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The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed a resentencing court’s life without parole sentence for a man who tortured and murdered a woman in 1995.
Jerry E. Russell Sr. was arrested in 1998 for the kidnapping, torture and murder of 44-year-old Pamela Foddrill, who was intellectually disabled.
Foddrill and her mother would often walk to the grocery store together, but on the day of her kidnapping, Foddrill went alone, and was lured into a van and driven to Russell’s house.
Prior to the kidnapping, Russell had become obsessed with Foddrill, and spoke to his companions about abducting her, according to court reports.
For over a week, the group sexually assaulted and physically tormented Foddrill until they decided to kill her and dispose of her body in Illinois.
In 2003, years after being sentenced to life without parole plus 73 years, Russell filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In 2019, he agreed with the State of Indiana to dismiss the petition with prejudice in exchange for resentencing.
Following the resentencing hearing, Russell was sentenced to life without parole plus 73 years.
In Russell’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the state argued the high court didn’t have jurisdiction over the case because it’s a sentence modification, which goes directly to the Court of Appeals.
However, Russell claims his resentencing has continually been discussed as such, pointing to the motion’s introductory paragraph and prayer for relief, which asked the court to “conduct a new sentencing hearing” and “impose a new sentence.”
The motion later reads that the state agreed to “a new sentencing hearing” and the court would “impose a new sentence.”
Any discussion of “modification” in the joint motion “seem to refer to the possibility that the resentencing court could enter a different sentence than the original revised sentence,” said Justice Derek Molter.
Russell brought four claims to his arguments on appeal for resentencing, the first arguing the resentencing court erred in concluding he was not intellectually disabled.
Though the state conceded his intellectual function was diminished, the Supreme Court affirmed Russell did not satisfy his burden to claim intellectual disability.
To claim it, Russell would’ve had to prove “significant limitations in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills that manifested before the age of twenty-two,” to which he did not do, Justice Molter said.
Second, Russell argues the resentencing court exceeded its discretion by rejecting his proposed mitigating sentencing factors.
However, in reviewing a sentencing court case from 1999, the Supreme Court concludes that to allege a trial court failed to find mitigating factors requires the defendant prove the mitigating evidence is significant and supported by the record.
The Supreme Court argues Russell did not prove the mitigating evidence was significant or supported.
In a second point to support his argument that the resentencing court exceeded its discretion, Russell claims the court relied on aggravating factors the record doesn’t support and assigned undue weight to aggravators regarding his non-murder convictions.
However, the Supreme Court stated Russell failed to show the aggravators he believed were considered by the court were actually considered.
The high court also noted the resentencing court gave appropriate weight to the aggravating factors they did consider, which included Russell’s criminal history and the victim’s mental limitations.
Russell also argued his sentence is inappropriate because of the nature of the offense and his character.
The high court disagreed, citing the horrific details of the crime he and his companions committed, and claiming his past crimes outweigh his current character in determining how long he should serve time.
Justices Mark Massa, Geoffrey Slaughter and Chief Justice Loretta Rush concurred, and Justice Christopher Goff dissented.
In his dissent, Goff says he agreed with the court’s opinion, but argued the trial court didn’t apply a “medically informed standard” when assessing Russell’s claim that he’s intellectually disabled.
Goff wrote that the trial court should’ve considered not just that the defendant has strengths in some areas and can function adequately inside prison, but if the defendant has intellectual shortfalls that require support in daily life outside of prison.
“Courts can no longer rely on the ‘incorrect stereotypes’ that intellectually disabled people ‘cannot have jobs or relationships,’” Goff wrote, citing Smith v. Sharp, 935 F.3d 1064, 1086 (10th Cir. 2019).
Goff called for the sentence to be vacated and the case remanded for further findings.
The case is Jerry E. Russell, Sr. v. State of Indiana, 21S‐LW‐451.
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