners of Clinton County and the County Council of Clinton County

22A-PL-2640

COA affirms declaratory judgment in case involving Clinton Co. sheriff who hired wife as jail matron

The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed a trial court’s declaratory judgment in a case involving Clinton County’s sheriff and his wife, ruling that it was not unlawful for a sheriff to appoint his wife as a jail matron and appoint a legal deputy of his choosing, but the county’s commissioners have oversight over contracts with that deputy that might encumber the county’s general fund.

The Tippecanoe Circuit Court’s order made no determination regarding any criminal activity in the case.

According to court records, in January 2019, Richard Kelly began his term as Clinton County’s sheriff.

Kelly appointed his spouse, Ashley Kelly, as the jail matron and manager of the jail commissary for the sheriff’s office.

The sheriff also appointed a legal deputy to serve the sheriff’s office.

The Indiana State Board of Accounts and Indiana State Police investigated the use of the jail’s commissary fund.

The Indiana Attorney General’s Office has also filed a complaint to recover public funds from the Clinton County sheriff and his wife, who are also facing conflict of interest and official misconduct charges for alleged misuse of jail commissary funds.

In March 2021, the Board of Commissioners of Clinton County filed a complaint for emergency preliminary injunctive relief requesting an order prohibiting Kelly from expending any further money from the commissary fund.

In April 2021, an amended complaint was filed adding, as plaintiff, the County Council of Clinton County. The trial court issued an order on June 14, 2021, denying the board’s and council’s request for a preliminary injunction.

On June 25, 2021, the sheriff’s office and Kelly filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment requesting that the trial court make the following determinations:

(A) Ind. Code §§ 36-2-2-2, 36-1-3-5(a)(2), and 36-8-10-212 allow elected officers, including Sheriff Kelly, to execute their own contracts subject to their budgets;

(B) Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10.6 provides that Kelly is entitled to appoint a legal deputy, neither the board nor the council approve the contract for the legal deputy, and the Council must appropriate a reasonable amount to pay the legal deputy;

(C) Ind. Code § 36-8-10-21 provides for the commissary fund and neither the board nor the council approve contracts for personnel regarding the commissary, including contracts for commissary manager;

(D) Kelly did not unlawfully pay legal fees from the commissary fund when there was a resolution in place for him to pay expenses for contracting with professional consultants;

(E) Kelly was entitled to pay for legal fees from the commissary for the defense of this and other actions challenging the operation of the fund. The counterclaim alleged no contract needed approval by the board and council given that no public funds were used to pay the commissary manager.

In October 2021, the board and council filed a motion to dismiss their complaint, and the trial court granted the motion.

Both the Clinton County board and council and Kelly and the sheriff’s office filed motions for summary judgment.

In their motion, Kelly and the sheriff’s office stated they filed the declaratory judgment action to prevent the interference of the board and council in the operations of the sheriff’s office.

In her affidavit, Ashley Kelly stated that she served as the jail matron as an employee of the sheriff’s office and also provided services as the commissary manager, which was a contractor position, and that her compensation as commissary manager was based on sales.

In their summary judgment motion, the board and council argued that the board as the county executive is the only entity in county government allowed to enter into contracts and that there are financial limits to the sheriff’s ability to contract and pay for a legal deputy.

On July 7, 2022, the court entered an order finding that the sheriff and his wife created Leonne LLC to receive profits from the sale of commissary items, with Ashley Kelly as a 51% member, and Richard Kelly as a 49% member.

The order stated the agreements to hire and pay Ashley Kelly and/or deposit profits into Leonne LLC were not submitted to the county for approval, and “[c]onversely, the former commissary manager, Nancy Ward, wife of former Sheriff Jeff Ward, signed annual contracts with the county, along with conflict of interest disclosures.”

The trial court declined to enter declaratory relief regarding the sheriff’s authority to appoint a legal deputy of his choosing or whether the council must appropriate a reasonable amount to pay that deputy.

It also ruled that it was not unlawful for the sheriff to appoint his wife as the jail matron and declined to enter declaratory relief on the broad question of whether elected officers can execute their own contracts subject to their budgets.

Also, the trial court found that Indiana Code § 36-8-10-21 provides for the sheriff’s commissary fund, and the county must approve contracts regarding the distribution of profits from the commissary fund.

Further, the trial court found that during the period of time when Council Resolution 2017-05 was in place, it was not unlawful for the sheriff to pay legal fees from the commissary fund for legal work of the sheriff’s office, without approval of the county.

It found that during the period of time when that resolution was not in place, the sheriff was still entitled to pay for legal fees from the sheriff’s commissary fund for all matters related to expenses of operating the commissary, without approval of the county.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling and expressed no opinion as to any criminal actions or the sheriff’s office and Kelly’s ability to recover attorney fees.

Writing for the court, Judge Elaine Brown said that, to the extent Kelly and the sheriff’s office requested the trial court to make the determination that elected officers, including Kelly, are allowed to execute their own contracts subject to their budgets, the trial court stated that requests for declaratory relief “must be limited to specific cases and controversies to avoid unintended consequences and judicial overreach” and “decline[d] the invitation to answer this broad question of law.”

“We agree the trial court was not required to enter the broad declaratory judgment requested by Appellants. We find no error in this respect,” Brown wrote.

The appellate court agreed that Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10.6 provides that the sheriff may appoint a legal deputy and that the council and board do not have the authority to reject the sheriff’s selected legal deputy.

The court also found that the trial court’s determination that agreeing upon a reasonable rate for the legal deputy’s fees as an inherent part of the appointment is reasonable and consistent with the intent of state law.

“The court’s limited determination seeks to avoid rendering superfluous the language in the foregoing statutes. We do not disturb the trial court’s limited determinations under these circumstances. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court,” Brown wrote.

Judges L. Mark Bailey and Leanna Weissmann concurred.

The case is The Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Richard Kelly v. The Board of Commissioners of Clinton County and the County Council of Clinton County, 22A-PL-2640.•