Indiana Court Decisions: Oct. 20-Nov. 2, 2022

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Posted Oct. 19, published to theindianalawyer.com Oct. 20

William Groves v. South Bend Community School Corporation

21-3336

7th Circuit rejects white South Bend athletic director’s ‘reverse racism’ discrimination claims

A former South Bend high school athletic director has failed to convince the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals that he wasn’t hired for a new job because he is white.

William Groves is a longtime employee of the South Bend Community School Corp. He started in 1991 as a social studies teacher and in 2007 became the athletic director at Adams High School.

In 2017, Groves, who is white, applied to work as the corporation’s director of athletics, a newly created, district-wide position. Then-Superintendent Kenneth Spells, who is Black, interviewed four applicants and ultimately recommended Seabe Gavin, who is also Black, for the position.

Spells explained that Gavin interviewed well, inspiring confidence in his ability to repair the school district’s strained relationship with the Indiana High School Athletic Association. Alternatively, Spells said Groves interviewed poorly, finding it particularly off-putting that Groves seemed to boast of firing 24 coaches during his tenure as AD at Adams, among other comments.

Thus, the school board hired Gavin for the position.

Groves responded to not receiving the job by invoking Title VII and suing the district on a theory of “reverse race discrimination.” He rooted his claim in the contention that he was much more qualified than Gavin but didn’t get the job because of unlawful discrimination.

In March 2019, the school district announced the elimination of the corporation director of athletics position and the creation of a hybrid dean of students/athletics position at each of the four high schools.

Groves, Gavin and seven other candidates applied for the four new positions. Although Groves received an interview, an offer never followed.

Gavin, however, fared better, as Principal Shawn Henderson, who is Black, offered the Riley High School position to him, explaining that he earned the job in large part based on the quality of the answers he gave during his interview.

Groves then amended his original complaint to add a claim of race discrimination based on his not receiving one of the new dean of students/athletics positions and a claim of retaliation for the elimination of his athletic director position.

During discovery, it came to light that Gavin had a criminal record with two felony convictions from the 1990s, so Groves again asserted the school district failed to adhere to its written policy of running a background check on Gavin, also because of his race.

But the Indiana Northern District Court ultimately awarded summary judgment to the school district, finding Groves didn’t offer enough proof to support his claim.

To overturn summary judgment on appeal, judges at the 7th Circuit wrote that Groves needed to show not only that the school district lied about its reason for not hiring him, but also that the true reason was racial discrimination. The court concluded he failed to clear that hurdle.

“The district court rightly recognized that Groves did not address the School District’s approach to internal hires with evidence — all he has is his own speculation,” Judge Michael Scudder wrote. “He identified no instances of the School District running background checks on existing employees seeking new, internal positions and offered no personal knowledge of the District’s actual practices. Groves’s evidentiary shortcoming proves fatal because, for its part, the School District came forward with the explanation that it has always viewed its policy as applying only to external hires.

“Groves fared no better on his second contention that he was far more qualified than Gavin for the position in question,” Scudder continued. “Here, too, the district court was right to conclude that Groves was only looking at half of the evidentiary picture.

“Yes, he may have been the more qualified candidate on paper alone. But the School District explained that side-by-side resume comparisons were not only the measure. How applicants performed in interviews greatly mattered, and, on this score, the record showed that Gavin outperformed Groves by a long shot.”

On the claim concerning the dean of students/athletics position, the 7th Circuit likewise found that Groves fell short.

“Once again, the evidence before the district court at summary judgment showed that Gavin received the role at Riley High School based largely on the quality of his interview,” Scudder wrote.

The 7th Circuit wrote that it considered a range of other contentions by Groves regarding his “reverse race discrimination” claims, but found none of them additive or persuasive.

“In the end, Groves’ case suffered from a failure of proof — he alleged a theory and account of reverse race discrimination but ultimately never backed it with enough evidence to allow a jury to find in his favor,” Scudder concluded.

The case is William Groves v. South Bend Community School Corporation, 21-3336.

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Oct. 21

In the Matter of A.C. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services, and M.C. (Mother) and J.C. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services

22A-JC-49

COA affirms removal of transgender teen from home, rejects parents’ constitutional claims

A mother and father whose transgender teen was removed from their home due to allegations of abuse has failed to convince the Court of Appeals of Indiana that their rights as parents, including their free speech and religious rights, were infringed upon when the court intervened.

On Oct. 21, the COA published a 28-page opinion in In the Matter of A.C. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services, and M.C. (Mother) and J.C. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 22A-JC-49.

The case started in May 2021, when the Department of Child Services received a report alleging that mother M.C. was verbally and emotionally abusing her 16-year-old child, A.C., by using rude and demeaning language regarding the teen’s transgender identity. As a result, A.C. had thoughts of self-harm.

Ten days later, DCS received a second report alleging M.C. and J.C., the child’s father, were being verbally and emotionally abusive because they do not accept their child’s transgender identity — and the abuse was getting worse.

A DCS family case manager investigated and reported that A.C. had been suffering from an eating disorder but had yet to be evaluated by a medical professional; the parents had withdrawn A.C. from school and DCS was unaware of the family’s intent to enroll A.C. in a new school; A.C. had been in therapy but the parents had discontinued it; A.C. did not feel mentally and/or emotionally safe in the home; M.C. said things such as “[Child’s preferred name] is the b— that killed my son”; and A.C. “would be more likely to have thoughts of self-harm and suicide if [Child] were to return to the family home due to mental and emotional abuse.”

A week after the second report, DCS filed a proposed child in need of services petition in the Madison Circuit Court, alleging A.C. was a CHINS on two bases: A.C.’s physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or seriously endangered due to the parents’ neglect, and/or A.C.’s physical or mental health was seriously endangered due to injury by the parents’ acts or omissions.

Following a hearing, the court issued an initial/detention order finding that it was in A.C.’s best interest to be removed from the home due to the parents’ “inability, refusal or neglect to provide shelter, care, and/or supervision at the present time.”

In November 2021, the parties informed the court that they had reached an agreement that DCS would dismiss the CHINS-1 and CHINS-2 allegations, unsubstantiate and expunge the record of any reports related to the parents, and proceed under the CHINS-6 statute, Indiana Code § 31-34-1-6. A.C. then admitted to being a CHINS-6 and the parents verified that they had no objection to their child’s admission.

After the hearing, the court issued an order finding that A.C. was a CHINS-6 because the child had an eating disorder, which was “fueled partly because of [Child’s] self-isolation from [the Parents] which is a behavior which is likely to reoccur” if A.C. was placed back in the parents’ home.

At the close of a subsequent dispositional hearing, the court informed the parties that it would leave in place its earlier order prohibiting the parents from discussing the child’s transgender identity during visitation, but confirmed that it could be discussed at family therapy and that the court would reconsider the order when it could be safely discussed outside of therapy.

The trial court entered its dispositional order in which it found A.C. needed services and therapy, in which the parents were ordered to participate. The court also ordered that A.C. would remain in the current home or placement with DCS supervision.

On appeal, the parents argued the dispositional order and the trial court’s prior order on the combined initial and detention hearing were clearly erroneous. They also argued both orders violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody and control of A.C., the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech.

None of those arguments persuaded the Court of Appeals.

First, the COA found the parents’ appeal of the initial/detention order was moot because the CHINS-1 and CHINS-2 allegations in the initial CHINS determination had been dismissed.

Next, judges concluded the trial court’s decision to continue A.C.’s placement outside the parents’ home was not clearly erroneous.

“In their appellants’ brief, the Parents’ sufficiency of the evidence argument rests largely on their contention that the Dispositional Order is contrary to the CHINS-6 statute because the order is based on parental acts or omissions related to their repudiation of Child’s transgender identity,” Judge Terry Crone wrote. “We have already found no merit to this argument.

“The Parents also contend that they participated in the DCS case management plan, maintained a safe and sanitary home, and sought medical and therapeutic services before the State became involved, and that Mother testified that she believed that they would be able to continue treatment while having Child at home,” Crone continued. “This argument is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline.”

Third, the COA found the dispositional order did not violate the parents’ constitutional rights.

“The clear and convincing evidence standard applies to termination of parental rights, Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2, not a CHINS proceeding,” Crone wrote.

On the issue of exercising religion, the appellate panel found that protecting the child’s health and welfare was a compelling interest justifying state action that is contrary to the parents’ religious beliefs.

“The CHINS-6 adjudication and the factual basis establish that Child’s health was substantially endangered and that the care, treatment, and rehabilitation would likely not occur without the court intervention,” Crone wrote. “Thus, the State has a compelling interest in protecting Child’s physical and mental health.”

Finally, looking at In re Paternity of G.R.G., 829 N.E.2d 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), the COA concluded the trial court’s temporary restriction on discussion of the child’s transgender identity did not violate the parents’ freedom of speech.

“The trial court recognized that Child’s eating disorder and self-isolation were connected to the discord at home regarding Child’s transgender identity,” Crone wrote. “Thus, the limitation of discussion of this topic directly targets the State’s compelling interest in addressing Child’s eating disorder and psychological health.

“Further, the order is narrowly tailored because it restricts the Parents from discussing the topic with Child only during visitation but permits the topic to be discussed in therapy, which permits the family to work on conflict management so that they will eventually be able to safely talk about it outside family therapy,” he concluded. “Accordingly, we conclude that the order restricting conversation of this topic outside of family therapy is a permissible prior restraint.”

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Oct. 25

Jeremiah Jordyn Smith v. State of Indiana

22A-CR-364

Reversal: Trial court breached contract when it revoked pretrial diversion agreement

The state must keep its end of the deal in a pretrial diversion agreement entered into by a man facing sex offense-related charges, the Court of Appeals of Indiana has ruled, reversing an order allowing the state to withdraw the agreement.

The case of Jeremiah Jordyn Smith v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-364, began when Jeremiah Smith’s parole officer asked the West Lafayette Police Department to investigate whether he was violating his lifetime parole for sex offenders by visiting his 16-month-old child.

Police officers found both Smith and his child inside the apartment where the child lived. They also learned the apartment complex had issued a lifetime ban against Smith due to his status as a registered sex offender.

Smith was thus arrested for Level 6 felony lifetime parole violation and Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. The state, however, only charged Smith with the misdemeanor offense, which the parties resolved through a pretrial diversion agreement.

Under the agreement, the state agreed to withhold prosecution of Smith for one year if he complied with terms dictated by the state. The state also reserved “the right to revoke th[e] agreement for any reason prior to its execution and for any violation of its terms thereafter.”

A week after the parties signed the diversion agreement, the state moved to revoke the agreement and to add a count for Level 6 felony lifetime parole violation. According to the state, the decision was based on the discovery of “additional information related to this case.”

However, the state never articulated what new information had been discovered, nor did it allege that Smith violated any terms of the agreement. In fact, the Tippecanoe Superior Court specifically found Smith “ha[d] been compliant with the terms of the agreement since entering into the same.”

Acknowledging the lack of certainty in the law concerning the state’s ability to unilaterally revoke a valid pretrial diversion agreement, the trial court determined the prosecutor’s broad charging discretion allowed the state to renege on its agreement.

But at the Court of Appeals, judges found that Smith’s diversion agreement was supported by consideration and that the state was bound by the agreement’s terms.

“The bargained for exchange in Smith’s diversion agreement is clear: the State agreed to ‘dismiss all charges in this case’ in exchange for Smith ‘successfully and timely complet[ing] all terms of th[e] agreement,’” Judge Leanna Weissmann wrote.

“… Having concluded that the State was bound by Smith’s diversion agreement, we have no trouble finding the State’s revocation of the agreement was a breach of its terms,” Weissmann continued. “The agreement specifically provided: ‘The State reserves the right to revoke this agreement for any reason prior to its execution and for any violation of its terms thereafter.’ As it is undisputed that the agreement had been properly executed and Smith did not violate any of its terms, the State had no right to revoke it.

“… Because revoking Smith’s diversion agreement without cause was a breach of the agreement’s terms, the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to revoke the agreement,” she concluded. “Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the case against Smith with prejudice.”

Christy Cinamon v. State of Indiana

22A-CR-390

COA allows suppression of drugs found in purse based on constitutional violations

A woman who was criminally charged after drugs were found in her purse as part of a search of someone else’s home has convinced the Court of Appeals of Indiana that the drug evidence should be suppressed.

Appellant-defendant Christy Cinamon was “hanging out” at a home owned by Donald Stelzel when law enforcement arrived to search for a woman named Stephanie Hawkins, who lived in Stelzel’s home. Cinamon was asked to leave the house, and Stelzel gave law enforcement permission to search the portions of the residence not covered by a search warrant.

It was during that search that Greene County Sheriff’s Detective Shawn Cullison found a one-zipper bag. He searched the bag and found a rolled-up washcloth that he believed was wrapped around a methamphetamine pipe, as well as a debit card issued to Cinamon.

Meanwhile, Cinamon had reentered the house to use the restroom. When she emerged, she admitted the bag was hers. She also admitted the item in the washcloth was a meth pipe.

Thus, Cinamon was charged with Level 6 felony possession of meth and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. She moved to suppress the evidence found in the bag — sometimes referred to in court proceedings as a purse and other times as a “little bag” — as well as her statements to Cullison, arguing a male homeowner did not have authority to consent to the search of a female’s purse.

But the Greene Superior Court denied her motion, finding the bag was not necessarily a purse and had no external features indicating it belonged to a female. Also, the court determined Cinamon was not in custody when Cullison asked her if she owned the bag.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed on interlocutory appeal, finding Cinamon’s federal and state constitutional rights were violated.

On appeal, Cinamon relied on Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957 (Ind. 2001), to argue that Cullison did not have authority to search her “purse.” The state, however, argued the bag was just that — a bag, with no gender-identifying features.

But the COA did not focus on the bag-versus-purse issue in ruling for Cinamon.

“In this case, the label given to the item is not dispositive,” Judge Robert Altice wrote. “… (N)otwithstanding the label, we conclude that the item searched, which had a zipper, is of the type one would use to carry items of a highly personal nature.

“We therefore conclude that the item searched was a container that can support a reasonable expectation of privacy,” Altice continued, referencing Krise.

Further, the COA noted Cullison was aware there were other individuals at home during the search aside from Stelzel, including Cinamon.

“This, taken with the fact that the item searched could support a reasonable expectation of privacy, leads us to conclude that Detective Cullison could not have reasonably believed that Stelzel had apparent authority to consent to the search of the item he found next to the couch,” Altice wrote, referencing Cinamon’s bag. “Therefore, the search of Cinamon’s purse violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.”

Turning to Cinamon’s argument that her rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution had been violated, the COA determined Cullison’s search came with a lower degree of suspicion, a higher degree of intrusion and a minimal risk to law enforcement needs.

“Because of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that it was unreasonable for Detective Cullison to search Cinamon’s purse,” Altice wrote. “The search therefore violated her rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.”

The case is Christy Cinamon v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-390.

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Oct. 31

T.D. v. State of Indiana

22A-JV-1016

Split COA voids juvenile’s delinquency adjudication, finds trial court failed to ensure minor knowingly waived rights

A juvenile’s delinquency adjudication for auto theft has been voided after a split Court of Appeals of Indiana found a trial court failed to ensure the child knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights when he admitted to the offense.

In June 2020, the state filed a petition alleging T.D. was a delinquent child for committing acts constituting Level 6 felony auto theft and Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult.

T.D. was detained, and his attorney moved for his release. In the motion, T.D.’s attorney stated he had spoken with T.D., who reported that he had “viewed [a] video on his rights” and had “no questions” about them. The attorney also stated that he had informed T.D.’s mother of “her son’s rights” and she had “no questions” about them.

The Lake Superior Court denied T.D.’s motion for release, finding he had “been advised of his rights, understands his rights, and has no questions regarding his rights.”

Then in July 2020, the trial court held an omnibus hearing at which T.D.’s attorney told the trial court that T.D. and the state had reached an oral agreement. The agreement provided that T.D. would admit to the auto theft allegation in exchange for the dismissal of the theft allegation, and disposition would be left to the discretion of the court.

The minor told the court he wanted to admit to the first count and argue disposition. His mother also agreed.

The court then asked T.D. about the offense, and he admitted he “took the car” without permission. The court did not discuss T.D.’s rights, reference a video or explain that T.D. was waiving his rights by admitting to auto theft.

Following the hearing, the trial court adjudicated T.D. as a delinquent child. In its order, the court found that T.D. and his mother “understand the admission waives those rights explained in the video.” The court then placed T.D. under the wardship of the Department of Correction.

A little over a year later, T.D. filed a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6), alleging his admission “was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary” because the trial court “made no mention or inquiries into the rights that T.D. was waiving.”

The trial court denied the dismissal motion, finding “the juvenile’s admission was voluntary and knowingly given with the adequate assistance of counsel.”

On appeal, T.D. contended the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment.

Looking at multiple cases, including A.S. v. State, 923 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), a split Court of Appeals panel agreed with T.D. and reversed in T.D. v. State of Indiana, 22A-JV-1016.

“For its part, the State doesn’t dispute that the trial court failed to ensure that T.D. knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights when he admitted to auto theft,” Judge Nancy Vaidik wrote for the majority, which included Judge Patricia Riley. “As already noted, at the omnibus hearing the trial court did not discuss T.D.’s rights, reference a video, or explain that T.D. was waiving his rights by admitting to auto theft. Instead, the State argues that a ‘juvenile court’s failure to follow the procedures outlined in the juvenile waiver statute is not the kind of infirmity that makes a judgment void.’

“… Although A.S. involved waiver of the right to counsel, which is not at issue here, that is immaterial,” Vaidik continued. “The juvenile waiver statute applies to ‘[a]ny rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law’— not just the right to counsel. Thus, under A.S., a trial court’s failure to ensure that a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waives his rights when the juvenile admits to being a delinquent child means that the agreed delinquency adjudication is void under Trial Rule 60(B)(6).”

The majority thus concluded that the record showed T.D. met his burden of proving he didn’t freely and with informed consent enter into his admission.

Judge L. Mark Bailey dissented, although he did agree with the majority that the trial court did not adequately advise T.D. of his rights prior to accepting his admission, such that his admission was not knowing or voluntary. But, Bailey continued, that error did not render the judgment void.

“In his brief on appeal, T.D. does not cite any relevant case law or legal authority to support his position that a violation of Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1 renders a judgment void,” Bailey wrote. “Rather, some of the cases T.D. cites tend to undermine his argument. Indeed, he cites cases for the proposition that ‘[s]trict compliance with the Statute is required for valid waivers with regard to juveniles,’ but none of those cases hold that a judgment is void for failure to comply with the relevant statute.

“… Second, while the majority is correct that an adult’s guilty plea must be vacated if it was not made knowingly or voluntarily, that does not render the judgment against the adult void,” Bailey continued. “… Should an adult plead guilty despite an unknowing or involuntary waiver of his or her rights, that guilty plea remains in full force and effect unless it is challenged. Thus, the judgment is merely voidable, not void. Similarly, here, at most, an admission following the unknowing or involuntary waiver of a juvenile’s rights results in a judgment that is merely voidable, not one that is void.”

Finally, Bailey opined it was “entirely possible” that had T.D. properly pleaded his claim under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), he would’ve been successful.

In a footnote, the majority addressed Bailey’s dissent.

“The dissent contends claimants such as T.D. may find relief from their involuntary admissions using Rule 60(B)(8). But as the dissent also notes, such an argument requires the showing of a meritorious defense,” Vaidik wrote. “This requirement would effectively shift the burden of proof to T.D. to prove he has a plausible defense to the underlying charges despite his involuntary admission.”

Reva Capalla and Mark Capalla v. Wilbert Best and Best Vineyards, LLC

22A-CT-657

COA rules for distillery in spirited legal battle with distributors

The sale and distribution of alcohol — or lack thereof — sat squarely in the middle of a legal battle fought between the product’s manufacturer and its distributors, with the Court of Appeals of Indiana ruling for the beverage producer.

In 2017, Reva and Mark Capalla, who owned businesses relating to the sale and distribution of wine and spirits, entered into agreements with Wilbert Best and Best Vineyards LLC to be the exclusive distributors of Best Vineyards’ products in certain states.

At the time, Reva claimed ownership of Shepherd & Shepherd Inc., a wine and spirits distribution business, while Mark claimed ownership of West Central Beverage Co. LLC. For its part, Best Vineyards is involved in winemaking and spirit distillation.

A dispute between the parties arose regarding whether the Capallas were adequately working on the Best parties’ behalf to distribute the products. Notably, a significant amount of the products still had not been sold at Shepherd & Shepherd when that business closed in 2018.

Mark then allegedly attempted to sell the remaining products to a company in California. Both sides offered different perspectives on what happened — Mark claimed the Best parties refused to allow him to complete the sale, while Best asserted the Capallas wrongly attempted to distribute the products in California, which was not covered by the parties’ distribution agreements.

When the Capallas asked the Best parties to take back the products, Best refused, allegedly believing the law forbade them from accepting the return of product from a distributor.

Best Vineyards ultimately sued the Capallas, alleging breach of contract, theft and deception, but the Capallas filed a notice of bankruptcy and were granted a motion to stay. Meanwhile, both Shepherd & Shepherd and the Capallas separately filed for bankruptcy.

As for Best Vineyards’ products, the Capallas claimed the products were destroyed when a bankruptcy trustee took control of Shepherd & Shepherd’s warehouse after a buyer could not be found for the products.

Law enforcement began an investigation into the facts and circumstances of the Best parties’ dealings with the Capallas and their respective businesses, which resulted in each of the Capallas being charged with one count of Level 5 felony theft.

Those criminal cases remain pending in the Harrison Superior Court, with Mark’s jury trial scheduled for Dec. 13. Reva’s jury trial, initially scheduled for Nov. 15, was canceled, according to court records, and the online case docket has not been updated since the cancellation.

After being charged, the Capallas filed the case that would become Reva Capalla and Mark Capalla v. Wilbert Best and Best Vineyards, LLC, 22A-CT-657, alleging abuse of process, malicious prosecution, defamation per se, fraud, deception and intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the Best parties’ motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the Capallas’ claims are barred under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and because the Capallas lack standing to bring the claims.

First, the appellate court noted the Capallas had a continuing duty to disclose their cause of action against the Best parties to the bankruptcy court and to include it as an estate asset. However, they failed to do so.

“By failing to disclose their interest in the underlying civil case to the bankruptcy court, the Capallas would be able to keep any funds they might recover as opposed to having such funds applied to their debt. For these reasons, we conclude that the Capallas were judicially estopped from bringing the underlying lawsuit,” Chief Judge Cale Bradford wrote.

As for standing, the appellate court noted that once the Capallas filed for bankruptcy, their claims against the Best parties belonged to the bankruptcy estate and could only have been brought by the trustee of their bankruptcy estates.

“Further, because the Capallas failed to disclose their interests in the civil suit, the bankruptcy trustee cannot be said to have abandoned the claim,” Bradford wrote. “Because the claim remained exclusively with the bankruptcy trustee, the Capallas lacked standing to bring the underlying lawsuit.

“The Capallas were both judicially estopped from bringing and lacked standing to bring the claims presented in this matter,” the appellate court concluded. “We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings to the Best Parties. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.”•