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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowThe following opinions were published after IL’s deadline Thursday:
Indiana Supreme Court
Mathew J. Cramer, II v. State of Indiana
23S-LW-19
Life without parole. Affirms Mathew Cramer’s life without parole prison sentence in Allen Superior Court after he was found guilty of murder, abuse of a corpse and resisting law enforcement. Finds the nature of Cramer’s offenses involves extreme brutality and justifies his sentence. Also finds Cramer’s criminal history reflects poorly on his character and justifies his sentence. Finally, declines to revise Cramer’s sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B).
Russell G. Finnegan v. State of Indiana
24S-MI-68
Miscellaneous. Affirms the Pulaski Circuit Court’s order finding Russell Finnegan in contempt of court under Indiana Code section 34-47-3-1 and ordering him to serve 170 days in jail for sending potentially “contumacious” material to Judge Kim Hall. Finds that the insanity defense statutes do not apply to indirect contempt proceedings. Justice Christopher Goff concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
Friday opinions
Indiana Court of Appeals
In re: the Marriage of: Marcos Coronado (Father) v. Connie Coronado (Mother)
24A-DR-157
Domestic relations. Reverses the Lake Circuit Court’s denial of Marcus Coronado’s motion to correct error that he filed following the trial court’s order striking the father’s “Verified Petition to Emancipate, Modify Child Support[,] Custody & College Contributions and Determine Arrearage.” Finds the trial court erred when it issued an order to strike the father’s child-related Motion because the father complied with Lake County Family Law Rule 9. Remands for proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion.
Michael Steury v. State of Indiana
23A-CR-2380
Criminal. Affirms Michael Steury’s convictions in Allen Superior Court of Level 3 felony rape and Level 6 felony sexual battery. Finds the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Steury’s second proposed jury instruction because the term “unaware” in the rape statute does not have a technical or legal definition different from its plain and ordinary meaning and the proposed instruction risked confusing the jury. Also finds the trial court also did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Steury’s third proposed instruction because the content of that instruction was covered by the other instructions given by the trial court and the instruction conflated the elements of Count II and Count III. Finally, finds the state presented sufficient evidence to sustain Steury’s convictions.
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