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Because the parents of a child with disabilities were the prevailing party in an administrative proceeding, attorney fees could be awarded to them, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in reversing a trial court’s decision.
The parents filed a lawsuit seeking recovery of their attorney fees from the Brownsburg Community School Corporation after the conclusion of a protracted administrative proceeding regarding the child’s eligibility for special education services.
The child, C.B., suffers from generalized anxiety disorder, depression and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
During the 2017-2018 school year, Brownsburg determined C.B.’s anxiety made him eligible to receive accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
While an accommodation plan was in place, C.B. brought a shotgun shell to school along with a device “believed to be capable of discharging the cell,” court documents show. The school recommended his expulsion and scheduled a meeting to determine whether his actions were caused by or substantially related to his anxiety.
But before that meeting, parents A.B. and D.B. filed a petition for due process hearing with the Indiana Department of Education, arguing the school should have arranged an education evaluation for C.B. because it would have shown he was eligible for special services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Brownsburg determined the shotgun shell incident was ultimately not related to C.B.’s anxiety, and he was expelled for the remainder of the school year.
The parents met with the school to resolve the issues presented in their petition, and Brownsburg agreed to have a doctor evaluate C.B. and then convene a case conference committee meeting to determine whether he was eligible for special services under the IDEA. At issue was the implementation of an individualized education program.
The case conference committee concluded C.B. did not meet the eligibility requirements for special education services. However, it also determined the accommodation plan needed to be amended to include and accommodate C.B.’s diagnosis of ADHD.
The Indiana Department of Education assigned an independent hearing officer to preside over the pending petition for due process hearing and a subsequently filed request for due process hearing.
The parties engaged in settlement negotiations in the months leading up to the due process hearing, and Brownsburg offered in April 2020 to pay for a new independent education evaluation of C.B. and hold another case conference committee meeting to revisit his eligibility.
C.B.’s parents provided a list of compromises they would agree to as long as Brownsburg agreed to pay for all attorney fees.
The school sent the parents a letter offering to accept each compromise — except for the payment of attorney fees. The school said it was willing to pay a portion of the fees, but not the full amount.
The parents rejected the offer and reinstated their initial demands.
In July 2020, Brownsburg sent the parents a draft settlement agreement, offering to acquiesce to all demands except for the issue of attorney fees. The school also filed a motion asking the independent hearing officer to cancel the upcoming due process hearing and dismiss the case.
The parents filed a response, indicating they did not object to the officer issuing an order acknowledging Brownsburg’s concession regarding C.B.’s eligibility under the IDEA. But they believed the officer should make factual findings regarding attorney fees.
The officer denied all pending motions and vacated the hearing.
About two weeks later, the officer issued a Finding of Eligibility and Order to Convene Case Conference Committee.
After holding another case conference committee and corresponding about the development of C.B.’s IEP, the parents filed a Motion for Prehearing Conference to Resolve Pending Issues.
The officer denied the motion, stating she was not “inclined to address any further motions from the parties other than one for dismissal” and that the motion didn’t identify exactly what issues necessitated a prehearing.
The officer dismissed the petitions in August 2020.
In September 2020, the parents sued Brownsburg for attorney fees pursuant to the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision that allows fees to be awarded to prevailing parties in administrative proceedings.
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Indiana Southern District Court, Indianapolis Division, granted summary judgment for Brownsburg, explaining that the only question relevant when determining prevailing-party status is if C.B.’s parents secured a “material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties” through the officer’s order.
The district court determined the answer was no because the officer’s eligibility finding and order didn’t require Brownsburg to do anything it hadn’t already agreed to.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit reversed, finding Brownsburg and the district court put too much weight on the school’s stipulation where it agreed to provide remedies for C.B.
“There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Stipulation filed by Brownsburg was binding,” the opinion says.
The 7th Circuit noted the wording of the concluding paragraphs in the stipulation, which say the school “points out that these stipulations were made in an extreme effort to resolve this case short of an administrative hearing. Although [Brownsburg] does not agree, they are willing to offer these stipulations to be ordered and resolve the case.”
“Everything in the Stipulation was conditioned on acceptance of the offer by C.B.’s parents that they ultimately, and unequivocally, declined,” the opinion says.
It wasn’t until the officer’s finding of eligibility that the legal relationship between the parents and the school was materially altered, the 7th Circuit ruled, making it the first time Brownsburg was found to have a legal obligation to provide C.B. with special education services.
“Therefore, C.B.’s parents are the prevailing party of the administrative proceedings before the IHO,” the opinion says.
The 7th Circuit noted it is only holding that attorney fees could be awarded to the parents, without expressing whether they should be.
The case was remanded for further consideration.
The case is A.B. and D.B., individually and as parents of C.B., a disabled minor v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, 22-1277.
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