Maley: Summary judgment procedures in Indiana’s federal courts

Local Rules 56-1 in the Southern District of Indiana and Northern District of Indiana govern summary judgment procedure and are critical in summary judgment practice. Both similarly require the movant to support its motion with a statement of material facts not in dispute with supporting evidence.

Although the Southern District requires this in the brief while the Northern District requires the statement of material facts in a separate document, both courts’ rules have the same purpose of putting the non-movant on notice of the support undisputed facts.

The non-movant can then respond challenging those asserted facts. Again, each court’s Local Rule 56-1 requires the non-movant to inform the court if any facts are disputed. The Southern District requires in the brief a Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, while the Northern District requires a separate Response to Statement of Material Facts.

Furthermore, the Southern District’s Local Rule 56-1 provides that the court “will assume that: (1) the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the movant are admitted without controversy except to the extent that: (A) the non-movant specifically controverts the facts in that party’s “Statement of Material Facts in Dispute” with admissible evidence; or (B) it is shown that the movant’s facts are not supported by admissible evidence; or (C) the facts, alone or in conjunction with other admissible evidence, allow the court to draw reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor sufficient to preclude summary judgment.”

The Northern District’s Local Rule 56-1 does not contain this or similar language, but ample case law is similar.

Both courts’ Local Rule 56-1 address motions to strike. The Southern District provides, “The court disfavors collateral motions—such as motions to strike— in the summary judgment process. Any dispute over the admissibility or effect of evidence must be raised through an objection within a party’s brief.” Local Rule 56-1(i). The Northern District provides, “Disputes about the admissibility or materiality of evidence must be raised in the parties’ briefs. A separate motion to strike must not be filed.” Local Rule 56-1(f).

Finally, both Local Rules require notice to pro se litigants of their obligations in responding to motions for summary judgment, with such notice to be in the form specified in each courts’ Appendices to Local Rules.

Recent decision of note

In Whorms v. Honda Mfg. No. 122-CV-01261-TAB-TWP, 2024 WL 1329934 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2024), Magistrate Judge Baker granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment in a Title VII case. Plaintiff proceed pro se, and failed to comply with Local Rule 56-1 in responding to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Notable sections of the opinion include the following.

“Honda filed its Local Rule 56-1(k) statement [Filing No. 54], which put Whorms on notice of his obligation to properly respond to Honda’s summary judgment motion. Nonetheless, Whorms failed to identify admissible material facts in dispute that would preclude summary judgment. Whorms’ response to Honda’s motion for summary judgment states in its entirety:

‘The defendants claim that Lowring and Vollet saw me with my pants down exposing my underwear along with trying to prevent them from working are complete falsehoods and are lies. The accusation of me having my pants down was first used by Lundsford as I left her office. I thought this accusation erroneous biased and malicious towards me as a Black male, infering that Black males are more likely to be in a compromising position for misbehavior. The incident with Lowring and Vollet occurred prior to the conflict with Volleta the following day; no attempt by HR was made to meet about this incident. When Lowring lied to spvsr. Peelman about me starting machinery which was not to be done he apologized to me but did not report the incident to HR. Vollet Lowring and I worked with each other on several occasions and achieved our 100% production goal many times on one occasion Vollet and I achieved over 200% production quarter. As for defendants new witness ‘Michael Evans’ I’ve never encountered this individual. I’ve reported incidents of verbal abuse and harassment to Goodard yet he took no action on my behalf, I seek to question these accusers in court to attest to my behavior at Honda Greensburg.’” [sic]

Judge Baker then concluded, “In submitting or responding to a motion for summary judgment, “[a] party must support each fact the party asserts in a brief with a citation to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or other admissible evidence.” S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Whorms’ response brief does not satisfy the requirements of Local Rule 56-1. His response does not contain the required “Statement of Material Facts in Dispute.” Rather, his “disputes” largely consist of unsupported argument. Honda’s reply brief sets forth a helpful chart analyzing every allegation in Whorms’ response and detailing why it is insufficient and how it fails to identify any genuine issues of material fact.”

Judge Baker further explained: “Whorms fails to identify any admissible evidence disputing any of the facts identified by Honda. Moreover, his response cannot be considered an admissible affidavit or declaration for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) because it is neither sworn nor verified under the penalty of perjury. ‘A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, ‘it is also well established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules.’ Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008).

Judge Baker concluded, “Honda’s statement of material facts is therefore not in dispute and is supported by admissible evidence, including Whorms’ deposition. Therefore, the Court accepts Honda’s statement of material facts not in dispute for purposes of ruling on its motion. However, the Court considers those facts in the light most favorable to Whorms. See, e.g., Crawford v. Martin, 2023 WL 2330710, at *1 (S.D. Ind. March 2, 2023) (‘When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’ (citing Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2021)).”

Judge Baker thereafter analyzed the claims under applicable Title VII precedent, concluding that summary judgment was required. But the failure to comply with Local Rule 56-1 – which occurs from time to time with counsel not just pro se litigants – was critical.

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John R. Maley is a partner with Barnes & Thornburg LLP. Opinions expressed are those of the author.