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This opinion was issued on March 2 after The Indiana Lawyer’s deadline. 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Incorporated v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I.
No. 22-1082

Civil. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division, Judge Tanya Walton Pratt. Circuit Judge Sykes writes that the court affirms the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Church Mutual Insurance Company in this insurance dispute over replacement-cost benefits following a fire at the Lighthouse Tabernacle Church. Holds that Lighthouse Tabernacle waived its argument that it was relieved of its contractual obligation to repair or replace the damaged property as a condition to receiving additional replacement-cost payments by failing to raise that argument in response to the summary-judgment motion, and that forfeited arguments in civil cases rarely warrant plain-error review absent extraordinary circumstances. Concludes that because the church chose which arguments to present and did not raise its new legal theory on appeal in a timely manner — which was based on state appellate precedent — it cannot now obtain relief under civil plain-error doctrine, and that the judgment for Church Mutual must be affirmed. Brennan, C.J., and Hamilton, J., concur. Appellant’s attorney: Jason M. Smith. Appellee’s attorneys: Todd D. Small, John B. Drummy.

This content was created with the assistance of artificial intelligence and has been reviewed by an editor for accuracy.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Renaissance Associates I L.P., Jonathan Petersen, and Austin Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Hammond, Indiana
No. 24A-PL-2312

Civil. Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, Judge Calvin D. Hawkins. Affirms the trial court’s denial of the landlords’ motion for summary judgment and grant of the City of Hammond’s cross-motion for summary judgment in an action seeking refunds of 2015 rental registration fees paid before legislative amendments disqualified Hammond from a statutory fee exemption. Senior Judge Robb writes that although the legislature amended Indiana Code section 36-1-20-1.2 in 2015 — with a retroactive effective date of Jan. 1, 2015 — to redefine “rental registration or inspection program” in a manner that removed Hammond from the fee exemption, the amendment did not create a refund obligation for fees lawfully collected before enactment. Holds the definitional amendment was not remedial and does not operate retroactively to require repayment, emphasizing the statute contains no express refund mechanism and that fees were required to be maintained in a dedicated fund for program costs. Further holds that under Armour v. City of Indianapolis, there is a rational basis for treating landlords who paid without protest differently from those who withheld payment or protested, noting administrative burdens and funding concerns associated with issuing refunds. Concludes Hammond did not commit a tort by collecting the fees under then-existing law and that absent explicit statutory language mandating refunds, the city is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. May, J., and Brown, J., concur. Appellants’ attorneys: David W. Stone IV; Jonathan D. Petersen. Appellee’s attorneys: Bryan H. Babb; Bradley M. Dick.

This content was created with the assistance of artificial intelligence and has been reviewed by an editor for accuracy.