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The Indiana Supreme Court reinstated the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission to a case involving the City of Carmel, reversing an Indiana Court of Appeals decision that claimed the commission couldn’t be a party in the case while also acting as a fact-finding entity.
In reversing the appellate court’s decision, the high court argued the commission acts in a “quasi-legislative” role and cannot be compared to judicial fact-finding bodies like a trial court.
“There is neither a rule nor a statute that expressly provides for the Commission to be a named party when its own final order is appealed but it has been a “long-standing custom and practice,” wrote Justice Mark Massa, citing Hamilton Se. Utils., Inc.v. Ind. Util. Regul. Comm’n, 101 N.E.3d 229, 231 (Ind. 2018). “For more than a century, the Commission, under its numerous names, has defended its orders on appeal, notwithstanding the appearance of other appellants and appellees.”
The court further argued that public policy supports the commission’s participation in cases, saying it plays a crucial role in ensuring all facts are presented to the courts.
“Without the Commission’s participation on appeal, Indiana appellate courts would lose the benefit of the Commission’s expertise,” Massa wrote.
The court also stated the commission’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Since 1913, control over public utilities has been under the commission “as the agent of the state.” City of Huntington v. N. Ind. Power Co., 5 N.E. 2d 889, 892 (Ind. 1937).
Given its position in authority over utilities, the high court argued the commission has the overall say on if ordinances are reasonable or not, and an ordinance will stand unless the commission says otherwise.
In this case, the City of Carmel was asking Duke Energy to pay to move their services lines underground, supporting its case using two local ordinances.
The commission found that unreasonable not only because it would cost significantly more than Duke’s above-ground projects, but because Duke serves customers in 69 Indiana counties, and that higher cost would end up impacting customers across the state.
“…it is thus unlikely that those customers outside of Carmel would benefit from Carmel’s aesthetic improvements resulting from buried lines; that Carmel’s underground requirements are expensive; and that the Ordinances shift costs onto Duke’s customers statewide, forcing all Hoosier customers, even distant rural ratepayers, to bear the burden of the projects,” said Massa.
The court’s opinion stated the commission has both the expertise and the public interest in mind when making decisions, which allows it to have the final say.
Finally, the court held that the commission’s only statutory remedial power was to declare the ordinances in question “void.”
Justice Derek Molter concurred in part and dissented in part, with Justice Geoffrey Slaughter and Justice Christopher Goff concurred with separate opinions.
In Molter’s dissent, the justice stated that while he agrees that the City of Carmel cannot ask Duke to pay to move the lines because it would cost customers across the state, he disagreed with invalidating Carmel’s ordinances “on their face,” saying the opinion suggested that going forward, the city can never enforce any part of the two ordinances in question.
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