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A trial court did not violate a convicted child molester’s rights with its jury instructions or abuse its discretion by imposing probation conditions that limit the man’s contact with children, the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed Thursday.
According to court records, Randall Johnson began dating and living with a woman and her children in 2008 in Indianapolis. The woman’s children included A.H., who was born in 2006, and D.C. and C.C., who are younger than A.H.
Johnson molested A.H. from the time she was 9 or 10 years old until she was approximately 13 years old.
In December 2020, when A.H. was 15 years old, she told her mother about Johnson’s actions. Her mother did not believe her, so A.H. told her grandmother about the molestations.
A.H.’s grandmother notified the authorities.
In February 2021, the state charged Johnson with three counts of Level 1 felony child molesting for performing or submitting to “other sexual conduct” with A.H. The jury found Johnson guilty as charged and the Marion Superior Court vacated the judgment for Count II.
On Counts I and III, the trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate sentence of 30 years, with five years suspended to probation. It also imposed conditions of probation, including limitations on Johnson’s ability to have contact with children.
Johnson appealed and argued that the trial court’s preliminary instructions to the jury regarding juror questions violated the jury’s right to determine the law pursuant to Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution. He also argued that the probation conditions imposed were an abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with Judge Elizabeth Tavitas writing the opinion for the appellate court.
Johnson’s argument regarding preliminary jury instructions pertained to the following portion of the trial court’s instruction: “You must put your questions in writing. I will review them with the attorneys, and I will determine whether your questions are permitted by law. If it is not permitted, you may not speculate as to why it was not asked, nor what the answer may have been.”
According to Tavitas, that instruction follows Indiana Evidence Rule 614(d).
“We have held that Evidence Rule 614(d) ‘makes evident by its language that not all juror questions are proper and that a trial judge must determine whether the question is appropriate after hearing objections from the parties,’” Tavitas wrote, citing Trotter v. State, 733 N.E.2d 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Further, under Johnson’s interpretation of Article 1, Section 19, the jury would determine the admissibility of evidence, which was not consistent with the purpose of the article, the judge continued.
“The instructions as a whole properly informed the jury of its constitutional duties under Article 1, Section 19, and did not mislead the jury,” she wrote. “We conclude that Johnson has failed to demonstrate fundamental error in the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding juror questions.”
As for the probation conditions, Johnson contended that the trial court did not make a “best interests” finding regarding D.C. and C.C. He also said D.C., C.C. and their mother support having contact with Johnson.
Regardless of the children’s view of Johnson as a father figure, Tavitas wrote, Johnson and the children’s mother were not married, and D.C. and C.C. are not Johnson’s stepchildren.
“Accordingly, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.2(b)(2) is inapplicable here. The trial court, thus, was not required to make a ‘best interests’ finding,” she wrote.
Additionally, Tavitas noted Johnson’s molestation of A.H. created a family rift that is ongoing.
“Continued contact between Johnson and A.H.’s siblings is unlikely to help heal that family rift,” she concluded. “Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Johnson’s contact with D.C. and C.C.”
Judges L. Mark Bailey and Dana Kenworthy concurred.
The case is Randall D. Johnson v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-2898.
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