Parents’ consent to adoption not required, COA affirms

A mother and father with lengthy criminal records and a history of instability did not have to consent to the adoption of their daughter, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed on Tuesday.

Mother C.T. gave birth to a daughter, K.T., in early 2018. K.T. was born addicted to heroin, and she was placed in the custody of foster parents G.C. and C.B. one day after her birth.

The foster parents filed a petition to adopt K.T. in September 2019. While the adoption case was pending, the Department of Child Services reported that C.T. was not in compliance with services while the child’s father, J.J., had been arrested for domestic battery and driving under the influence and had not secured stable housing. A child in need of services case was also pending, and the Department of Child Services was pursuing reunification as the primary permanency plan but adoption as the secondary.

The adoption case was bifurcated, with the Fulton Circuit Court first considering whether C.T. and J.J.’s consent to the adoption was required. The court determined consent was not required from either parent, pointing to J.J.’s lengthy criminal history and his limited contact with his daughter. Likewise, C.T. also had a criminal history and “never exercised regular and consistent contact” with K.T., the court found. The court determined both parents were “too unfit to parent” K.T., noting their lack of financial and residential stability.

Both parents filed an interlocutory appeal of the finding that their consent was not required, but the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in In Re: the Adoption of K.T.; J.J. and C.T. v. G.C. and C.B., 20A-AD-2102.

C.T. raised only one argument on appeal: Whether the CHINS case that was pending at the time of the adoption proceeding prohibited the trial court with dispensing from the parents’ consent in the adoption case. According to the COA, that argument “misunderstands our case law.”

Judge Edward Najam pointed to the cases of Lake County Division of Family and Children Services v. T.B. (In re Adoption of T.B.), 622 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1993), and Bond v. Bracey (In re Adoption of E.B., 733 N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, which he said stand for the rule that “’CHINS proceedings and adoption proceedings may be considered simultaneously if the goals of the proceedings are the same.’”

“… (U)nlike in In Re Adoption of E.B., here we do not have a final judgment on the adoption petition. Rather, we only have an interlocutory order on Mother’s and Father’s consents to the adoption,” Najam wrote in a Tuesday opinion. “Further, at the time of the hearing on Mother’s and Father’s consents in the adoption proceeding, the primary permanency plan in the CHINS proceeding was reunification, but the secondary permanency plan was adoption.

“That is, DCS was moving on two tracks in the CHINS proceeding: on one, DCS was engaging Mother and Father with services in an effort to reunify them with Child. On the other, and in the event that the reunification efforts eventually failed, DCS was laying the groundwork to have an adoption lined up for Child to be entered without delay. The Foster Parents’ adoption petition was in furtherance of that secondary permanency plan,” he continued.

“… We conclude that the goals of the two proceedings at this point are in alignment and, thus, that the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it considered whether Mother’s and Father’s consents to the adoption were required.”

J.J.’s appeal focused on whether the trial court erred in finding his consent, specifically, was not required. In upholding that ruling, the appellate panel noted J.J. was arrested twice in the weeks leading up to the court’s hearing on consent, and he had a notice of a probation violation at the time. Additionally, J.J. had been relying on family members with criminal histories for housing.

“Last, Father asserts that, because, at the time of the hearing on consent, DCS was opposed to adoption as the primary permanency plan, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that dispensing with Father’s consent is in Child’s best interest. … Father’s argument is, in effect, that DCS’s position on an adoption is the end of the matter,” Najam wrote. “But that is not consistent with the Indiana Code, which squarely places with our trial courts the task of finding whether dispending with parental consent is in a child’s best interests. I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a)(11). Further, the court here did not ignore DCS’s position.

“Rather, the court made clear that it was aware that DCS opposed the adoption, and the court set a later date for a hearing on the independent question of DCS’s consent to the adoption,” the panel concluded. “… There is no error on this issue.”