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The state must keep its end of the deal in a pretrial diversion agreement entered into by a man facing sex offense-related charges, the Court of Appeals of Indiana has ruled, reversing an order allowing the state to withdraw the agreement.
The case of Jeremiah Jordyn Smith v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-364, began when Jeremiah Smith’s parole officer asked the West Lafayette Police Department to investigate whether he was violating his lifetime parole for sex offenders by visiting his 16-month-old child.
Police officers found both Smith and his child inside the apartment where the child lived. They also learned the apartment complex had issued a lifetime ban against Smith due to his status as a registered sex offender.
Smith was thus arrested for Level 6 felony lifetime parole violation and Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. The state, however, only charged Smith with the misdemeanor offense, which the parties resolved through a pretrial diversion agreement.
Under the agreement, the state agreed to withhold prosecution of Smith for one year if he complied with terms dictated by the state. The state also reserved “the right to revoke th[e] agreement for any reason prior to its execution and for any violation of its terms thereafter.”
A week after the parties signed the diversion agreement, the state moved to revoke the agreement and to add a count for Level 6 felony lifetime parole violation. According to the state, the decision was based on the discovery of “additional information related to this case.”
However, the state never articulated what new information had been discovered, nor did it allege that Smith violated any terms of the agreement. In fact, the Tippecanoe Superior Court specifically found Smith “ha[d] been compliant with the terms of the agreement since entering into the same.”
Acknowledging the lack of certainty in the law concerning the state’s ability to unilaterally revoke a valid pretrial diversion agreement, the trial court determined the prosecutor’s broad charging discretion allowed the state to renege on its agreement.
But at the Court of Appeals, judges found that Smith’s diversion agreement was supported by consideration and that the state was bound by the agreement’s terms.
“The bargained for exchange in Smith’s diversion agreement is clear: the State agreed to ‘dismiss all charges in this case’ in exchange for Smith ‘successfully and timely complet[ing] all terms of th[e] agreement,’” Judge Leanna Weissmann wrote.
“… Having concluded that the State was bound by Smith’s diversion agreement, we have no trouble finding the State’s revocation of the agreement was a breach of its terms,” Weissmann continued. “The agreement specifically provided: ‘The State reserves the right to revoke this agreement for any reason prior to its execution and for any violation of its terms thereafter.’ As it is undisputed that the agreement had been properly executed and Smith did not violate any of its terms, the State had no right to revoke it.
“… Because revoking Smith’s diversion agreement without cause was a breach of the agreement’s terms, the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to revoke the agreement,” she concluded. “Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the case against Smith with prejudice.”
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