RFRA defense fails to stop child abuse prosecution

A Lawrence County man tried to defend himself against child abuse charges by asserting his right to religious freedom, but the Court of Appeals of Indiana found the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not apply in his case because the prosecution demonstrated it had chosen the least restrictive means to advance the state’s compelling interest in protecting children.

Scott A. Blattert Jr. was reported to the Indiana Department of Child Services in 2019 for physically abusing his children.

Video and testimony indicated he punched his children in the face, struck their heads with his elbow and choked them. One of the children told officials that Blattert allegedly settled on punishing them with industrial-grade glue sticks because “they caused the most pain while bruising the children the least.”

Blattert was subsequently charged with aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, strangulation, a Level 6 felony, five counts of domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than 14 years of age, each as a Level 5 felony, and three counts of domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, each as a Level 6 felony.

Blattert filed a notice with the Lawrence Superior Court that he intended to “invoke the privileges and immunities established” under Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act. A member of the Ellettsville Church of Christ, he claimed he must “do what Christ commands,” including practicing corporal punishment.

After a hearing, the trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to strike the defense.

Blattert filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that even if physically hitting his children was unreasonable as a matter of criminal law, RFRA precluded a conviction because he was exercising his sincerely held religious beliefs.

The state countered that the religious freedom statute did not apply. In particular, the state asserted that limiting Blattert’s discipline to reasonable force did not substantially burden his religious exercise. And even if it did, the state continued, the prosecution can continue because the case is the least restrictive means to further the state’s compelling interest in protecting Blattert’s nine children.

In Scott A. Blattert, Jr., v. State of Indiana, 21A-CR-1082, the Court of Appeals agreed with the state that the prosecution meets the least-restrictive-means standard, so RFRA does not apply as a matter of law.

Blattert did not dispute that the state had a compelling interest in preventing the mistreatment of children. Rather he asserted “parental privilege” as an exception to the statutes he is charged with violating and maintained that those exceptions undermined the argument that the state has a compelling interest.

The appellate panel was not persuaded.

“So the parental privilege is an exception to a criminal prohibition on some corporal punishment which might otherwise be prohibited even though it is reasonable,” Judge Derek Molter wrote for the appellate court. “But the compelling governmental interest the State seeks to advance here is protecting children from physical abuse, which does not require a prohibition on reasonable corporal punishment. Advancing that interest only requires a ban on unreasonable corporal punishment, and the parental privilege does not offer any exception to that restriction.”

The Court of Appeals also found the state met its burden of showing that it was pursuing the least restrictive means.

“The State has satisfied this part of its burden because it offers the parental privilege as a defense to battery and similar crimes rather than completely banning the practice of corporal punishments,” Molter wrote. “This accommodates religious practices which require reasonable corporal punishment. While it does not accommodate religious practices requiring unreasonable corporal punishment, there is no apparent accommodation of those practices which would still allow the State to achieve its compelling interest in protecting children from physical abuse.”

The case was remanded for further proceedings.