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A man convicted of child sex-trafficking did not have his Miranda rights violated when a detective asked him questions after he said he would “rather” have a lawyer, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in affirming a lower court’s decision.
Jane Doe was introduced when she was 17 to the man, Khalil Jackson, through her sister. Doe’s father had gone to prison for child molesting, and Jackson, then 24, assured her she was his “best friend” and that he wouldn’t let anyone touch her again.
Jackson then coaxed Doe, still 17, into prostitution for his benefit, picking up customers at gas stations, truck stops and driveways.
He would take them to apartments, houses and hotel rooms.
Jackson also advertised the services with nude photos of Doe, and he eventually transported her to Michigan for prostitution.
He destroyed Doe’s cell phone and beat her as a result of Doe trying to run away. Jackson became paranoid after a family friend posted on Facebook that he was being investigated by the FBI. He took Doe to a different hotel, where he beat and dragged her into the road.
A friend saw Doe and took her home.
Doe spoke to police while in the hospital but was too afraid to report the trafficking.
Jackson then made threatening phone calls to Doe’s family home and left threatening voicemails after they stopped answering. Threats included burning the house down.
A Saint Joseph County detective, responding to a report about possible human trafficking, interviewed Doe and her family. Doe’s grandfather played the voicemails, and Doe gave the detective phone numbers related to advertisements on an escort website.
Police collected evidence that included texts and information from some of the hotels where Doe was trafficked. Police collected 400 advertisements of Doe for prostitution.
Police also seized a cell phone from Jackson’s apartment and interviewed him.
A federal grand jury incited Jackson on five charges: child sex-trafficking, producing child pornography, possessing child pornography, transporting child pornography and cyberstalking.
A jury convicted him on all counts. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, sentenced him to 40 years and denied his motion for a new trial.
On appeal, Jackson argued the district court should have granted his motion to suppress statements he made during his interview with police, including that he knew the email addresses used to prostitute Doe and that he knew Doe’s age.
Jackson argued using the evidence would violate his right to counsel and other Miranda rights.
The 7th Circuit didn’t follow the district court’s logic exactly but ultimately still disagreed with Jackson’s argument.
While Jackson disclosed information such as his phone number and social media after he had been given his Miranda rights, Jackson argued his statement that he would “rather have a lawyer” was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel and make continued questioning a violation of his rights.
The recorded interview shows Jackson “arguably” invoked his right to counsel, the 7th Circuit ruled, “but even if he did, he then immediately opened the door for further interrogation by reinitiating conversation.”
In denying Jackson’s motion to suppress, the district court judge ruled his statement about how he’d “rather” have a lawyer fell “somewhere between the unambiguous request of ‘can I have a lawyer’ and the ambiguous statement ‘maybe I should get a lawyer.’” The district court concluded Jackson’s question — “What is there more I can do to help myself?” — made the statement ambiguous.
The district court also ruled Jackson’s phrasing expressed only a “conditional preference.”
The 7th Circuit said it was less confident that Jackson chose his verb tense to address an unlikely scenario and that it has ruled in past cases — including United States v. Martin, 664 F.3d (7th Cir. 2011) — that nearly identical expressions were sufficient to invoke the right to counsel.
“Nevertheless, we recognize that the district court was trying to parse a very fast exchange between Jackson and the detective,” the opinion says.
After about 30 minutes of talking to the detective, Jackson finally said, “I want a lawyer now,” which the 7th Circuit agreed invoked his Miranda rights. But that was after he had disclosed his cell phone number, email address and social media profiles.
“Even if we assume Jackson unambiguously asserted his right to counsel with his statement that he would rather have a lawyer, and even if he had not reinitiated the interrogation, we are also satisfied that any constitutional error would have been harmless,” the opinion says.
Jackson also argued the district court should have allowed his request for a limiting instruction to the jury to consider voicemails he left Doe’s family only on the cyberstalking charge.
He argued the voicemails were “other acts” with respect to the human trafficking and child pornography charges and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404.
But the 7th Circuit found no abuse of discretion.
“Jackson’s threatening voicemails were evidence of witness intimidation,” the opinion says. “They were direct evidence to prove the human-trafficking and child-pornography charges, so Rule 404(b) does not apply here.”
Jackson also argued the district court should have issued a limiting instruction on the theory that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence.
The 7th Circuit recognized threats to witnesses can pose a danger of unfair prejudice by appealing to a jury’s sympathies.
“Nevertheless, reliable evidence of threats can be probative of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt,” the opinion says, “and we see nothing unfairly prejudicial in admitting threats that defendant Jackson intentionally recorded to try to prevent his prosecution and conviction.”
Judge David Hamilton wrote the opinion.
The case is United States of America v. Khalil M. Jackson, 21-2811 & 22-1003.
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