School district, ex-wrestling coach who slapped student win summary judgment in federal court

IL file photo

A former high school wrestling coach who slapped a student and the school district he worked for have won summary judgment in federal court on claims filed by the student and her mother.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana Magistrate Judge John Martin issued the order Friday in Jessica Kittle, on behalf of her minor child, J.M., and Jessica Kittle, individually v. Duneland School Corp., and Keith Davison, individually and as a Coach of Chesterton High School Wrestling, 2:21-cv-219.

According to court records, on July 12, 2021, J.M. and her mother filed a nine-count complaint against Duneland School Corporation and one of its wrestling coaches, Keith Davison, alleging J.M. was “smacked” in the face by the coach during a wrestling practice. The incident happened in December 2020, when J.M. was a student at Chesterton High School and a member of the wrestling team.

J.M. continued to suffer severe anxiety at the thought of Davison, according to Martin’s order. She moved to an alternative school and had to attend summer school and participate in credit recovery. J.M. testified that she struggles with disassociating and focusing on her schoolwork, the order says.

Davison’s coaching duties at Chesterton High School for the remainder of the 2020-2021 season were suspended, but he was allowed to coach and be involved with the Duneland Wrestling Club, which participated in activities at the school.

Davison resigned his position as a volunteer unpaid wrestling coach for the high school on Jan. 21, 2021, and he has had no contact with J.M. since Dec. 28, 2020. No criminal charges were filed against him.

Jessica Kittle, named as a plaintiff individually and on behalf of her child, alleged federal claims of obstruction of equal protection and due process clause of the 14th amendment right to a public education, as well as eight state-law claims: battery, assault, criminal mischief, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligence per se, statutory harassment and right to dignity violations, and loss of consortium.

Duneland sought summary judgment on the federal law claims on the basis that there were no genuine issues of material facts as to municipal liability for Davison’s conduct. The school district claimed the plaintiffs had asserted no basis for municipal liability under the framework of Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Duneland also argued that the plaintiffs did not plead a cause of action asserting the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, but if they had, the IDEA requires that they exhaust their administrative remedies, which they failed to do.

For his part, Davison sought summary judgment on the federal claims on the basis that the official capacity claims are redundant of the claims against Duneland. He also argued he is entitled to qualified immunity.

But Kittle alleged that Davison’s conduct was “extreme, outrageous, and in no way within the scope of physical contact involved in the sport of wrestling.” Also, they said Duneland’s handling of the assault constituted a denial of their 14^th Amendment rights as well as their rights under IDEA.

Granting the defendants’ motions on the federal claims and dismissing without prejudice the state-law claims, Martin first wrote that the fact that a principal has broad discretion regarding educational and scholastic matters within his school does not equate to final policymaking authority.

“In the present case, Plaintiffs content that their allegations satisfy Monell because the high school principal, Mr. Martinson, was a person with final policymaking authority who decided it ‘was unnecessary to bar Davison from the premises of Chesterton High School despite the fact that he admitted to slapping a fifteen-year-old female high school student,’” Martin wrote. But he continued, “The principal, the person Plaintiffs argue made the post-incident decision which resulted in Davison being barred from coaching Chesterton High School wrestling but not from coaching Duneland Wrestling Camp, is not a final policy maker under Indiana law, and Plaintiffs have not set forth any evidence or analysis to the contrary. They therefore cannot satisfy that prong of the Monell test.”

Because the plaintiffs have not identified a final policymaker who violated any of their rights, Martin wrote, he did not need to address whether their 14^th Amendment rights were actually violated by Duneland.

Turning to J.M.’s rights under IDEA, Martin said the shift from asserting a claim based on J.M.’s status as a female student to one based on her status as a student with an individualized education program whose needs were not properly addressed is a significant shift and not properly raised in response to a motion for summary judgment.

“Additionally,” the magistrate wrote, “as Duneland points out in its reply, IDEA requires that a party complaining about an IEP … exhaust their administrative remedies … . Accordingly, there are no federal claims remaining against Duneland.”

Turning to Davison, Martin first determined the official-capacity claim against him was redundant.

As for the individual-capacity claim, the plaintiffs “cite no case law to support the argument that the amount of harm is relevant to whether the conduct is shocking,” Martin wrote.

“There is no doubt that the conduct here was intentional; however, there is no evidence that the slap was ‘so ‘brutal’ and ‘offensive’ that it did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency,’” he wrote.

Further, “Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that Davison had contact with J.M. after the incident at issue or that he was on school grounds at any time that he was not authorized to be present to perform his duties for the Duneland Wrestling Club. … Plaintiffs have not included case law to support a theory that Kittle had the right to require that Davison be banned from the school, and there is no evidence to show that Davison did anything after the incident at issue to interfere with J.M.’s education.”

Finally, Martin remanded the state-law claims to state court, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

“The period of limitations for the claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ Complaint is tolled for the time the claim has been pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed by this Court unless state law allows for a longer tolling period,” the magistrate concluded.