Indiana Court Decisions – May 20-June 2, 2021

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

May 25

Civil Plenary-Habeas Petition/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Jay R. Thompson v. Frank Vanihel

20-2571

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the dismissal of a convicted killer’s habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, agreeing that his attorney’s alleged errors did not prejudice him.

In 1982, an Indiana jury convicted Jay Thompson of murder and conspiracy to commit burglary on the theory that Thompson and a friend stabbed a couple to death during a house break-in. Thompson initially was sentenced to death but later was resentenced to an aggregate 120 years’ imprisonment, affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court.

Between August 1992 and 2014, Thompson filed several amended post-conviction relief petitions that continued to languish, bouncing between several public defenders, two private attorneys and pro se appeals.

When the Indiana Supreme Court denied his petition to transfer, Thompson turned to federal court with a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his trial attorney was ineffective and that his conviction violated the protection against double jeopardy.

Although the district court concluded that laches was a firmly established and regularly followed rule in Indiana, the 7th Circuit vacated and remanded upon finding that Thompson had made a substantial showing that his rights to effective assistance of counsel and against double jeopardy were indeed violated.

On remand, the district court dismissed the habeas petition because “counsel’s alleged errors did not prejudice Thompson.” The 7th Circuit agreed, affirming the district court in Jay R. Thompson v. Frank Vanihel, 20-2571.

In affirming the district court, the 7th Circuit agreed that the evidence against Thompson was “overwhelming.” It drew facts from the district court’s recitation, relying also on the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision from Thompson’s direct appeal.

“Viewed as a whole, it is not substantially likely that the result of Thompson’s trial would have been different but for the errors he identifies,” Circuit Judge Thomas Kirsch wrote.

On appeal, Thompson argued his counsel failed to move pretrial to suppress Thompson’s request for a lawyer and his post-request statements; failed to object to the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument referencing Thompson’s request for a lawyer in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); and failed to present the prosecutor’s remarks in Thompson’s direct appeal in state court.

“It is not likely, much less ‘substantially’ so, that the result of Thompson’s trial or appeal would have been different but for his counsel’s failure to act in the three ways Thompson identifies,” the 7th Circuit held.

“Both the physical evidence and the eyewitness testimony was consistent with Dillon’s testimony implicating Thompson, including the blood on Thompson’s jeans and glove that law enforcement recovered from his closet shortly after the murders; the hunting knife found in Thompson’s trunk, freshly cleaned and oiled; Thompson’s presence with (Richard) Dillon at a laundromat just after the murders; and the forensic pathologist’s testimony that the stab wounds on the (victims) were consistent with two different knives. Thompson’s uncorroborated alibi was not supported by the evidence. … And Thompson’s question after telling his mother that he thought they should get a lawyer did not prejudice Thompson (and he has not argued otherwise on appeal),” the panel concluded.

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May 26

Civil Plenary-Prosecutors/Immunity

David Jones v. Rodney Cummings, et al.

20-1898

A former inmate who sued Madison County prosecutors after he was released on habeas relief cannot pursue that lawsuit under immunity principles, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed.

In David Jones v. Rodney Cummings, et al., 20-1898, plaintiff-appellant David Jones was charged with battery, intimidation and being a habitual offender. Nine days after the omnibus date had passed, Madison County deputy prosecutors Steve Koester and Daniel Kopp moved to add a charge of criminal confinement, which was granted without objection. The charges against Jones were amended twice more after that.

Jones was found guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to an aggregate of 45 years – 20 years for criminal confinement enhanced by 25 years for being a habitual offender, plus shorter concurrent terms for battery and intimidation.

Jones’ appeals wound their way to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which denied his petition for habeas relief. The 7th Circuit, however, reversed in 2019, finding his defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for not objecting to the amendments of the charges.

Jones was released in May 2019 and filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Koester and Kopp, in their individual capacities, had committed abuse of process and maliciously prosecuted him when they added a new charge “for the sole purpose to increase his prison time by decades[.]” He also sued elected Madison County Prosecutor Rodney Cummings, arguing the prosecutor had adopted a policy ignoring Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5 (1982) and Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944 (Ind. 1998), prohibiting substantive amendments to charging information after the omnibus date.

But the district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, agreeing that Cummings, in his official capacity as elected prosecutor, was not a “person” under Section 1983. The court also agreed with Koester and Kopp that “their act of filing an amended charge sits comfortably within the scope of their prosecutorial duties and entitled them to absolute prosecutorial immunity.”

Jones appealed, arguing Cummings was a county official, not a state official, allowing him to be sued under Section 1983. As for the deputies, Jones alleged they were entitled only to qualified immunity because their conduct was “rogue.” Finally, Jones asked the 7th Circuit to create a new rule holding that prosecutors are only entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct is “unlawful,” even if it is prosecutorial in nature.

But the appellate court ruled for the prosecutors in full, with Judge Diane Wood first holding that Cummings is a state official. She also rejected Jones’ request to create a new rule for qualified immunity.

“The only question is whether Koester and Kopp’s conduct — filing and amending criminal charges against a defendant — are core prosecutorial functions,” Wood wrote. “We need not belabor the point. They are.

“… Although each of the defendants Jones sued has something to do with his lengthy incarceration, the district court properly recognized that the law does not permit him to sue any of them for redress,” Wood concluded.

Indiana Court of Appeals

May 20

Criminal-Child Molesting/Hearsay

Paul M. Robey v. State of Indiana

20A-CR-2187

A grandfather convicted of molesting his granddaughter failed to persuade the Indiana Court of Appeals that a video of his granddaughter’s statement published at his trial was impermissible hearsay.

In Paul M. Robey v. State of Indiana, 20A-CR-2187, 10-year-old B.B. was staying with her grandparents, Paul and Patricia Robey, at their home in Martinsville in November 2018. When Patricia had gone to bed, B.B. began to fall asleep in Paul’s lap but awoke when she “felt his hand starting to go down [her] pants.” B.B. pretended to be asleep and rolled over so Robey couldn’t continue to touch her.

B.B. told her mother what happened, and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department took a report. B.B. then underwent a forensic interview, which was recorded on video.

Martinsville Police then questioned Robey, who claimed he thought B.B. was his wife at the time because he was “half asleep” during the incident. But the state charged Robey with Level 4 felony child molesting, publishing the video of B.B.’s forensic interview during the trial over Robey’s objection.

A jury convicted Robey and he appealed, alleging reversible error in the Morgan Superior Court’s decision to allow the video of B.B.’s interview, which he claimed was a recorded recollection. The court had allowed a 46-minute portion of the interview to be published to the jury but not admitted as an exhibit.

But “(i)n his appellate brief, Robey raises several challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, most of which are waived because he made no such objections on the record at trial,” Judge Terry Crone wrote in an opinion affirming Robey’s conviction.

“… The only challenge that Robey preserved is that the State failed to establish that the video was ‘on a matter [B.B.] once knew about but now [could not] recall well enough to testify fully and accurately … ,’” Crone wrote. “To be sure, B.B. was able to testify fully and accurately about the essential elements of the crime with which Robey was charged, and the video simply added some minor details to her account. Thus, the video was merely cumulative of B.B.’s testimony, and any error in its publication was harmless.”

Civil Tort-Wiretap/Summary Judgment

Ron Whitt, Jeff Roseboom, Abbey Moffitt, Patrick Cicero, and Ron Colpitts v. Town of New Carlisle

20A-CT-2279

Municipal employees who alleged their conversations were illegally recorded in violation of the Indiana Wiretap Act failed in their appeal challenging the grant of summary judgment to their employer, the town of New Carlisle.

The case involves former New Carlisle Police Chief Jeff Roseboom, Sgt. Ron Whitt, Det. Patrick Cicero, New Carlisle Town Council member Ron Colpitts and his niece, Abbey Moffitt. The group alleged other city officials had been spying on conversations they had either in Roseboom’s office or the office of the town clerk, Susan Moffitt.

The appellants began to suspect their conversations were being recorded when an unrelated person would bring up topics they had discussed in private. They filed a complaint against the town, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The St. Joseph Superior Court ruled in favor of the town, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in Ron Whitt, Jeff Roseboom, Abbey Moffitt, Patrick Cicero, and Ron Colpitts v. Town of New Carlisle, 20A-CT-2279.

“Here, the Appellants have designated no evidence that electronic communications were intercepted, alleging only that security cameras or hidden devices in offices may have been secretly recording audio, allegations which only entail the interception of oral communication,” Chief Judge Cale Bradford wrote.

“Further, while Appellants claim that those audio devices may also have captured one side of a phone conversation at times, or that an office phone may have been used to capture oral conversations occurring in an office, those interceptions would also not fall under the IWA, as the statute only covers the interception of communication during its transmission,” Bradford wrote.

The COA panel also rejected the appellants’ argument that their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated, finding that the town council had not authorized “the creation or operation of an audio surveillance system in the Town Hall.”

“Further, the Appellants have failed to designate any evidence to suggest that a Town employee with final policy-making authority over the town acted to create an audio surveillance system,” Bradford wrote.

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May 21

Criminal-No-contact Order/Deceased Victim

James L. Mosley v. State of Indiana

20A-CR-2094

No-contact orders cannot be issued to protect dead people, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled in a reversal for a man who sent an apology letter to a deceased person he previously committed fraud against.

James Mosley was convicted of Level 5 felony corrupt business influence after engaging in a multicounty home improvement scam in which he accepted thousands of dollars in payments from homeowners without performing the promised work. He was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, with six years suspended to probation.

Written in Mosley’s probation conditions was the requirement that he would have no contact with B.P., one of the victims of his scam. But B.P. had already died two years before Mosley’s sentencing, which neither party nor the trial court were aware of.

Not long after he was sentenced, Mosley wrote an apology letter to B.P. from prison in which he offered to buy the car that he had attempted to obtain from her during his earlier offense. When informed by her daughter that B.P. had died, Mosley wrote a lengthy letter to B.P.’s daughter, who contacted the Ripley County Prosecutor’s Office to halt further contact from him.

Mosley was subsequently charged with attempted invasion of privacy for writing the letter to B.P. when a no-contact order was in effect. Although the Ripley Superior Court granted Mosley’s motion to dismiss that charge, it found Mosley had violated the terms of his probation by attempting to contact B.P.

Thus, the trial court partially revoked Mosley’s probation, ordering him to serve three years in prison. But the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed in James L. Mosley v. State of Indiana, 20A-CR-2094.

“We agree with Mosley that the no-contact order was void and could not support either a prosecution for attempted invasion of privacy or a probation revocation based on his commission of that offense,” Judge Leanna K. Weissmann wrote for the appellate court. “… As the trial court lacked authority under Indiana Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(18) to issue a no-contact order barring Mosley’s contact with B.P., given her earlier death, the order was void at the outset.

“… The State essentially is asking us to find Mosley should spend three more years in prison for attempting to violate a no-contact order that the State should never have sought and the trial court should never have entered as to a victim who no longer needed protection,” Weissmann continued.

Because the no-contact order imposed as a condition of Mosley’s probation was void, the appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probtion and reversed in his favor.

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May 25

Juvenile Paternity-Relocation/Contempt

In Re: The Paternity of K.C.; Kayley Boonstra v. Daniel Corcoran

20A-JP-1592

A mother who took her son from Indiana to Virginia without his father’s knowledge or the court’s permission has lost her appeals of orders finding her in contempt and awarding physical custody of her child to his father.

Parents Kayley Boonstra and Daniel Corcoran share a son, K.C., who was born in 2014. Boonstra is also the mother of two other children. A 2018 paternity order regarding K.C. gave Boonstra primary physical custody while Corcoran received regular parenting time.

Boonstra got married four months later, and her husband enlisted in the U.S. Air Force. She told the Cass Circuit Court in March 2019 that her husband would be stationed in Virginia and that she intended to relocate with him. She also claimed that she could maintain homes in both Indiana and Virginia.

Corcoran objected, and the trial court denied Boonstra’s petition to relocate. Boonstra relocated without the child, and Corcoran in October 2019 moved to modify custody. He argued that he had been caring for K.C. since Boonstra relocated and sought a modification of child support and parenting time.

Boonstra, however, filed a second petition to relocate. While the case was pending, Boonstra picked up K.C. from his paternal grandparents’ home and boarded a plane with him without Corcoran’s knowledge. K.C. remained in Virginia for roughly three months.

Corcoran responded with two contempt citations, and a special judge held her in contempt and denied her second petition to relocate. Corcoran was awarded physical custody, while Boonstra was ordered to pay $5,406 in attorney fees plus $123 a month in child support.

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, with Judge Rudolph Pyle first pointing to Boonstra’s initial claim that she could maintain homes in Indiana and Virginia. That promise did not come to fruition, and when later questioned by the trial court, Boonstra claimed “she had simply said whatever she could to keep her kids together.”

“… (B)ecause Mother had never planned to stay in Indiana with her three children and had always intended to relocate to Virginia with Stepfather, Mother has failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that her relocation to Virginia was a substantial change in one or more of the relocation factors,” Pyle wrote

As to the modification of custody, the appellate panel agreed with the trial court that Boonstra’s relocation 800 miles away was a “substantial change” in circumstances. What’s more, K.C. was close to his father and grandparents and had been enrolled in preschool in Indiana.

“We further note that Mother’s act of keeping K.C. in Virginia for three months undermined K.C.’s relationship with Father. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that a modification of custody was in K.C.’s best interests,” the panel held.

The COA further agreed with the trial court that Boonstra had brought a groundless action warranting the award of attorney fees for Corcoran, and that her removal of K.C. to Virginia was a relocation contravening the denial of her petition to relocate.

Finally, the panel upheld the order for Boonstra to pay child support, finding “(t)he trial court’s child support determination is not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.”

The case is In Re: The Paternity of K.C.; Kayley Boonstra v. Daniel Corcoran, 20A-JP-1592.

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May 26

Civil Tort-Canceled Contract/COVID-19

Westwood One Radio Networks, LLC, f/k/a Westwood One Radio Networks, Inc. v. The National Collegiate Athletic Association and NIT, LLC

20A-CT-1965

The Indianapolis-based NCAA again has prevailed in a contract dispute with radio broadcaster Westwood One, which had argued that because COVID-19 caused the cancellation of the 2020 March Madness tournament it didn’t have to pay for radio rights to the tournament.

Westwood One had been the exclusive radio broadcaster of the tournament since 2003. The parties entered into a contract in 2011 giving Westwood One the exclusive radio rights in exchange for a “rights fee” due in two installments each year. The amount of the contract was not disclosed, but the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote that “(t)here is no dispute that Westwood One’s unpaid balance for the 2019-2020 contract year exceeds two million dollars.”

In 2020, Westwood One made its first payment in January, as scheduled, but declined to make its second payment in April because the tournament’s cancellation. The NCAA then canceled the contract, but Westwood One moved to enjoin that action.

The Marion Superior Court denied the injunction, finding Westwood One had “sufficient mechanisms to track and calculate any losses attributable to the termination of the Radio Agreement, including lost advertising and licensing fees, such that Westwood One could be made whole through a legal remedy.” Additionally, the court determined Westwood One had not shown irreparable harm to its goodwill or reputation through the cancellation of the contract, finding the broadcaster “has not shown it possesses a protectable goodwill interest in its relationship with March Madness … .”

On appeal, Westwood One returned to its reputational argument, contending that other organizations such as the NFL could follow the NCAA to a new broadcaster. Also, it argued that deals with clients could be negatively impacted if the broadcaster could no longer package the March Madness tournament with other events.

But the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, pointing to testimony from Bruce Gilbert, Westwood One’s head of sports programming.

“Gilbert indicated that while goodwill was an ‘intangible’ factor, Westwood One nonetheless took it into account, assigning a monetary value to it at least some of the time when assessing whether a particular licensing agreement is profitable. Although Gilbert testified that he was not aware of a ‘general formula’ for monetizing goodwill in use at Westwood, the fact that it did it some of the time supports an inference that it can do it in the case of the Radio Agreement,” Chief Judge Cale Bradford wrote.

“Gilbert also indicated that Westwood One’s goodwill helped it to sell advertising and when it was negotiating licensing agreements with companies like SiriusXM,” Bradford continued. “Taken as a whole, Gilbert’s testimony supports a reasonable inference that Westwood One is capable of ascertaining damages due to loss of goodwill with reasonable accuracy, even if it has not already done so in this particular circumstance. This, along with Westwood One’s over ten years of data on which it can rely to estimate its losses for 2020 and/or in the future, supports the trial court’s finding that preparing a reasonable estimate of its losses should be possible.”

Westwood One’s appeal pointed to the risk of future losses based on reputational damage. It also argued that factors such as the pandemic and the emergence of streaming made it impossible to estimate its losses.

But “(i)f Westwood One is capable of determining damages to loss of goodwill related to the Tournament, it follows that it is equally capable of calculating similar losses should it lose a client such as the NFL,” Bradford wrote. “As for Westwood One’s claim that changes in the marketplace will make future damages difficult to ascertain, internet streaming (as the NCAA points out) is not a new phenomenon, and Westwood One has had since at least 2011 … to evaluate its impact on its business.

“Finally, although Westwood One claims that the continuing effect of COVID-19 may cause future Tournaments to be played in a ‘bubble’ or in front of empty stands, it does not explain exactly how this would affect radio broadcasts,” the chief judge continued. “Indeed, it may be that ratings will go up if COVID-19 continues to restrict other entertainment options.

“In short,” Bradford concluded, “Westwood One has failed to establish that the evidence unerringly leads to a conclusion opposite to the one reached by the trial court.”

The case is Westwood One Radio Networks, LLC f/k/a Westwood One Radio Networks, Inc. v. The National Collegiate Athletic Association and NIT, LLC, 20A-CT-1965.

Civil Tort-Duty to Protect/Bar Fight

BoJak’s Bar and Grille v. Marcus Henry

21A-CT-170

A Franklin bar owed a duty to a patron who was “sucker punched” by another patron even after warning bar security about tensions between the two men, the Indiana Court of Appeals has ruled.

In August 2018, Marcus Henry was involved in a verbal altercation with Keith Knura at BoJak’s Bar and Grille in Franklin. Both men returned to the bar the next week, and Henry informed bar security about the prior altercation.

Bar security checked in on the two groups – Henry and his friends and Knura and his friends – frequently throughout the evening. While the groups seemed fine most of the night, Knura later sucker punched Henry, striking him multiple times in the head before running away.

Henry sued both Knura and BoJak’s, and the bar moved for summary judgment, claiming it did not owe a duty to Henry because the assault was not foreseeable. But the Johnson Superior Court denied the summary judgment motion, prompting the instant interlocutory appeal in BoJak’s Bar and Grille v. Marcus Henry, 21A-CT-170.

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the bar, with Chief Judge Cale Bradford writing that the instant case was more like Hamilton v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations Inc., 92 N.E.3d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) than Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E. 3d 384 (Ind. 2016). In the former, the chief judge wrote, “restaurant employees were aware of the discord and escalating tension between the two groups prior to the altercation.”

Likewise here, “The incident in this case was not an unforeseeable sudden act that occurred without warning,” Bradford wrote.

“The designated evidence clearly establishes that BoJak’s staff knew of prior tension between the two groups and had specifically been warned of an altercation that had occurred between the two groups the week before. BoJak’s security felt the two groups required extra attention, checking on them more than ten times and keeping a ‘constant watchful eye.’

“We conclude that these facts are sufficient to create a duty for BoJak’s to take reasonable steps to provide for Henry’s safety while on the premises,” Bradford concluded. “This is not to say, however, that BoJak’s was negligent, as issues of breach and proximate cause must still be determined by a trier of fact.”

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June 1

Miscellaneous-Access to Public Records/Motion to Dismiss

Rebekah A. Atkins v. Crawford County Clerk’s Office, Elected Clerk, Lisa Stephenson Holzbog, Chief Deputy Clerk-Lisa Ward, Deputy Clerk Charla Dawn Wright, and Deputy Clerk Vicki McMullen

20A-MI-2160

A Crawford County woman claiming the local court clerk illegally denied her access to public records can proceed with her claim, though she won’t receive appointed counsel, the Indiana Court of Appeals has ruled.

In October 2020, Rebekah Atkins filed a complaint alleging the Crawford County clerk was creating fake court records pertaining to Atkins’ identity and, along with the clerk’s office and its employees, was denying Atkins access to records she claimed belonged to her. Atkins raised claims of perjury, intimidation and violations of the Access to Public Records Act.

Atkins made 16 filings regarding her complaint, including a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion for appointed counsel, both of which were denied. The appellee-defendants then moved to dismiss, which the Crawford Circuit Court granted.

But the Indiana Court of Appeals reinstated the litigation, with Judge Elizabeth Tavitas writing that “Atkins’ complaint was sufficient to ‘put a reasonable person on notice’ as to why Atkins filed her claims.”

“Appellees argued in their motion to dismiss that Atkins’ complaint should have been dismissed because of her failure to pay the filing fee. That argument was premature under Indiana Trial Rule 12, which requires all but a handful of issues to be asserted via responsive pleading, as opposed to a motion, at such an early stage of a civil proceeding,” Tavitas wrote. “Regardless, based on our reading of the order striking pleadings from the record — filed after the order dismissing Atkins’ complaint — the trial court seems to have dismissed Atkins’ complaint exclusively on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”

Further, “… Atkins’ claims, though beset with irrelevant text and interjections, are nevertheless discernible,” Tavitas wrote.

“… We do not close the courthouse doors at this early stage to any litigant merely because we are skeptical about her chances of success. At this fledgling juncture, we must accept the facts alleged in Atkins’ complaint as true. Thus, as a matter of basic civil procedure, dismissal was a premature, improper vehicle for the disposition of Atkins’ claims.”

The appellate panel also reversed the denial of Atkins’ motion to waive the filing fee, with Tavitas writing that the panel wanted to “fill (the) gap” in jurisprudence on waiver of filing fees at the trial court level. The panel said the holding in Campbell v. Criterion Grp., 605 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 1992), applies equally to trial and appellate cases.

In this case, however, the panel added that it had a “scant record” to review on the issue of Atkins’ indigency, because the trial court neither held a hearing on the motion to waive the fee nor explained its reasons for denying that motion.

“If the trial court had any doubt about Atkins’ indigency, the trial court could have exercised several options,” Tavitas wrote. “A trial court may waive a filing fee, and, upon a later discovery that the litigant has the means to pay, order reimbursement of the waived fee; or a trial court may hold a hearing to examine the litigant’s potential indigency.

“Either method will safeguard the longstanding, fundamental obligation to allow access to the courts by all, regardless of one’s financial standing. By any standard, Atkins proved her indigency, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and to waive court filing fees. Atkins is entitled to proceed with her suit without paying the filing fee,” the panel held.

However, the COA affirmed the denial of Atkins’ motion for appointed counsel, finding no “’extraordinary circumstances’ inviting such an appointment … .” Also, “the trial court was permitted to deny the request on the grounds that Atkins is unlikely to prevail on her claims.”

Finally, the panel rejected Atkins’ claim that the trial court was biased and had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

“We find that the record is without evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the trial court judge was unbiased and unprejudiced,” Tavitas wrote for the unanimous panel. “Adverse rulings on Atkins’ multiple motions, without more, are insufficient to demonstrate bias.”

The case is Rebekah A. Atkins v. Crawford County Clerk’s Office, Elected Clerk, Lisa Stephenson Holzbog, Chief Deputy Clerk-Lisa Ward, Deputy Clerk Charla Dawn Wright, and Deputy Clerk Vicki McMullen, 20A-MI-2160.•