Indiana Court of Appeals
Clifton Ervin v. State of Indiana
29A05-1109-CR-454
Criminal. Affirms grant of a portion of Ervin’s motion to suppress. The trial court properly determined that the evidence seized by the uniformed on-duty police officers should not be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Remands for trial.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Jason Tye Myers v. Charles R. Deets III, Deets & Kennedy, and Great American Insurance Group
79A02-1108-CT-771
Civil tort. Affirms summary judgment for Edward Kennedy and the law firm on Myers’ claim for fraud against them and Deets. Myers couldn’t show that either Kennedy or the law firm was liable for Deets’ alleged fraudulent conduct. Reverses grant of Great American Insurance Group’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and remands for further proceedings. Judge Riley concurs in part and dissents in part.
Indiana Court of Appeals
E. Paul Haste v. State of Indiana
03A01-1108-CR-369
Criminal. Dismisses Haste’s appeal of his conviction of and sentence for Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine because the order from which he appeals isn’t a final judgment.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Finance Center Federal Credit Union v. Ronnie D. Brand, Debora J. Brand and GMAC Mortgage, LLC
49A02-1111-MF-1089
Mortgage foreclosure. Affirms partial summary judgment in favor of GMAC regarding the priority of the GMAC Mortgage and Finance Center Federal Credit Union mortgages. Equity should not allow the Finance Center to gain an unexpectedly elevated priority because of any negligence of GMAC that did not harm Finance Center.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Gabriel J. Sharkey v. State of Indiana
84A04-1110-CR-550
Criminal. Affirms sentence following guilty plea to Class D felony intimidation. Sharkey’s 18-month suspended sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the crime and his character.
Indiana Court of Appeals
In the Matter of V.H.; J.H. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services
49A02-1110-JC-947
Juvenile. Reverses juvenile court’s grant of CHINS petition and vacates the court’s participation order, holding that the CHINS adjudication and participation decree were erroneous.
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Kristi J. Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust Company
United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge Sarah Evans Barker.
11-1631
Civil. Affirms District court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Salin Bank & Trust Company, holding the bank did not violate Cortezano’s rights by firing her due to her husband’s immigration status. Remands to the District Court to strike from the record the names of Cortezano’s three children, as the District Court had not previously ruled on that motion.
Indiana Court of Appeals
In Re the Adoption of S.J., R.W. v. G.C. and J.C.
04A03-1110-AD-449
Adoption. Dismisses appeal from R.W., the biological father of S.J., holding than an order that states his consent is not required for the petition to proceed neither grants nor denies S.J.’s adoption and is not a final, appealable action.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Heriberto Suarez v. State of Indiana
02A05-1106-PC-325
Post conviction. Affirms denial of petition for post-conviction relief. The court did not err in denying his claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Robert A. Turner v. State of Indiana (NFP)
62A01-1111-CR-514
Criminal. Affirms imposition of public defender fee.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Dana L. Lewis, Jr. v. State of Indiana
40A01-1106-CR-276
Criminal. Reverses denial of Lewis’ motion to suppress statements he made during a police interview regarding an alleged sex crime. Lewis’ question, “Can I get a lawyer?” constituted an unequivocal invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
BMD Contractors Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland
11-1345
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge Tanya Walton Pratt.
Civil. Affirms summary judgment for Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. The Industrial Power/BMD Contractors subcontract expressly provides that Industrial Power’s receipt of payment is a condition precedent to its obligation to pay BMD. Because Industrial Power was never obligated to pay BMD in the first place, BMD may not recover against Fidelity on the payment bond. Also holds that pay-if-paid clauses are not void under Indiana public policy.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Allison Riggle v. State of Indiana
49A05-1109-CR-472
Criminal. Reverses conviction of Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The traffic stop was invalid because Riggle did not commit a traffic violation. Remands with instructions to vacate her conviction.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Ashanti Clemons v. State of Indiana
49A02-1108-PC-737
Post conviction. Affirms denial of amended petition for post-conviction relief. Clemons was not denied effective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Luis Ramos v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A04-1103-CR-138
Criminal. Affirms sentences for felony murder and Class A misdemeanor possession of a handgun without a license, but remands for correction of sentence, holding sentences were to be served consecutively, not concurrently.
Indiana Court of Appeals
M.O. v. Indiana Dept. of Insurance, Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund
53A05-1112-PL-682
Civil plenary. Affirms conclusion that Indiana Code 24-4.6-1-101 (1993), with its 8 percent interest rate, applies to payments to M.O, a successful malpractice claimant, and that interest began to accrue on the 15th day of the month following the end of the claim period in which the claim was filed with the Patient’s Compensation Fund.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Andrew C. Kesling, individually and as Trustee of the Andrew C. Kesling Trust v. Peter C. Kesling, et al.
45A03-1106-PL-271
Civil plenary. Reverses judgment in favor of father Peter Kesling that found he was entitled to rescission of stock purchase agreements entered into on June 25, 2004. Finds that Andrew Kesling’s trust declaration did not deprive him status as a shareholder and that he was a shareholder when he entered into the purchase agreements with Peter Kesling. Remands for the court to rule on the claims raised by Andrew Kesling’s siblings.
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Choice Management Services Inc. et al.; SonCo Holdings LLC v. Joseph D. Bradley, receiver, and ALCO Oil & Gas Co. LLC
11-1702
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, Judge Robert L. Miller Jr.
Civil. Affirms order insofar as it determines that SonCo willfully violated the agreed order, but vacates the $600,000 sanction and remands. On remand, the judge can: reimpose the sanction he imposed, upon demonstrating that it is a compensatory remedy for a civil contempt after all; impose a different or perhaps no sanction, whether for civil contempt or for misconduct not characterized as contempt; or proceeding under the rules governing criminal contempts.
Indiana Court of Appeals
D.A. v. State of Indiana
49A02-1108-JV-692
Juvenile. Affirms juvenile court’s decision to order inpatient treatment for D.A. who entered into a plea agreement admitting to Class B misdemeanor battery if committed by an adult and “conditionally” agreed to admit to Class C felony child molesting, if committed by an adult. D.A.’s placement is consistent with the goals for his rehabilitation. The appellate judges do not have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether the trial court erred in accepting his conditional plea to the child molesting charge because there was no evidence of D.A.’s intent with regard to the molesting. The conditional plea is the equivalent to a withheld judgment so there is no final judgment or appealable final order from which to appeal.
Indiana Court of Appeals
In the Matter of V.C., Child Alleged to be in Need of Services v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services
79A02-1112-JC-1172
Juvenile. Affirms determination that V.C. is a child in need of services. The juvenile court did not erroneously deny father’s request to issue a subpoena to the maternal aunt. Father also failed to demonstrate good cause for granting his request for a continuance, so the juvenile court acted within its discretion in denying his request.