Indiana Court Decisions: May 18-31, 2023

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

May 19

United States of America v. Travis Lee Beechler

21-3379

7th Circuit affirms meth conviction, sentence for man on home detention

A search that uncovered 388 grams of methamphetamine and led to a man’s conviction did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because he waived them as part of his home detention, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled in affirming a district court’s judgment.

The 7th Circuit also affirmed sentencing enhancements.

In August 2020, Travis Beechler and his girlfriend were serving terms of home detention confinement through Marion County Community Corrections and were required to stay in their separate residences.

At the time, the FBI Safe Streets Gang Task Force was doing a wiretap investigation involving people distributing controlled substances, and agents discovered a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at the girlfriend’s residence.

Agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor and reported to community corrections that it suspected one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in drug trafficking.

An employee, accompanied by an Indianapolis police officer, went to the girlfriend’s residence for a compliance check, and there they saw both Beechler and his girlfriend. They also discovered meth.

Officers then obtained a search warrant and seized five firearms, ammunition and more evidence of drug trafficking, including 388.4 grams of meth, 10.6 grams of heroin and about $1,500 in cash.

Beechler was charged with possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon.

Beechler was taken into custody and agreed to an interview, acknowledging that he stored the drugs at the home for another person in exchange for free rent, that he had the ability to sell pounds of meth at a time, that others often fronted him up to five pounds of meth and that he tried to make at least $1,000 for each pound he sold.

He also acknowledged guns in the home, admitted that he knew they were loaded and said they were to protect the drugs.

Beechler filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the compliance check, claiming that although law enforcement labeled the search as a community corrections compliance check, officers actually conducted the search for law enforcement purposes, making it a warrantless search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The U.S. District for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, denied the motion, finding Beechler waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of the home detention agreement.

A jury convicted Beechler on all counts.

Beechler moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.

The court denied his post-trial motions, ruling he simply restated his suppression arguments.

The district court applied four sentencing enhancements: the “manager or supervisor” enhancement, the “drug premises” enhancement, an enhancement for having five firearms and the “career offender” enhancement. He was sentenced to 30 years.

On appeal, Beechler challenged the court’s denial of his motion to suppress and his motion for a judgment of acquittal and new trial. He also challenged the court’s application of the sentencing enhancements.

The 7th Circuit affirmed all rulings.

In affirming the denial of Beechler’s motion to suppress, the 7th Circuit ruled that when assessing privacy expectations for a person in the correctional system, it has to weigh factors including the level of supervision to which the person has been subjected with the government’s interest in protecting the public and reducing recidivism.

Beechler’s status on home confinement, the court ruled, “significantly diminished his expectations of privacy.” The court also noted the clarity of Beechler’s home confinement agreement, which contained a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.

“Beechler unambiguously waived his rights under the Fourth Amendment,” the 7th Circuit ruled, adding the state had an interest in supervising him to ensure compliance with the terms of his agreement.

In affirming the denial of Beechler’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, the 7th Circuit noted his argument depends on the finding that the motion to suppress evidence should have been granted.

“Having determined that the district court properly denied his motion to suppress, however, we can consider this evidence in assessing the jury’s verdict,” the 7th Circuit said in ruling the government presented “more than sufficient evidence” of Beechler’s guilt to support the jury’s verdict.

That evidence, the court said, included the interview Beechler gave in which he admitted to selling large quantities of drugs and aiming to make at least $1,000 for every pound sold.

In affirming the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancements, the 7th Circuit ruled the district court didn’t commit reversible error with any of the enhancements.

The “drug premises” enhancement, for example, requires that manufacturing or distributing controlled substances must be one of the primary uses of the premises, even if it’s not the sole purpose.

The 7th Circuit noted the finding that Beechler stored large quantities of drugs meant for sale and received free rent in exchange for safeguarding the drugs.

For the “career offender” enhancement, the 7th Circuit said Beechler waived his argument by failing to properly develop it on appeal.

Still, the court ruled the claim would fail anyway. Beechler argued the prior felony conviction the district court used for the enhancement doesn’t qualify because he committed it when he was 17 and the case was improperly waived to adult court.

But the 7th Circuit said a defendant can’t attack the validity of a previous state conviction unless it was obtained in a proceeding where the defendant was denied their right to counsel.

The 7th Circuit also ruled that even if Beechler was correct, it would still affirm his sentence because any error in applying the enhancements would be harmless.

Judge Ilana Rovner wrote the opinion.

The case is United State of America v. Travis Lee Beechler, 21-3379.

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May 30

United States of America v. Angela Baldwin, also known as Angela Taylor

22-1835

7th Circuit affirms minor sexual exploitation conviction, sentence for woman connected to Jared Fogle

A woman with ties to disgraced subway pitchman Jared Fogle who was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor and other crimes failed to convince the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals that her prosecution was vindictive or that her sentence is excessive.

The government first learned of Angela Baldwin, along with her then-husband Russell Taylor, as part of the investigation into Fogle.

At first, only Taylor was charged with crimes stemming from the couple’s sexual exploitation of minors, including Baldwin’s two daughters and niece. Taylor was a friend and employee of Fogle.

Taylor cooperated with the government in prosecuting Fogle and pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting minors and producing videos of their exploitation. He was sentenced to 27 years, but the Indiana Southern District Court vacated the conviction after finding his counsel ineffective.

The government decided to prosecute Taylor again, and he pleaded guilty to a smaller set of offenses and received the same sentence.

But the 7th Circuit vacated that conviction, ruling there were constitutional concerns the Indiana Southern District Court needed to address.

As part of the government’s reevaluation of Taylor’s case, prosecutors looked at the entire file and decided to bring similar charges against Baldwin for her involvement in the girls’ exploitation.

A jury in the Indiana Southern District Court, Indianapolis Division, convicted her of sexual exploitation of a minor, conspiring to produce child pornography and possession of child pornography.

She was sentenced to a little more than 33 years, below the advisory range of 110 years.

On appeal, Baldwin argued the district court should have granted her motion to dismiss because the government’s decision to prosecute her was vindictive.

Baldwin maintained she was prosecuted in retaliation for Taylor’s success in vacating his first conviction.

“Her argument lacks evidentiary or logical support,” the opinion says.

While Baldwin argued the timing of her indictment showed prosecutorial animus, the 7th Circuit said the record “tells a very different story.” New prosecutors evaluating the case, the opinion says, determined the evidence — including testimony from her now-adult victims — made the charges appropriate.

“In light of these facts and Taylor’s successful reprosecution, it is clear that the government was neither responsible for nor hampered by Taylor’s postconviction success,” the opinion states. “It is thus hardly surprising that Baldwin offers nothing but timing as evidence of the government’s improper motive.”

Even looking past the evidentiary shortcomings, the 7th Circuit ruled Baldwin’s vindictive prosecution claim “makes little sense on its own terms” because her position that she was prosecuted to punish Taylor “holds no water.”

Baldwin also argued her sentence was unreasonable because Taylor — whose conduct she said was more reprehensible than her own — received a lighter sentence.

Baldwin pointed to the fact that Taylor pleaded guilty to 30 counts and was sentenced to 324 months, or 10.8 months per count, while she was convicted on four counts and sentenced to 400 months, or 100 months per count.

“We have repeatedly and unambiguously rejected the idea that sentences must be evaluated on a per-count basis,” the 7th Circuit ruled, citing the case United States v. Jett, 982 F.3d 1072 (7th Cir. 2020).

“Finally,” the opinion says, “Baldwin contends that the district court’s implication that she was a bad mother is evidence of untoward prejudice. But the district court can consider the facts before it, and the record speaks for itself.”

Judge Thomas Kirsch wrote the opinion in United States of America v. Angela Baldwin, also known as Angela Taylor, 22-1835.

Indiana Supreme Court

Published May 17, posted to theindianalawyer.com May 18

Joseph Albert Oberhansley v. State of Indiana

20S-LW-620

Justices uphold LWOP sentence in murder case that involved cannibalism

A man convicted of the brutal murder of his ex-girlfriend, which included cannibalism, failed to convince the Indiana Supreme Court to overturn his sentence of life without parole.

Justice Christopher Goff wrote the opinion in Joseph Albert Oberhansley v. State of Indiana, 20S-LW-620. Chief Justice Loretta Rush and Justices Mark Massa and Derek Molter concurred, while Justice Geoffrey Slaughter concurred except with respect to one footnote.

The case involves Joseph Albert Oberhansley, who was convicted of burglary and the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Tammy Jo Blanton, which has been described as “horrific and brutal.”

Oberhansley described his upbringing in Utah as “good or better than most,” but the high court noted his accumulation of juvenile adjudications for assaults and burglaries.

When he was 17, he had a son with his then-girlfriend, whom he subsequently shot and killed a few days after the birth. He also shot his mother before shooting himself in the head in failed suicide attempt that left him with traumatic brain injuries.

He pleaded guilty to manslaughter and attempted murder, for which he served time in prison until 2012, when he was released on parole and transferred to Indiana, where he lived with family.

A year later, Oberhansley was charged with strangulation and resisting law enforcement.

Oberhansley was taken to the hospital in 2014 due to his mental state, claiming that the FBI was following him and asking the nurses to shoot him or give him a gun. He also referred to himself as “Zeus” and bit his own wrist.

He was prescribed medication after being taken to inpatient psychiatric treatment. After bonding out of jail, he sought medical treatment and was found to be “paranoid and delusional.”

That same year, Oberhansley started dating Blanton and moved into her house. She told a co-worker that Oberhansley assaulted her one weekend.

She did not go home that night and texted Oberhansley to get his stuff out of her house, saying she would be changing the locks. The next day he went to her work but left because she didn’t want to talk to him.

Oberhansley tried to enter her house to get his things after Blanton changed the locks. She didn’t let him in.

Later, in the middle of the night, Blanton called police saying he was attempting to kick her door down. A Jeffersonville police officer found him outside complaining about not being able to get in.

Officers spoke with Oberhansley, who agreed to leave the house.

But the next day, Blanton didn’t show up for work. Her co-worker was concerned after calling her multiple times with no answer.

Oberhansley eventually answered the phone, claiming to be Blanton’s brother and saying she had gone to care for their father. Blanton’s co-worker asked police to conduct a welfare check at her home, where police found Oberhansley.

Oberhansley had a cut on his hand when he opened the door, and a pat-down search revealed a brass-knuckle knife in his pocket, which had hair and blood on it.

An officer entered the home and found blood everywhere in the bathroom and a “bloody mound” in the tub. They also found the back door forced in and knives, utensils and dirty plates with blood on them in the kitchen.

Body tissues were found in a trash can under the sink.

Oberhansley was arrested and interrogated, during which he spoke of “tingling,” being “electrified,” wanting to “restore the balance” and “Zeus” falling. He also claimed two “Black guys” killed Blanton and wanted to eat his brain and take the “third eye.”

He admitted to eating part of Blanton’s brain to get the “third eye,” and her heart.

The state charged Oberhansley with murder, Level 4 burglary and Level 3 felony rape.

The state requested the death penalty, alleging three statutory aggravating factors: murder being intentionally committed during a burglary, murder being intentionally committed during a rape and the dismemberment of Blanton’s body.

Oberhansley was found incompetent to stand trial and was hospitalized. When his competency was restored, he initially filed notice of an insanity plea.

The parties later agreed that Oberhansley would withdraw his insanity defense and the state would seek LWOP instead of the death penalty.

The first trial ended in a mistrial and a second attempt to empanel a jury failed when insufficient jurors were available. When he finally proceeded to trial, the jury found Oberhansley guilty of murder and burglary but acquitted him of rape.

At sentencing, the Clark Circuit Court instructed the jury that before it could recommend an LWOP sentence, it had to find one or both aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that any aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances.

The jury recommended LWOP, and the trial court found sufficient evidence to support its decision.

On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Oberhansley argued that the jury failed to determine that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.

But the justices rejected his argument.

“The State, in its closing argument in the penalty phase, specifically asked the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to find that ‘these aggravators outweigh the mitigated factors of his mental illness,’” Goff wrote. “All in all, we do not doubt that the jury was conscious of its duty to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that it made the determination that it had to make, and that its final recommendation of LWOP reflected this. The trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in imposing an LWOP sentence.”

The justices also rejected Oberhansley’s argument that his sentence is inappropriate.

“We cannot ignore the fact that Blanton is the second partner whom Oberhansley has killed and the third person he has attacked with deadly force,” Goff wrote. “… In short, neither the nature of Oberhansley’s crimes nor the content of his character mark this case as an outlier warranting revision of his LWOP sentence.”

The justices added in a footnote, “We are mindful that LWOP sentences are largely ‘subject to the same statutory standards’ as death sentences and, like the latter, trigger a ‘heightened-reliability interest.’ Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 261 (Ind. 2021) (internal citations omitted). Regardless of a defendant’s attempt to waive a sentencing appeal, ‘the death sentence cannot be imposed on anyone in this State until it has been reviewed by this Court and found to comport with the laws of this State and the principles of our state and federal constitutions.’ Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 157– 58, 416 N.E.2d 95, 102 (1981).”

Slaughter concurred with the majority opinion except as to that footnote. He did not write separately.

Court of Appeals of Indiana

May 19

James H. Higgason III v. State of Indiana

22A-CR-2000

COA affirms 23-year delay in murder charges was justified by science advancements, not attempt to prejudice

A man charged and convicted of three counts of murder 23 years after the fact was not prejudiced because the delay was justified by advances in science, the Court of Appeals of Indiana has ruled in affirming a lower court’s decision.

In January 1998, Hammond police received a call reporting three deceased people at a house. Police found all three had been beaten and suffered lacerations, skull fractures and brain hemorrhages.

A neighbor told police she knew Higgason and that she smoked cocaine with him that night and saw him trade a shotgun for cocaine. Higgason confirmed the neighbor’s presence at the house that evening, and police found a 12-gauge shotgun in the attic.

Police determined the shotgun belonged to Higgason, and he admitted to being at the house several times throughout the night and early morning of the killings. He said he didn’t return after he traded the gun for cocaine.

Months later, police received a call from an FBI agent who said another man, David Copley, who was at the house that night, was having problems with his conscience and was involved with the murders.

Copley then told police that his earlier statement to them was true, “except for the part of when him and James Higgason left.”

He went on to tell police that they stayed at the house all night and killed two dealers to rob them of their cocaine and money.

At trial, Copley said they were at the house smoking cocaine. Elva Tamez, one of the three people killed, went outside to get Higgason cigarettes. Higgason locked the door behind her and proceeded to beat the other two to death. Copley testified he hit one person.

After Copley gave his statement to police, they asked him to call Higgason and got consent to record the call.

Copley told Higgason he was going to tell police was happened.

“No, dude,” Higgason said. “… You are talking about life, dude, forever. You are talking about going in for life, dude.”

Higgason asked why Copley wanted to “take (him) down.”

During a second call, Higgason told Copley, “You should have never told anybody else, dude.”

The detective gave the prosecutor’s office evidence, but the prosecutor never charged anyone.

In 2021, more DNA evidence led to Higgason and Copley being charged with three counts of murder and three counts of felony murder.

Copley pleaded guilty to one count of murder in return for a “complete and detailed sworn statement about his involvement in the crime.” He was sentenced to 45 years.

In May 2022, Higgason filed a motion to dismiss with the Lake Superior Court, arguing the evidence against him was “virtually the same evidence it has had in its possession since 1998,” and the “delay in filing the charges is really inexplicable.”

The court denied the motion.

At trial, the state offered as evidence the recordings of Copley’s calls with Higgason. Because the recordings were of low quality, the state provided jurors with a transcript.

The trial court told jurors the calls were between Copley and Higgason, but Higgason objected, arguing the court made an improper statement identifying Higgason as the other person on the call because there was no evidence at that time that would identify Higgason as the other person.

The trial court clarified to jurors that “the testimony thus far is it’s a recorded phone call that was done by Mr. Copley.”

Higgason requested a mistrial “based on the inference that the court has concluded that the … statements are attributable to Mr. Higgason.”

The court denied the request, stating it believed the jurors would follow its earlier admonishment.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges for Higgason, who again renewed his motion for a mistrial. The court again denied.

The court entered verdicts for the three murder charges, noting it believed the felony murder counts should merge.

Higgason was sentenced to 60 years for each murder, to be served consecutive to one another, for an aggregate sentence of 180 years.

Higgason presented multiple points on appeal, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss, denied his request for mistrial and admitted recordings of the phone calls.

He also argued the trial court committed reversible error when it responded to a jury question without first notifying counsel.

The Court of Appeals disagreed.

Higgason cited the 23-year gap between the crime and charges in arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

He cited a case — Barnett v. State, 867 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) — in which an inmate charged with voluntary manslaughter more than a decade after the fact convinced the Court of Appeals he “was clearly prejudiced by the State’s unexplained and unjustified delay — whether intentional or negligent — in bringing charges.”

But the Court of Appeals ruled Higgason’s case is different.

The state, the court ruled, “was justified in the delay and did not engage in the delay to gain a tactical advantage. The State needed additional evidence to charge Higgason and that evidence could not be gathered at the time of the crime.”

Regarding his appeal of admitting recordings of the phone calls, Higgason argued the state didn’t lay a proper foundation for admitting the recordings.

But the Court of Appeals ruled the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it met every factor of the test established in McCollum v. State, 582 N.E.2d 804, 811-2 (Ind. 1991). That includes that a tape recording “be of such clarity as to be intelligible and enlightening to the jury.”

The Court of Appeals ruled that while the tapes had “certainly aged,” the clarity was sufficient.

Higgason also argued the court erred because it entered digitized recordings of the calls rather than the actual tapes, which he said were the available best evidence.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling the recordings were properly admitted under Evidence Rule 1003.

Regarding his appeal of the court’s denial of his request for mistrial, Higgason said when the trial court identified him as the second person on the calls with Copley, he “was placed in grave peril” of an unfair trial.

The Court of Appeals ruled the inadvertent error didn’t place him in grave peril of an unfair trial because the comment was brief, subsequent evidence supported the statement.

Finally, in arguing the trial court erred when it didn’t notify him after the jury submitted two questions, Higgason said one of the questions about what it would mean if the defendant was present but didn’t inflict any blows was a request to be informed of law arising in the case and, thus, counsel should have been present in the courtroom for the trial court’s answer.

The Court of Appeals first ruled Higgason’s argument was waived because he didn’t make an objection at trial. Waiver notwithstanding, the court ruled the error was harmless.

Judge Melissa May wrote the opinion. Judge Peter Foley and Senior Judge Edward Najam concurred.

The case is James H. Higgason III v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-2000.

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May 25

Dustin A. Lane v. State of Indiana

22A-CR-2276

Split COA reduces man’s 3,000-day invasion of privacy sentence to less than 1 year

A man’s repeated letters to his ex-wife violated a no-contact order but did not warrant an aggregate sentence of 3,000 days for misdemeanor invasion of privacy, a split Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled.

The COA majority revised Dustin Lane’s sentence from 3,000 days to 300 days and remanded to the Lawrence Superior Court to enter a sentencing order consistent with the appellate opinion.

In 2018, Lane was convicted of Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury. According to court records, the trial court issued a no-contact order prohibiting Lane from direct or indirect contact with the victim, his ex-wife, A.N.

While that order was still in place, between March 2020 and September 2021, Lane sent separate letters, approximately one per month, to A.N. Lane sent the letters — which primarily addressed questions about the parties’ children — while he was still incarcerated for domestic battery.

In January 2022, A.N. reported the letters to the police. Lane was then charged with 10 counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.

He pleaded guilty to all charges pursuant to a plea agreement that left sentencing to the trial court’s discretion.

The trial court sentenced Lane to consecutive 300-day sentences on each count, for an aggregate executed sentence of 3,000 days.

During the same hearing, Lane admitted that he violated his domestic battery probation. Thus, the court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve 730 days of his previously suspended sentence consecutively to his 3,000-day sentence.

Lane appealed.

The appellate majority concluded Lane’s 10, 300-day sentences should be served concurrently rather than consecutively.

Writing for the majority, Judge Terry Crone said although Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) requires the court to consider both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, the appellant is not required to prove that each independently renders his sentence inappropriate.

“The nature of Lane’s offenses, on the other hand, persuades us that the trial court simply went too far in imposing ten consecutive close-to-maximum 300-day sentences for these Class A misdemeanors,” Crone wrote.

“… All in all, Lane’s letter writing resulted not only in ten consecutive 300-day sentences, but also in the revocation of his probation and execution of 730 days of his previously suspended sentence, to be served consecutively to these misdemeanor sentences,” the judge continued. “While by no means do we condone Lane’s repeated violations of the trial court’s no-contact order, upon balancing the relatively nonthreatening nature of these violations and Lane’s character, we are persuaded that the trial court’s 3,000-day aggregate executed sentence is inappropriate.

“… We are guided in appellate review to focus on the forest — the aggregate sentence — rather than the trees — consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count. … When we look at the ‘forest,’ as opposed to the ‘trees’ here, Lane’s aggregate sentence is an outlier that simply cannot stand.”

Judge Margret Robb concurred.

But in a 15-page dissent, Judge Dana Kenworthy stressed Lane’s history of nearly two decades of abuse against the victim and other criminal charges he faced as the result of his actions.

“Indeed, Lane repeatedly violated a no-contact order designed to protect A.N. while Lane was (1) in prison for committing Level 5 felony criminal confinement against A.N., resulting in her bodily injury, and (2) facing a suspended sentence in a separate cause for committing Level 6 felony domestic battery against A.N., where Lane had ‘grabbed [A.N.], dr[agged] her, hit her repeatedly in the ribs, the back, her legs, strangled her, pushed her down, and dr[agged] her down a hallway,’” Kenworthy wrote.

She opined that the offenses were not part of a single episode of criminal conduct, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was authorized by statute.

“Here, the majority revises Lane’s sentence without mentioning the trial court’s detailed sentencing statement. As to that sentencing statement, the trial court discussed the nature of the offenses and acknowledged the State’s assertion that Lane was trying to reinitiate the cycle of domestic violence,” Kenworthy wrote.

Addressing Kenworthy, Crone wrote, “The dissent obviously has sincere and strongly held beliefs about domestic violence. And while no one on this Court condones violence in any context, this is not a case of a domestic violence conviction. This case involves a review of the sentence imposed for ten misdemeanor counts of invasion of privacy.”

The case is Dustin A. Lane v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-2276.•