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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowIndiana Supreme Court justices have determined that an amended statute dealing with ownership transfer in instances of eminent domain may be applied retroactively.
Summary judgment was upheld for the town of St. John by the Indiana Court of Appeals after the court determined unoccupied property owned by David Guzzo did not qualify as agricultural land under Indiana Code § 32-24-4.5-8. The 8.65-acre property sat vacant for five years and was sought by the town for a “Roadway Improvement and Economic Development Project.”
St. John acquired the land, but Guzzo argued he was entitled to 150% of the fair market value for the land’s qualification as occupied real property, or 125% of the fair market value for its qualification as agricultural land pursuant to the statute. The appellate panel rejected that argument, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted Guzzo’s transfer petition.
In David Guzzo, et al. v. Town of St. John, Lake County, Indiana, 19S-PL-00147, Guzzo challenged whether he was required to physically live in the residence or use the land for agricultural activities at the time of the taking in order to receive his requested entitlement. On July 31, he filed a “Notice of Change in Law and Verified Motion for Remand” arguing that recent amendments to I.C. 32-24-4.5 governing the procedures for transferring ownership of real property condemned through eminent domain from one private person to another should be applied retroactively to his case.
Supreme Court justices agreed, finding the statute was intended to be applied retroactively.
St. John had argued the fair market value of the property is “determined under IC 32-24-1” when the court-appointed appraisers file their report. It also argued “fair market value,” as used in the statute, refers to the appraisers’ report, while “damages” refers to a determination by the factfinder. However, the justices rejected those assertions in a Friday order.
“Aside from its semantic argument, the Town also argues that if the Guzzos were correct, subsection 8(b)(1) would be meaningless because it could not apply to any case. But it is not difficult to imagine an eminent domain case in which the trial court entered a fair-market-value determination before July 1, 2019, and for which an appeal was still pending when these amendments went into effect,” Chief Justice Loretta Rush wrote for the panel. “Without deciding the question, we observe that subsection 8(b)(1) may apply to such a case. The existence of subsection 8(b)(1) clarifies that subsection 8(b)(2) does not apply to cases where there has already been an agreement by the parties or a determination by the trier of fact concerning fair-market value.”
Additionally, the high court declined to address St. John’s argument that the recent amendments should not be applied retroactively to the case because doing so would violate a vested right. Justices therefore concluded that on its face, subsection 8(a)(2) applies to Guzzo’s case because fair market value has not yet been determined under I.C. 32-24-1.
“We thus dismiss this appeal without prejudice and remand to the trial court to determine the fair market value of the Guzzos’ property and assess whether they are entitled to enhanced compensation,” the panel concluded. “The parties are free on remand to argue whether there is any constitutional limitation on applying the amended statute to this case.”
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